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PREVENTING RADICALIZATION: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

December 2015

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Study by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)

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CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CIPD: *Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance* [Interministerial committee for the prevention of delinquency]

CNAPR: *Centre national d'assistance et de prévention de la radicalisation* [National centre for radicalization prevention and support]

CONTEST: Counter-Terrorism Strategy

COPPRA: Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation

CPOST: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

CPTED: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

CTITF: Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

DAECH: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

DCLG: Department for Communities and Local Government

ECEGVR: European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation

EDL: English Defence League

ETA: *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* [Basque Country and freedom organization]

EUROPOL: European Police Office

FINTRAC: Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada

RRG: Religious Rehabilitation Group

ICCT: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism

ICPC: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime

ICSR: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation

INHESJ: *Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice* [National institute for advanced studies in security and justice]

JI: *Jemaah Islamiyah.* An Indonesian Islamist organization affiliated with al-Qaeda.

MCU: Muslim Contact Unit

NGO: Non-governmental organization

NYPD: New York City Police Department

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PEGIDA: *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* [European patriots against Islamisation of the West]

PET: *Politiets Efterretningstjeneste* [Danish police intelligence service]

SIPI: *Stichting Interculturele Participatie en Integratie* [Foundation for intercultural participation and integration]

START: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

STREET: Strategy to Reach, Empower, and Educate Teenagers

UCLAT: *Unité de coordination de la lutte antiterroriste* [Anti-terrorism coordination unit]

UN: United Nations

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Preventing radicalization leading to violence – a topic notably absent from security discussions

Two divergent themes have emerged from discussions surrounding the tragedy of last November 13 in Paris: first, the highly understandable "declaration of war" by President Hollande, who called for heightened controls, and second, comments from security experts who understand the limitations of repression measures and surveillance. We can only hope that a middle ground emerges, leading to the realization that prevention efforts are the only way to stop a movement that is proving so trying to the forces of law and order. No response, preventive or repressive, can claim the ability to neutralize the security risk. However, security is not possible without the combined effort of both. And yet, we have neglected prevention efforts in favour of repression measures, thus compromising the basic right to privacy and undermining the effectiveness of the public safety apparatus. However, the evidence shows that prevention minimizes risk, thereby complementing the efforts of law enforcement while easing their burden and enhancing effectiveness. Above all, prevention builds a safer community, something we can all appreciate. And solutions do exist.

On October 21, 2015 at the City Hall in Paris, under the auspices of the Embassy of Canada and in the Ambassador's presence, the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) presented the preliminary findings of the first part of its study on the prevention of radicalization. The packed and high-level audience attested to the level of concern. The timing of this event, with the tragedy of November 13 barely three weeks away, highlights the need to strengthen prevention efforts in order to offset the limitations of control measures. The main themes of the ICPC study shed light on this issue.

ICPC senior analyst Pablo Madriaza and analyst Anne-Sophie Ponsot describe radicalization prevention as a combination of certain conventional security principles, like surveillance, with social policies concerning integration and cohesion. They state: [translation] "the social prevention of radicalization aims to limit the development of risk factors and strengthen factors that protect against such a process."

Their study identifies effective and strategic prevention projects, though few in number, operating in Europe, North America, Asia, and the Middle East (including Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates). These projects share the same definition of radicalization, target the same individuals and have the same response structure.

The targeted individuals are usually isolated youth in search of an identity, "politically frustrated" with a "cognitive openness" to radical discourse following a triggering event in their political, social

or personal environment. They consequently become more susceptible to "radicalization entrepreneurs," influential, radicalized individuals in search of followers.

The prevention structure centres on concentric units: the individual, to strengthen his or her resistance to radical discourse; the individual's relational environment, to counteract the sources of radicalization; the individual's community, to identify negative influences; and the societal environment, to foster harmonious integration.

The ICPC study provides concrete examples of responses at each level. In the United Kingdom, for example, the *Being British Being Muslim* programme works with young Muslims to promote religious diversity in harmony. In Norway, the EXIT program engages the parents of young people exhibiting extremist loyalties. The same programme operates in Norway, Sweden and Germany to motivate, provoke thought and stabilize individuals through moderate, positive discourse. The objective is to dissipate violence before acting out, something we would all support. Nothing about this response is complacent. It seeks to eliminate risk where it exists: in the mind of the radicalized individual.

Response measures also centre on deradicalization. The ICPC study describes prison intervention work in Denmark, Singapore, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia where prisoners engage in theological discussions with imams to deconstruct extremist ideology. The United States and the United Arab Emirates are jointly following in the same direction. Under the *Sawab* project, both countries have joined forces to counter radical Internet propaganda by encouraging online debate and opening a tolerant, constructive dialogue.

The ICPC study involves three key components that assist in preventing radicalization: pluralist and harmonious social integration, greater emphasis on more refined, non-combative debate, and diversified discourse that is truly inclusive.

Faced with the obvious limitations of control measures, with their steep costs and offensive incursions on privacy, prevention must receive more attention. Safety cannot effectively or morally rely solely on surveillance, which undermines privacy, accumulates relevant and irrelevant information, and fails to address the heart of the problem. Prevention resources must be increased, community partnership strengthened and intervention policies broadened. The debate must therefore turn its attention to these areas, concretely and urgently.

This study represents a step in this direction.

Me Chantal Bernier, ICPC President

We tend to assume that radicalisation is something that occurs only on the other side, not noting that in responding to terrorism, the polarisation process in society – and between societies – often radicalises both sides. Schmid, A. P. (2013). Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation: A conceptual discussion and literature review.

In the past decade, radicalization leading to violence has become a growing international concern, especially for developing countries. In particular, the phenomenon concerns young expatriates of Western countries and their involvement in national and international violence and terrorist activities. Most of these activities relate to religious beliefs and right-wing extremism. The attacks of September 11, 2001, played a fundamental role in this concern. Many authors agree that the post-9/11 period fostered research on terrorism, especially on a theoretical understanding of the radicalization process (Ducol, 2015). The attacks in Madrid and London, however, were more pointedly responsible for reorienting scientific research toward studying this process, especially with the rise of "homegrown terrorism" by radicalized individuals who were born and spent most of their lives in the West (Kundnani, 2012; Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). This topic also relates to other phenomena, including "lone wolves" and foreign fighters (Bakker, 2015). In the 1980-1999 period, scientific research on radicalization was mentioned in only 3% of publications in the field,[1] compared to 77% in the 2006-2010 period (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013).

Although terrorism and radicalization are complementary fields of study, and although both concepts are sometimes used interchangeably, they exhibit important differences. Different approaches were therefore used to compare them. According to Taspinar (2009), for example, the "terrorism" approach highlights "state actors, jihadist ideology, counter-intelligence, and coercive action," whereas the "radicalization" approach tries to explain the phenomena according to its root causes, focusing primarily on psychological, social and economic development. These two trends illustrate the shift [translation] "that occurs within the academic world from a paradigm centred on the "causes/roots" of violent clandestine militancy phenomena, to another paradigm centred on understanding these phenomena through the lens of the radicalization concept," (Ducol, 2015, p. 49). Two types of response emerge. The first is relatively safe, focused more specifically on preventing attacks and thus directly targeting violence. In relation to violence, the second response is more indirect: although it tries to reduce violence, it does so by addressing the underlying factors that socially or individually explain the development of radicalization. From a radicalization angle, studies are more amenable to a preventive approach than one anchored in terrorism. This shift is

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[1] Of a sample of 260 articles or scientific reports from "Combating Violent Extremism—Radicalization Literature Archive (CVE-LA)."

largely due to the above-mentioned rise in "homegrown terrorists" in Western countries, and the escalating concern over Western "foreign fighters," especially those in Syria. The friend/foe dichotomy is not as easy to apply as it was in the case of 9/11, when all of the attackers were foreigners. Research has therefore transitioned toward understanding factors that explain the radicalization process in Western countries, a field of study that has finally spread to the rest of countries affected by this problem.

Chart 1. Articles that use the term "radicalization" in thirty specialized journals

Source: Kundnani, 2012, p. 7

As in criminology, the "terrorism/radicalization" dichotomy mirrors the coercion/prevention polarity. In the same way that the idea of crime prevention began to take hold forty years ago, counter-radicalization is in its infancy, with all the problems potentially involved. Several arguments support increased initiatives and strategic responses centred on prevention rather than reaction. One of them also originates in the crime prevention field: unlike the coercive approach, prevention not only reduces the economic costs of attacks, but also the social costs associated with the targeted people and countries, and with individuals engaged in a radicalization process. However, the similarities end there. Currently, prevention of radicalization poses more problems than crime prevention did forty years ago, particularly due to the lack of a consolidated body of scientific literature and evidentiary data (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013) and the absence of a conceptual framework to guide the implementation of prevention strategies.

The recent attacks in Paris will undoubtedly fuel discussion on the topic, particularly in terms of its specific features and issues related to counter-terrorism.

To begin with, these events were not only the worst terrorist attack in France, but they also gave rise to certain conclusions and singularities compared to trends seen in the West over the past decade.

a) First of all, these attacks confirm the importance of addressing violent Western radicalization (most of the identified attackers were Europeans);

b) Secondly, they confirm the importance of Western "foreign fighters" and conflicts in Muslim countries in explaining the Western radicalization process;

c) Thirdly, if the hierarchical and direct links between *DAECH* and cells in France are confirmed,[2] this type of attack reflects a shift in trends toward the decentralization and empowerment of cells seen in the West following the September 11, 2001 attacks;[3]

d) Lastly, the unusual nature of the attacks resides in the fact that suicide attacks are a rare occurrence in the West (see Box 1).

Furthermore, the counter-terrorism measures introduced and reaction to the attacks also underscore the issues and challenges inherent in this type of problem. As discussed in the second part of this document concerning explanatory factors, the consequences of the attacks are four-fold:

a) They strike Western countries and people in general, causing death, injury, property damage and psychological effects*;*

b) They initiate measures that limit individual rights and freedoms (surveillance, state of emergency, etc.) and thus affect people's daily lives*;*

c) They expose citizens of the countries in question to retaliation by countries affected by the attacks, for example, Syrian civilian bombing victims; and lastly,

d) They also hit the community, in this case Muslim, by putting moderate, generally peace-loving and non-practising Muslims on the same footing as small, radicalized groups. The attacks generate a wave of discrimination and Islamophobia that compounds the stigmatization, isolation and sense of alienation of communities, while eroding ties and a sense of belonging to the host country, and by facilitating *jihadist* recruitment (Schmid, 2013). In this way, both the attacks and the counter-terrorism measures taken have paradoxical consequences and a high social cost.

The preventive approach described here aims precisely to counterbalance this point of view by addressing the factors underlying the phenomenon and thus avoiding the tremendously negative impact of actions and their reactions.

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[2] Although the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks, the specific nature of the connection involved remains to be determined.

[3] See note at bottom of page 6.

Specifically, this study's objectives are to promote a preventive approach within response strategies and projects related to radicalization leading to violence, and to gather information on conceptualization, trends, research and prevention tools (legislative and practical), particularly in relation to the social prevention of this problem. Achieving this second objective will generate useful tools for implementing best practices in intervention within different levels of governance.

This study was performed in two phases: it began with a systematic review of specialized literature and continued with a field work phase during which we will be conducting interviews with key stakeholders in different countries, especially Western countries, at different intervention levels: national and international strategy, municipal and the local-community level.[4]

Phase 1	Phase 2
Systematic Review	Interviews and Analysis

This report follows the first phase of the study. The first phase consisted of reviewing and analyzing scientific literature and grey literature, national and international standards and legislation and relevant promising programmes or practices worldwide. It also provided a basis for selecting the key countries, and players in each country, included in the specific study performed in the second phase of our research.

To achieve the first objective, we conducted two systematic reviews of the literature on radicalization leading to violence using a series of keywords.

  a) The first review focused on literature that contextualized the phenomenon exclusively in Western countries, i.e., trends, radicalization and recruitment contexts, decisive factors in the process, and explanatory models and radicalization trajectories.
  b) The second review directly addressed strategies, programmes and projects for preventing radicalization leading to violence. In this case, given the limited number of studies on this specific topic, we included studies without geographic limitations.

For the purposes of this research, we selected 483 documents.

Although scientific studies form the core of this review, we also considered literature on discussions surrounding the topic, given the limited number of scientific articles based on evidentiary data or primary sources of information and the sometimes inadequate quality of these data (see Box 4).[5] In both reviews, we limited our research to the period from January 1, 2005, to June 1, 2015, and to articles written in French or English. In some cases, however, when an article was obviously important in giving us a better understanding of some aspect or other of the phenomenon, we

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[4] See description of the methodology used in Appendix 1, Methodology, page 133.
[5] In other words, scientific literature that discusses the topic but does not use scientific data or primary data sources: surveys of the literature, theoretical or conceptual articles, etc.

used specific sources dated before or after our study period. Certain work by Sageman and Wiktorowicz in 2004 fell into this category. As well, although most relevant studies focussed on *jihadist* radicalism, our research also addressed religious radicalism, particularly the Islamist variety, and far-right radicalism, both essentially in the context of Western countries.

For the purposes of this study, we adopted the following working definition of "radicalization leading to violence": [translation] *"the process whereby an individual or group adopts a violent form of action, directly related to a politically, socially or religiously motivated extremist ideology that challenges the established political, social or cultural order"* (Khosrokhavar, 2014, pp. 8–9). Although this definition guided our research, it was merely a working definition; a systematic review requires the inclusion of numerous viewpoints and specific definitions used by the different researchers. However, this definition was adequate for several reasons. First of all, it is broad enough to cover various kinds of radicalization. Secondly, it positions radicalization as a process and thus a phenomenon that changes and transitions through several steps. This definition also shares certain similarities with social movement theory. In our minds this is relevant since a significant portion of the literature reviewed uses this type of model as a basis for explaining the radicalization process. Furthermore, radicalization includes a significant political component. This study endeavours to avoid naturalizing the radicalization phenomenon, and to understand it instead from a relational viewpoint. This means that no radical group exists in isolation, and it is therefore permeable to the influence of the context, in particular the context of the State or a rival group (Mathieu, 2010). Therefore, radicalization cannot be understood or defined without referring to this same context. This relational viewpoint was developed under political process theory, which explains how the actions of dissenting groups and their opponents (often the State) change according to the opponents' characteristics and the context (Tarrow & Tilly, 2008). Accordingly, a radicalized group does not act against the government of a Western democratic nation in the same way it would against an authoritarian state, like Saudi Arabia or Syria (see Box 5).

This report is divided into four parts. The first part shows worldwide trends in radicalization; the second provides an overview of factors and models that explain radicalization and recruitment contexts; the third focuses on various models for responding to and preventing radicalization, and the fourth concludes this report and offers several recommendations.

This section provides an overview of violent trends resulting from radicalization rather than the radicalization phenomenon itself, given the lack of relevant data and the difficulties inherent in measuring such a process. It therefore sketches a general picture of terrorism across the world, especially in the West. An overview of global suicide attacks, foreign terrorist fighters and radical right trends is also presented.

2.1 Terrorism around the world

Illustration 1. Global impact of terrorism[6]

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014, p. 8

The US State Department's "Country Reports on Terrorism 2014," published in 2015, as well as the report by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), provide details of terrorist activities across the world (E. Miller, 2015; US State Department, 2015). In 2014, between 13,000 and 16,800 terrorist attacks took place worldwide. These attacks were responsible for an estimated 32,000 to 43,500 deaths and 34,000 to 40,900 injuries, for an increase of approximately 80% in the number of deaths since 2013 (E. Miller, 2015; US State Department, 2015). The US State Department report mentions that these terrorist attacks took place in 95 different countries, with 60% in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Nigeria. Most of the deaths related to terrorist attacks (78%) took place in Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria (US

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[6] In terms of deaths, injuries, property damage and psychological impact.

State Department, 2015). More specifically, the conflicts raging in these regions and the violent nature of terrorist attacks explain this increase. In fact, the report identifies no fewer than 20 attacks involving 100 victims around the world in 2014, compared to two in 2013 (E. Miller, 2015; US State Department, 2015).

2.1.1   Terrorism in the West

In 2014, no fewer than 201 terrorist attacks (successful, aborted or failed) took place in Europe, according to the Europal report entitled, "*European Union terrorism situation and trend report 2015*" (European Police Office, 2015). These attacks were perpetrated in seven European Union member nations, with more than half in the United Kingdom, and resulted in four deaths and 774 arrests on terrorism charges (European Police Office, 2015). Europol notes that separatist groups, followed by anarchist and extreme left-wing groups were responsible for the vast majority of these attacks. France alone reported no fewer than 50 separatist incidents in Corsica. In 2014, two of the 201 attacks identified were thought to be religiously motivated, including the attack in Brussels, Belgium, against the Jewish Museum (European Police Office, 2015).

In 2014 the number of terrorist attacks dropped in most countries. The number of arrests, however, did not: 774 in 2014 compared to 535 in 2013 (European Police Office, 2015). Most arrests related to religious terrorism, i.e., 395 cases, for an increase of 179 cases compared to 2013. Arrests in connection with political extremism also increased, from three far-right cases in 2013 to 34 in 2014. For far-eft cases, the figure climbed from 49 in 2013 to 54 in 2014 (European Police Office, 2015).

In North America, the terrorist threat remains as present as ever and bears certain similarities to the European Union. In Canada, for example, the incidents of October 2014 against Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent and Corporal Nathan Cirillo put the issue of radicalization leading to violence back on the country's agenda. The most recent data indicate some 93 Canadian men and women tried to leave the country to join the Islamic State or al-Qaeda and affiliated groups (Lang & Mitchell, 2015). A Senate report on the issue also states that some 80 Canadians returned to the country after spending time abroad with terrorist groups (Lang & Mitchell, 2015). Between 2009 and 2014, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) reports that there were some 683 transactions in Canada "related to terrorist financing" (Lang & Mitchell, 2015). While recent attention has focused on religious extremism and radicalization, extremist political groups dominate the statistics, as they do in the European Union. In fact, according to the Director of the *Service des enquêtes sur la menace extrémiste de la Sûreté du Québec*, the extremist threat investigative service of the Quebec provincial police force, right-wing extremist activities are the most prevalent in Quebec: [translation] "Most cases opened by the service concern right-wing extremism and hate crimes, which account for over 25 percent of cases. Next in line are Islamist radicalization cases, which represent a little under 25 [per cent] [sic]," (Lang & Mitchell, 2015, p. 2).

Box 1. Global suicide attacks[7]

Table 2. Number of suicide attacks worldwide by year

Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, 2015, p. foreign fighters.

The University of Chicago's Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) developed the "Suicide Attack Database," which documents all suicide attacks committed around the world since 1982. According to this database, from 1982 to June 2015, a total of 4,620 attacks took place in 40 different countries, causing over 45,500 deaths and 118,000 injuries. In 2014, some 545 suicide attacks caused a total of more than 4,600 deaths and 8,600 injuries. In June 2015 alone, 305 suicide attacks killed 2,503 victims and injured 4,920 (Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, 2015).

Suicide attacks in the West

In the West, 101 attacks have been committed since 1982, resulting in a total of 3,820 deaths and 9,718 injuries. The September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States largely account for the high number of victims. In 2014, two suicide attacks were inventoried, one in the Ukraine by Russian separatists and one in Russia by Chechen separatists, for a total of nine dead and 12 injured. Up until June 2015, only one attack had been committed, in the Ukraine, by Russian separatists, leaving one dead and five injured (Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, 2015).

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[7] Suicide attacks are defined as attacks in which the attackers kill themselves at the same time that they deliberately try to kill others. This database is limited to suicide attacks committed by non-governmental parties (Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, 2015, p. unnumbered).

Chart 3. Number of suicide attacks in the West by year (1982–2015)

Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, 2015, p. n/p

Chart 4. Number of suicide attacks by country (1982–2015)[8]

Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, 2015, p. n/p

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[8] The database contains no data for France. Web site revised in September 2015.

2.2 Foreign terrorist fighters

Foreign terrorist fighters represent a major trend in radicalization leading to violence. This section attests to the scope of the phenomenon and its importance throughout the world, specifically in the West. These concerns are evident in actions that try to prevent these individuals from leaving to fight abroad and efforts to manage their return.

The age of persons on the path to violent extremism is surprisingly young. According to the United Nations, the average age of foreign fighters is somewhere between 15 and 35 years (United Nations Security Council, 2015b). Other sources reveal that the average age of Europeans who left to fight was between 18 and 29 years (Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014). Furthermore, "[t]he journey from initial interest to radicalization, to commitment, to action and, ultimately, to joining a foreign terrorist group has rapidly accelerated" (United Nations Security Council, 2015b, p. 5).

Box 2. Definition of foreign fighters

In its Resolution 2178 on threats to international peace and security resulting from acts of terrorism, the United Nations Security Council defined foreign fighters as, "nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training." (United Nations Security Council, 2014, pp. 4–5).

2.2.1 Statistics

It is virtually impossible to accurately determine the number of foreign fighters in the world. However, several sources indicate that the figure may have exceeded 25,000 fighters in 2015 from over 100 States, fighting primarily for the Islamic State and al-Qaeda (and its affiliated groups) in Syria, Iraq and Africa (Bakowski & Puccio, 2015; Neumann, 2015; United Nations Security Council, 2015a, 2015c). According to the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee, the ranks of foreign fighters swelled by 71% across the world starting midway through 2014 until March 2015. These statistics were available, among other reasons, due to "more comprehensive internal reporting by Member States and greater open-source data," (United Nations Security Council, 2015a, p. 8). The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) even states that the current conflict raging in Syria and Iraq surpasses the 1980s conflict in Afghanistan in terms of the number of foreign fighters deployed (Neumann, 2015).

The ICSR estimates that the number of foreign fighters in Syria in 2013 reached approximately 11,000 individuals from 74 different countries. Of that number, approximately 2,800 were Westerners. Based on ICSR estimates, the number of fighters in 2014 amounted to approximately 4,000, primarily from Western Europe. The European Union estimates that in January 2015, the

numbers dropped somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters (Bakowski & Puccio, 2015; Neumann, 2015).

In terms of the number of fighters, the European Union countries most affected are France (1,200 fighters), the United Kingdom (between 500 and 600) and Germany (between 500 and 600), followed by Belgium (440) (Neumann, 2015). Elsewhere in the Western world, Australia, for example, has some 100 to 250 foreign fighters, Canada close to 150 (Lang & Mitchell, 2015), the United States roughly 100, and Russia some 800 to 1,500 (Neumann, 2015). Expressed as a percentage of population, the ICSR has identified Belgium as the European Union nation most affected, with 40 fighters per million residents, followed by Denmark, with 27 fighters per million residents and Sweden, with 19 fighters per million residents (Neumann, 2015).

2.2.2 Geography

As the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee mentions, most foreign fighters are based in Syria and Iraq, followed by Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and Pakistan (United Nations Security Council, 2015a). Apart from the problems facing the fighters' countries of origin and destination, the "countries of transit are also at high risk and face a major burden" (United Nations Security Council, 2015a, p. 12). Take Turkey, for example, which shares over 1,000 kilometres of border with Syria and Iraq, or countries like Austria, Hungary, Romania and Serbia, which have become a thoroughfare for foreign fighters (European Police Office, 2015).

2.2.3 Returning

It is difficult to determine the exact number of foreign fighters who return home after training or participating somehow in a conflict. However, the ICSR estimates that approximately 5% to 10% of fighters die on the battlefield, while currently 10% to 30% have left conflict zones to return home, or to a country of transit (Neumann, 2015).

The return of these fighters to their country of origin or another country can cause various problems: "terrorist attacks and ancillary activities, such as radicalizing others, recruiting, generating social media content, raising funds and providing training, logistical support or courier services" (United Nations Security Council, 2015a, p. 9). According to the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee, the threat is quite real. However, based on the same foreign fighter experience during the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, less than 15% of veteran foreign terrorists subsequently took part in terrorist activities (United Nations Security Council, 2015a).

2.2.4 Women in conflict zones

Like many other statistics surrounding this issue, the exact number of women among the ranks of the *jihadists* is difficult to determine. However, estimates from various sources allow us to measure the scope of this relatively new phenomenon. Bakker and de Leede of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague (Netherlands) estimate that approximately 10% of the

Western foreign fighters in Islamic State-occupied territories are women. These women also represent 18% of European expatriates (2015; Briggs Obe & Silverman, 2014).

2.3   The far right

In terms of far-right trends, the 2014 and 2015 Europol reports underscore that far-right extremist groups in Europe do not appear to use terrorist methods. However, they are nonetheless active (European Police Office, 2014, 2015). Glaser (2006), however, reports that the number of acts of violence motivated by xenophobia in central and western Europe has increased significantly, especially among youth. A degree of consensus has emerged indicating that this increase started in the 1990s in several countries on the continent (Rieker, Schuster, & Glaser, 2006). The rebirth of nationalistic, populist and extreme right-wing ideologies following the fall of the Soviet Union in the formerly communist countries of central Europe is especially significant (Glaser, 2006). The United Kingdom also noted in 2014 that the threat from far-right extremist groups had changed. Now, these groups appear more highly organized and more active (European Police Office, 2015).

As David Art recalls in his article, "Why 2013 Is Not 1933: The Radical Right in Europe," extremists attract a very small percentage of the population. Concerning the far right in Europe, he writes: "In most European countries, unfiltered racism and fascist nostalgia are hardly vote-winners. To be attractive to that sizable percentage of the electorate for which immigration is a chief concern, radical right parties need to present themselves as representing the common-sense views of the 'silent majority' rather than those of the fanatical fringe." (2013, p. 89).

<div align="center">

Box 3. Types of far-right extremism

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Berlet and Vysotsky (2006) have identified three types of far-right extremism in the United States:

a)   *Radical right-wing political movements* are essentially authoritarian; their leadership, hierarchy and order are considered natural forms of organization for the group and for society. They use this authoritarianism to create restrictive and exclusive definitions of nationhood, race and citizenship in the aim of achieving an ideal social homogeneity. Their main purpose is to build an organization for confronting a racial conflict or politically overthrowing the State. This type of movement functions like a fringe political party.

b)   *Religious movements* include any organization whose main ideology consists of a system of spiritual beliefs and whose members follow the religion in question. Such movements are often based on an apocalyptic, dualistic idea of a "holy war" between true believers and the godless enemy.

c)   *Cultural movements* are composed of a series of groups, unconnected by any common ideology, associated with the youth counter-culture (skinheads, for example) and they often develop around a group identity forged through the active display of neo-Nazi or white

supremacist symbols. Informal gatherings at places like rock concerts or bars are used for propaganda and recruitment purposes.

2.3.1 Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia

On the European continent, Europol has noticed that most activities by radical right groups relate to anti-Semitism and Islamophobia (European Police Office, 2014, 2015). These xenophobic demonstrations are timed to coincide with international incidents, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, migrant crises or conflicts in the Middle East. Europol has identified several incidents that conform to this trend: anti-Islamic demonstrations in Germany, various acts of vandalism against synagogues in France, the PEGIDA movement and more (European Police Office, 2014, 2015).

2.3.2 The radical right in the United States

Despite recent violent events in the United States attributed to Muslim-type radicalism (knife attack in Boston and attacks in Texas and Kansas), "the main terrorist threat in the United States is not from violent Muslim extremists, but from right-wing extremists," (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2013a; Kurzman & Schanzer, 2015, p. n/p). In the case of "lone wolves," Chermak, Freilich and Simone found that, "far leftists and jihadists were less likely to be considered solely a lone wolf threat compared to far-right extremists and single-issue extremists" (2010, p. 1030). Various researchers also report that most violent, lone-wolf attacks are committed by right-wing extremists (Bates, 2012; Michael, 2012).

Relevant statistics support this trend. Depending on the sources and definitions given to "political" violence, incidents attributed to the extreme right in the United States are more numerous than those blamed on Islamist extremism. Between 1990 and 2010, 140 homicides driven by right-wing ideology were identified,[9] compared to 30 attributed to Islamist extremism during the same period (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2013b). As the following chart shows, incidents attributed to the far right since September 11, 2001, involved 48 victims, compared to 31 for incidents committed by *jihadists* (International Security, 2015). Other statistics, including some from the Global Terrorism Database, show that 65 attacks in the United States since 9/11 have been attributed to the radical right, and 24 to Muslim extremists (Shane, 2015).

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[9] In 2013, this figure increased to 155 homicides and, if we consider the Oklahoma attack, the figure rises to 358 homicides (Freilich, Chermak, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014).

Chart 5. Deaths in the United States by year and by extremist group

Source: Based on International Security, 2015.

2.3.3   Women and the radical right

Although radical right groups usually support a male-oriented culture that excludes women, recent observations note an increase in women's participation in these groups, especially in the United States (Blee & Creasap, 2010; Blee, 2005). Some women join these groups when their companions are threatened by economic crisis or when they feel personally threatened or victimized by the actions of foreigners or culturally different individuals. However, the role they play within these organizations remains conditioned by traditional gender roles. Men, for example, see the women in these groups to be motivated by maternal duty and emotion, rather than an ideological commitment. Another study of skinheads reported that men viewed women as accessories in the white supremacy cause (Blee & Creasap, 2010).

For example, Blee (2005) explains that some white supremacist groups use women for their central role in the family, because they are less likely to become police informers and their involvement can make the organization's image seem more benign. However, their role in terrorist acts is often secondary and serves three purposes: to gain legitimacy (by giving the group a semblance of normality), to promote group unity (by creating loyalties among groups) and to support imprisoned group leaders (Blee, 2005).

III. EXPLAINING RADICALIZATION: FACTORS, CONTEXTS AND TRAJECTORIES

Although radicalization is a recent field of study, the growing number of scientific articles published in the past decade has nurtured a series of explanations of increasing diversity and complexity. Each field or discipline, especially in the social sciences, seems to have developed its own explanation for the phenomenon. Studies based on social movement and political science theory, as well as social psychology and sociology, have widely influenced this field of study. Criminological and neuroscientific theories are just beginning to emerge. Despite it all, these theories have two common features: most of them lack scientific data or use extremely limited methods (see Box 4, Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). This results from the very nature of the study, i.e., the very limited number and very wide variety of cases, as mentioned earlier. Radical profiles are the most relevant example: there is no consensus on traits shared by people who engage in a radicalization process (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014; Sageman, 2007; Zammit, 2010). Apart from gender and age (most radicals are young men), education, and financial and social resources, motives and loyalties differ from group to group, if not from one individual to another (Gill et al., 2014; Zammit, 2010). Sageman underscores the fact that radicalized persons have a high level of education and a middle-class background. Most are married and show no predisposition to criminal behaviour (Sageman, 2004, 2007, 2008). In contrast, a study by Bakker (2006) concerning the European situation underscores that the vast majority of radicalized individuals are single, often working-class men and many have criminal records. Accordingly, there is more than one pathway to radicalization, and as McCauley and Moskalenko comment: "Rather there are many different paths. How many can be estimated by calculating how many different combinations can be made of the mechanisms already identified" (2010, p. 88). Although these studies try to establish explanatory models, most are exploratory, not explanatory (Skillicorn, Leuprecht, & Winn, 2012). To summarize, the radicalization field of study is too limited to generate a consensus or certainties. The Sageman-Hoffman controversy concerning the autonomy of radical groups in relation to the centralizing influence of al-Qaeda is a good example of the uncertainties that continue to surround the global radicalization process (Sageman & Hoffman, 2008a, 2008b).[10]

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[10] Sageman states that al-Qaeda's influence has declined significantly in the past few years and that Western extremist groups are increasingly independent, self-trained and self-activated, with no specific ties to other groups or to al-Qaeda. Hoffmann, on the other hand, insists that al-Qaeda continues to have a major influence within these groups in the West.

Box 4. Radicalization research methods

A recent study by Neumann & Kleinmann (2013) assessed the quality of radicalization research: 34% of the studies inventoried lacked either methodological rigor (concerning procedure) or scientific rigor (concerning the type of data); 74% used qualitative methodologies, mostly case studies and narrative techniques, while 20% used a quantitative method. Among the qualitative studies, only 26% demonstrated a high level of methodological rigor, while 94% of quantitative studies were rigorous. Most studies belonged to the fields of sociology (36%) and political science (23%), and only 7% to psychology.

In the course of our research, and concerning the methodology used, most studies inventoried focus on describing radical individuals based on conversations[11] or the quantification of secondary data taken from official and unofficial sources,[12] the latter being the most frequent approach. However, one problem inherent in this type of study is the lack of a reference group for making comparisons against radicalized persons. This makes it difficult to determine whether the features described are specific to this one group, or whether they reflect a normal population distribution (Skillicorn et al., 2012). This is a major problem for developing profiles. Other studies have tried to overcome this deficiency by including comparison groups. Examples include the Kreuger (2008) study in the United States and the work of Altunbas & Thornton (2011) in the United Kingdom, who compared a sample of the Muslim population to radicalized populations.

Another type of study concerns radicalization perceptions, attitudes and predispositions in a target population. These studies are interesting from a prevention viewpoint, when it comes to detecting the underlying factors in a segment of the population considered at risk, and are therefore more relevant for developing primary and secondary prevention programmes. Qualitative[13] and quantitative methods are available.[14] These methods have the advantage of using samples larger than those of the above-mentioned descriptive studies of radicals. However, improved sampling strategies are needed to make them more representative of the study population; furthermore, the cognitive models on which these studies are based can be used to explain the predisposition to radical ideas, but not the commission of a terrorist act. Nevertheless, this type of study is definitely promising.

Case studies[15] were also one of the most widespread analytical methods in the literature. Such studies encompass several levels of analysis (individual, group or country) and most of them rely on secondary sources of information. Although case studies can explore a specific subject in great detail, they have obvious limitations, especially in terms of generalizing their results. One

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[11] See Abbas, 2012; Khosrokhavar, 2013, 2014; Sageman, 2004.
[12] See Bakker, 2006; Crone & Harrow, 2011; Gartenstein-Ross, 2014; Gill et al., 2014; Sageman, 2004, 2008; Zammit, 2010. Unofficial sources refer to information from the media, Google searches, Wikipedia, blogs, etc.
[13] See for example Beski-Chafiq et al., 2010; Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010.
[14] See for example Bhui et al., 2014; Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013; Skillicorn et al., 2012.
[15] See Costanza, 2012; de Mesquita, 2005; McCoy & Knight, 2015; M. D. Silber & Bhatt, 2007.

of the best examples in this regard is the study by Wiktorowicz (2004), one of the rare examples of a study based on a combination of field observations and interviews with a radical group.

Lastly, socio-historical models try to establish connections between certain characteristics, i.e., groups or countries and developments over the course of history in attacks or radicalization processes. This is a working model specific to the political process theory of social movements[16] (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tilly, 1978a, 1978b). One interesting example comes from Ashour (2007, 2008, 2009), who historically explains the process of deradicalization and disengagement by various armed Islamist groups by drawing connections between the traits of these groups and government action, for example, control or incentives.

The purpose of this section is to describe some of the different explanations for radicalization developed in the various studies reviewed, particularly factors and trajectories. In this case, the trajectories of radicalization are defined as linear causal models in which individuals or groups transition through different stages of radicalization. Naturally, radicalization trajectories are not the only explanatory model. However, given the attention they command in the literature, we decided to devote an entire section to a detailed description and critical analysis of them. Explanatory models as such are not limited to linear, causal relationships; otherwise, they would establish connections among factors at different levels, without using a single direction. Unfortunately, given their large number, these complex models will not be described in this phase of the study. Lastly, factors represent the simplest unit of explanation.[17] Although they will be incorporated into each of the models, including trajectories, we decided to inventory these units in order to underscore the various items used to explain radicalization.

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[16] See Box 5. Opportunities for radicalization.
[17] We applied the same rationale in presenting prevention measures, i.e., we focused on the typology of specific measures rather than complex programmes.

3.1 Explanatory factors in the radicalization process

The different factors that account for the radicalization process cannot be placed at the same level. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) identify three levels: the individual, group and mass levels. However, these three levels fail to encompass the different levels and different categories of factors gleaned from the literature; take, for example, societal factors or opportunities for radicalization (see Box 5). To construct a diagram, we therefore took guidance from the ecological model developed by Bronfenbrenner (2009), which underscores the complexity involved in the emergence of a phenomenon based on several levels of analysis.

Illustration 2: Diagram of factors

This diagram is not intended as an explanatory model, but simply as a way to present information gathered from the systematic review. Della Porta (1995) used a similar model to explain left-wing extremism in Italy and Germany, as did Hegghammer (2010) to account for the rise in *jihadism* in Saudi Arabia. No one factor alone can explain the radicalization process. On the contrary, a range of possible combinations of various factors is needed (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). The purpose of this section is to inventory the information gathered during the specified time period, even if this information is sometimes contradictory, as shown by the Sageman and Bakker studies cited earlier.[18] We will underscore the contradictions between studies in order to identify areas of consensus.

Individuals are the core of the model, surrounded by other factors that have some influence on radicalization. Unlike other more context-dependent factors, individual factors are also useful for describing the profiles of radicalized individuals. The relational level concerns factors pertaining to close relationships (family, friends, etc.). The meso-systemic level corresponds to factors of an institutional or community nature. Factors at the macro-systemic level relate to large social systems

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[18] See introduction to this section for explanations of radicalism.

(justice, education, etc.) and State action. We also included geopolitical factors in this level. Lastly, the exo-system refers to the culture and values surrounding other levels of understanding.

The opportunities concept is a factor that is starting to garner attention. Opportunities are context-based or circumstantial variables that hold the opportunity to become radicalized (see Box 5). Recruitment settings (Internet, prisons, etc.) are thought to offer opportunities for like-minded individuals to meet, providing a source of inspiration for radicalization (King & Taylor, 2011; Precht, 2007). McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) underscore the importance that intelligence agencies played in the transition from radical thinking to actually carrying out a suicide attack[19] by providing an opportunity for action. Intervention by Western nations in Muslim countries is also considered an opportunity for nurturing radicalization processes (Sirseloudi, 2012). Accordingly, opportunities exist at the different levels of our presentation diagram, except the individual level. We will therefore consider all of these factors (except individual factors) as being opportunities for radicalization, and we will begin with a description of recruitment opportunities, followed by the different levels of complexity.

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Box 5. Opportunities for radicalization

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Two relevant sources exist for studying opportunities: one comes from the field of criminology and the other from social movement theory. Situational prevention is one of the best known models in criminology. It is premised on the idea that criminals make rational choices after evaluating the opportunities available to them (Felson & Clarke, 1998). These opportunities relate to the nature of the offence, are place and time specific and depend on the routines of the likely victims and of the criminals (Felson & Clarke, 1998). This theory gave rise to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED),[20] which emphasizes the influence of environment in determining opportunities for crime (Shaw, 2010). Precht (2007) used this model to explain how recruitment contexts create opportunities for radicalization. Taylor also highlights how settings or situations, especially spatial, play a significant role in the process (King & Taylor, 2011; Taylor, Roach, & Pease, 2015). However, this model's creator, Clarke, is the one who tried to apply these ideas most directly, specifically to preventing attacks (Clarke & Newman, 2007).

The other source is political process theory, based in particular on the concept of political opportunity structure widely used to explain social protests (Della Porta, 2013; McAdam and al., 1996; Tilly, 1978a). This model explains how the socio-political context, especially the relationship between State and social movements, has an important impact on the rise and fall of social mobilization processes. Kriesi (1995), for example, defined political context according to three characteristics: the State's formal structure, informal procedures and the dominant strategies of political authorities in relation to opponents, as well as the configuration and distribution of power within the party system. Combined, the characteristics that encourage mobilization are considered a political opportunity structure. Research by Ashour (2008), cited in Box 4, is a good

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[19] Al-Balawi. Kwaiti double agent who killed seven CIA agents and one Jordanian agent in 2009 in a suicide attack (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014).
[20] Environmental-design based crime prevention.

example of state influence over deradicalization processes. The concept has also been used to explain the rise of Islamist radicalism in Saudi Arabia, and in Russia (Dannreuther, 2010; Hegghammer, 2010). In the latter case, for example, Dannreuther (2010) underscores that the success of radical Islamist groups results from their ability to adapt to the available political opportunity structure for collective action in general. This model has also been used to study the rise of Europe's radical right. Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou (2015) explain that the sharp rise in right-wing extremist groups in Europe during an economic crisis results from the ability of these groups to take advantage of political and cultural opportunities, particularly the rise of nationalism.

Despite the important role that opportunities can play in preventing radicalization, their exploration as an analytical tool remains largely overlooked in the literature. Research centred more on situations or contexts that encourage radicalization, rather than on the individuals themselves, would probably have a greater chance of success in limiting the effects of radicalization on populations at risk, without resorting to counter-terrorism measures, which entail problems at different levels, especially in relation to individual and civil rights.

3.1.1   Recruitment opportunities or channels

Jihadist networks and right-wing extremist groups share many similarities in terms of their propaganda methods and how they exploit fear and social frustrations (Amghar, 2006; Blee & Creasap, 2010; Khosrokhavar, 2014). Silber & Bhatt (2007) define radicalization contexts as "radicalization incubators." Prey to extremist rhetoric, these incubators become gathering places that make up a community's radical sub-culture. The authors in question mention various locations conducive to radicalization and ideology sharing, such as mosques, cafés, taxis, prisons, student associations, NGOs, bars, bookstores, the Internet (forums), and more.

Precht (2007) defines radicalization contexts as different locations conducive to meeting like-minded people and, at the same time, offering promising prospects to recruiters or agents seeking to radicalize individuals. He also identifies certain fertile grounds for radicalization: Internet, satellite stations, prisons, mosques, schools, universities, sports activities, etc. (Precht, 2007).

According to Bouhana and Wikstrom, the radicalization context is characterized by "socialising practices, notably moral teaching, which support terrorist violence; a lack of effective monitoring of the behaviours that go in the setting; and opportunities for attachments to radicalising agents, by the peers, recruiters, or moral authority figures" (2011, p. x).

Considering the radical players targeted for the purposes of this report (radical Islamists—including *jihadists*—and the radical right), we will focus on the Internet, prison and music (concerts and bars) as indoctrination sites.

a) Internet

The Internet is an important factor in the radicalization phenomenon, and extremist groups are constantly adapting their communication methods to the availability of new technologies (European Police Office, 2015). However, its role in the radicalization process is complex.

For one thing, we note some degree of consensus in the literature that the Internet is a tool and a facilitator in the radicalization process (Ducol, 2015; Pauwels et al., 2014; Precht, 2007). Although there have been some cases in which the Internet was the only tool used in radicalization (United Nations Security Council, 2015a), it does not generally seem sufficient to support the entire process (Ducol, 2015; King & Taylor, 2011; Precht, 2007).

The Internet also plays several roles or functions at different stages of the radicalization process. Extremist groups, especially terrorist groups, use the Internet as a channel of communication for distributing a large quantity of propaganda images and videos, and as a planning and recruitment tool (United Nations Security Council, 2015a). Social media are another important means of radicalization and fighter recruitment, particularly because they obliterate all social barriers among fighters in conflict zones and among potential recruits across the globe (United Nations Security Council, 2015a). As Precht (2007) also underscored, the Internet plays a role in every phase of radicalization, whether in distributing propaganda, in recruitment, or in later stages of the process, such as technical support in bomb-making. The Internet and social media in particular are also the fighters' main sources of information on events in the field during the current conflict in Syria and Iraq (Carter, Maher, & Neumann, 2014).

Lastly, the Internet offers many advantages to any extremist group. It ensures fast, easy and inexpensive communication amongst themselves and with the world (Pauwels et al., 2014; Precht, 2007). The Internet is an ideal platform for the broad distribution of propaganda and threats, and also allows for undisputed information sharing[21] (Precht, 2007). The following section examines the Internet's role in recruitment and propaganda in more detail.

Recruitment

Prior to the 1990s, Islamist radicalization occurred in mosques and so-called "sensitive" neighbourhoods, in contact with religious fundamentalists (Amghar, 2006). Government authorities grew aware of this phenomenon and began monitoring these places of worship more carefully (Erez, Weimann, & Weisburd, 2011). At that point, radicalization shifted direction into the realm of the Internet. Increasingly, *Jihadist* recruitment—at least its initial phases—is taking place online (Erez et al., 2011; Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, & Sheehan, 2012).

Right-wing radicals also use the Internet as a tool for spreading propaganda. There are many websites in Germany and the Netherlands, and a large number of them broadcast neo-Nazi ideology (Schellenberg, 2013). Whether on behalf of the extreme right or *jihadism*, the Internet

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[21] See, "Countering extremist discourse," page 93.

enables indoctrination from a distance and serves as an excellent filter for locating future members of radicalized organizations.

Far-right radical movements are less organized than the *jihadist* movements. The radical right is divided, acts more or less locally and does not seek internal unity (Art, 2013; Blee & Creasap, 2010; Campana & Tanner, 2014). However, group recruitment methods are similar. Individuals who visit radical Islamist/extreme right-wing sites must prove themselves before gaining acceptance (Campana & Tanner, 2014; Khosrokhavar, 2014; Melzer & Serafin, 2013).

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Box 6. The Internet and young Westerners who leave for Syria

The Internet is a polarized space that brings together people with elective affinities. With this description, Farhad Khosrokhavar (2014) introduces his analysis of Web-based *jihadist* recruitment. In his view, the key to Islamist radicalization is frustration coupled with victimization. While individuals immigrating from the Maghreb or Muslim Asia find it difficult to integrate into Western societies, young middle-class whites who leave for Syria seem to be seeking adventures that combine spiritual forces with a cause viewed as humanitarian. Khosrokhavar describes these young people as "romantic revolutionaries." Whether they come from a background of immigration vulnerability or greater white comfort, they are all in search of an identity. Islam is their answer, offering a life of minute-by-minute structure, summed up in the surah of the Quran found on the Internet—in turn chosen and disseminated by radicals (Amghar, 2006; Erez et al., 2011; Khosrokhavar, 2014; Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2012). Apart from this quest, these youth share a common longing for recognition and accomplishment in a fight against "ungodly Western imperialism" (Amghar, 2006; Khosrokhavar, 2014; Mitchell Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Vidino, 2010). Khosrokhavar explains: [translation] "The *jihadist* Internet provides an exorcist function and gives reassurance to fringe individuals with no social ties by incorporating them into a salvific community" (2014, p. 74). The propaganda of *jihadist* sites is effective with this type of public because it is intellectually open and permeable. We also know that "youth" are the most likely to become radicalized, especially in their teenage years. Youth are also the ones who use the Internet with greatest ease and the most often.

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Sophisticated propaganda

The Internet is the ideal site for radicalization: as a tool, it enables relatively secure and anonymous contact with *jihadist* or extreme right leaders and lets people gather information while maintaining a low profile. With geographic barriers no longer an issue, discussions are possible with radicals from around the globe (Blee & Creasap, 2010; Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2012).

Most people who use radical forums realize that they and their conversations are being monitored by intelligence services and, most of the time, these services are able to intercept messages intended to be private (Erez et al., 2011). However, this does not seem to prevent users from discussing their plans rather openly (Erez et al., 2011).

The emphasis is placed on "empowerment" and the egalitarian aspect of *jihadist* groups: everyone gets a chance, everyone can accomplish "great things" (Amghar, 2006; Erez et al., 2011; Hegghammer, 2006). The *jihadist* therefore has the opportunity to become a hero, since death opens to him the gates of heaven and glory (Amghar, 2006; Hegghammer, 2006; Khosrokhavar, 2014). Furthermore, unlike far-right extremists, *jihadists* clearly intend to convert their enemies and turn them against the West, Judaism, Christianity, etc. (Erez et al., 2011; Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2012).

Globalization and the Internet are therefore vehicles for discussing and propagating ideas. Radical Islamism uses this tool to teach one interpretation of the religion, the culture of sacrifice (martyrdom) and the need to choose sides (the West or the holy path of Islam) (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2012). In this case, forums become conversation sites where participants are galvanized as a group (Erez et al., 2011).

Weaknesses and nuances

According to a report submitted to the National Institute of Justice in 2011, 15% of discussions concern *Da'wa*, i.e., Islamic teachings/proselytism. However, "Despite the global Jihad's claim to be fighting an alliance of Crusaders and Zionists (i.e. Christians and Jews), three-quarters of all discussions lack any reference to either group. Of those that do, 24% mention Christians, whereas 9% mention Jews" (Erez et al., 2011, p. 9). The identified enemy is less often the "Jews" and increasingly "Christians" and "bad Muslims." The "bad Muslims" primarily live in Arab-Muslim countries and are the leading targets of terrorism (Erez et al., 2011; Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2012).

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Box 7. Islam: A multi-sided religion. Islamism: Extremism divided

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> Contrary to popular belief, *jihadists* do not act in unison. A great deal of dissention, known as *fitna*,[22] over the interpretation of Islam strains their activities. The Muslim world is disparate, split into large Sunni/Shiite families which are also divided. While less well-known, persistent internal conflicts trouble the Salafist movement. At a theological and also a geopolitical level, these conflicts generate different interpretations of Islamism. Struggles rage between Salafist *jihadists* in Syria and Iraq to expand their influence, territory or financing to the detriment of other groups. Rivalries emerge on social media. Islamic State and the al-Nosra Front, for example, are embroiled in a "Twitter war"[23] over leadership of the Syrian *jihad*.

b) Prison: Discontentment and isolation

Khosrokhavar (2014) points out numerous times in his book that prison is a prime site for radicalization, since the individuals within its walls are often society's outcasts. Furthermore, he

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[22] This idea embodies chaos and disorder in the Muslim world. Today, the word is often used to explain the dissention and conflict surrounding different interpretations of the Quran, Islam and Islamism.
[23] Twitter wars

underscores that locking them up makes them vulnerable, isolated, bored and discontent (difficult conditions of confinement). In the case of Muslims, a chaplain is supposed to attend to inmates on a regular basis to listen to them and provide spiritual support. This raises two problems (Khosrokhavar, 2014). First of all, in both Europe and North America, Muslim chaplains are generally underrepresented compared to pastors and other representatives of Christian or even Jewish denominations. For the imprisoned Muslim faithful, this failure is seen as an insult to them by the correctional facility, or even society. Secondly, as a cause and consequence of this shortage of official religious representatives, self-styled imams surface inside the prisons. They expound a strict form of Islam that can radicalize inmates who follow their preachings. In his analysis of radicalization in American prisons, Brett Goldman underscored in 2010 that "even when Muslim chaplains are available, they face intimidation by radical inmates who have fulfilled the role of spiritual leader for other inmates" (2010, p. 4). Goldman concurs with Khosrokhavar on many points in his work on prisons.

Recruitment methods

Goldman (2010) stresses the impact of self-proclaimed religious leaders in prisons. These leaders "will target the most vulnerable inmates who might come from disaffected backgrounds and/or those who are incarcerated for the longest period of time" (Goldman, 2010, p. 9). The prison setting recreates a micro-society where ties with family or friends are cut and where inmates form bonds with others who are culturally similar (Gutiérrez, Jordan, & Trujillo, 2008). This affinity leads Muslim prisoners to gravitate to one another and make contact with potential recruiters; the situation may go unnoticed, given the general shortage of guards and workers (Amghar, 2006; Goldman, 2010; Gutiérrez et al., 2008; Khosrokhavar, 2014). When penitentiary administrators discover a case of radicalization, the inmate is separated from the potential recruiter. However, far from "deradicalizing" the inmate, the process often cements his ideology (Goldman, 2010; Gutiérrez et al., 2008; Khosrokhavar, 2014).

c)   Music and events: Modernization efforts within the radical right[24]

In order to win over younger generations, extreme right-wing groups have tended to modernize their image through rock or heavy metal groups (Art, 2013; Campana & Tanner, 2014; Melzer & Serafin, 2013). Music and events are effective ways to recruit new militants (Melzer & Serafin, 2013). According to Blee and Creasep, these "Music and media scenes also create international links between movements through media distribution and concerts" (2010, p. 277). Concerts, for example, are an excellent way to communicate ideas without attracting the attention of the authorities (Campana & Tanner, 2014). In these cases, radicalization occurs in a friendly, music-

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[24] According to Schellenberg, 1,671 radical right sites were identified in Germany in 2011, and social media like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter were used very frequently (2013). Among these websites, 391 were associated with neo-Nazi groups, 63 with independent nationalist groups, and 52 were used specifically to deploy certain right-wing campaigns or events.

based environment where bands meet, play at locations that are kept secret until the last minute, and regularly trade members (Campana & Tanner, 2014).

3.1.2 Individual factors

Table 1. Individual factors in the radicalization process[25]

Factor	Islamism		Far right	
	Consensus	ICS*	Consensus	ICS*
Socioeconomic level		■		■
Employment		■		■
Education		■		■
Criminal behaviour		■		■
Personal crisis		■		
Age (being young)	■		■	
Gender (men)	■		■	
Negative experiences		■		■
Military training		■		■
National identity (exclusion and xenophobia)	▧	▧	■	
Nationals/immigrants		■		
Search for identity	■		▧	▧
Religion		■	▧	▧
Mental health		■		■

* ICS = Insufficient or conflicting studies

Contradictions concerning socio-economic levels, employment and education. For some, educated individuals from middle-class families seem more susceptible to radicalization, especially Islamist radicalism, in the United States (Krueger, 2008; Sageman, 2004). In fact, poverty does not seem to correlate with radicalization (Bjørgo, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). In this case, the "relative deprivation" concept[26] developed by Gurr (1970) is often cited to explain the importance placed on the perception of poverty in radicalization, rather than actual living conditions (Bjørgo, 2005). In a study involving a Muslim population in the United Kingdom, researchers found that persons with incomes over £75,000 and educated individuals were more likely to show openness to radicalization (Bhui, Warfa, & Jones, 2014). Again in the United Kingdom, Altunbas and Thornton (2011) compared an extremist group to a Muslim population and confirmed Sageman's data: extremists were better educated, generally came from a middle-class background and earned higher incomes than the Muslim population in general. Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009), on the other hand, compared the United Kingdom and the United States and found that extremists had limited

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[25] A table summarizing the state of knowledge surrounding factors related to the two types of radicalism precedes each group of factors. Thus, for each type of radicalism, two state-of-knowledge categories are given: "consensus," i.e., most studies agree on this factor's relevance and "insufficient or conflicting studies," which indicates the absence of a consensus concerning this factor's importance or that there are insufficient evidentiary data for corroboration. An empty cell in the table signifies that our survey of the literature did not uncover a tie between the type of factor and type of radicalism.

[26] "Relative deprivation" refers to perceived discrepancies between the social conditions that one group of people think they deserve and what they are able to achieve and maintain, compared to the means at their disposal.

education and occupational success. Others studies contained profiles presenting significant variability in this regard, particularly among lone wolves (Gill et al., 2014). Other studies of radicals in general draw attention to individuals from the poorest segments of the population with limited education, especially in Europe and in Australia (Bakker, 2006; Zammit, 2010).

Studies have shown that increases in extreme right-wing radicalism relate to unemployment (Pauwels & De Waele, 2014). In a study on far-right extremists in the United States, for example, close to 40% were unemployed (Gruenewald et al., 2013b). Right-wing extremists in Norway had lower levels of education (Carlsson, 2006). Although unskilled or unemployed workers tend to support the far right, other studies have underscored that most support comes from groups belonging to the middle-class or with an intermediate education (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007; Schram, 2010). Schram (2010) describes all of these characteristics in her "insecurity hypothesis," whereby support for the extreme right comes from a group's subjective sense of insecurity, although objective economic factors may be present.

Criminality. Like most other factors, there is no consensus on the issue of prior criminal activity among radicalized individuals. While Sageman (2004) argues that prior criminal activity is almost non-existent, Bakker (2006) mentions a significant percentage of reported petty crime (delinquency). In a study by Heinkel and Mace (2011), only seven of 27 terrorist plots involved at least one individual with a criminal record. On the other hand, close to 59% of far-right lone wolves in the United States had one prior arrest (Gruenewald et al., 2013a).

Personal crises. Like discriminatory experiences, personal crises seem to play a secondary role in radicalization. Heinkel and Mace (2011), for example, show that in most recorded extremist plots, at least one person had experienced a personal loss: divorce, separation, death of a parent or child, etc. The far-right lone wolves are more likely to isolate themselves than other extremists over a divorce, separation or the death of a spouse (Gruenewald et al., 2013b).

Young men. Gender is probably one of the only certainties concerning radicalization; most radicals are men (Bakker, 2006; Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009; Gill et al., 2014; Pauwels & De Waele, 2014; Sageman, 2004). Although some studies seem to place little importance on age, others highlight the young age of radicals compared to the general population to which they belong (Altunbas & Thornton, 2011; Krueger, 2008; Pauwels & De Waele, 2014; Mitchell Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Sageman (2004) explains that every wave of radicalization involves increasingly younger individuals, a finding confirmed by the United Nations in the case of foreign fighters (United Nations Security Council, 2015b). Silber and Bhatt (2007) indicate that men between 15 and 35 years of age from patriarchal societies are more vulnerable to the Islamist radicalization process. The same characteristic applies to far-right groups, in which youth under 18 are very likely to resort to violence (Pauwels & De Waele, 2014). On the other hand, the study by Gill et al. (2014) concerning lone wolves internationally argues that in the three groups studied, age was extremely relative at the time of the first attack.[27] Moreover, the sample is older than other terrorist groups (average age =

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[27] Far-right lone wolves, Islamists and attackers driven by specific reasons. Lone wolf Islamists are significantly younger than the other two groups (Gill et al., 2014).

33 years, between 15 and 69 years of age). However, Gruenewald et al. (2013a) confirmed that far-right lone wolves in the United States are young.

Negative experiences. A sense of injustice, discrimination and general grievance are often mentioned as motives for radicalization (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Precht, 2007; Victoroff, Adelman, & Matthews, 2012). However, there is no consensus on the specific role that such experiences play. In one study of a Muslim population in the United Kingdom, for example, these experiences had no impact on sympathy for radicalization (Bhui et al., 2014). Bjørgo (2005) sees these factors as symptomatic of structural factors, oriented around an ideology designed to serve the aims of armed conflict. This type of factor is therefore necessary but insufficient to launch the process. Other researchers underscore that the group's perceived social position plays a more important role in radicalization than the individual's perceived social position (Noppe, Hellinckx, & Velde, 2015). This could account for the support found among persons with a good education and high income. The sense of injustice or humiliation through identification with a third-party victim seems greater than personal experience but is not sufficient in itself to trigger the radicalization process (Schmid, 2013). Studies of the far right have also drawn attention to the importance of frustration among youth who perceive their situation as unfair or discriminatory (Pauwels & De Waele, 2014; Pels & de Ruyter, 2012).

Military training. Except for lone wolves, military training or experience preceding acts of violence does not seem to be a major factor in radicalization. Based on the study by Gill et al. (2014), for example, 26% of lone wolves had received prior military training, and of that number, 23.3% had combat experience. In the case of the far right, the difference between lone wolves and other extremists seems greater. One quarter of lone far-right extremists had military experience—a percentage similar to that reported by Gill et al.—compared to 8% for other similar types of extremists (Gruenewald et al., 2013b; Gruenewald, 2011).

In one study of a skinhead group, Campana and Tanner report: "Most of our respondents displayed a real fascination with physical activities, guns, including prohibited ones, and violence. Most of them had developed this fascination before joining a skinhead group and some confessed that they had become members of a skinhead group 'just for that'" (2014, p. 26).

Furthermore, radicalization among military personnel or war veterans is somewhat overlooked in the literature. According to Nečej and Ďurfina, despite various similarities between a military career and the radicalization process (particularly the far right), the major security threat perceived is radical infiltration of the army: "among the right-wing extremists and members of the armed forces we can see some overlapping in their value systems marked by discipline, organization, patriotism, weapons, authority" (2015, p. 7). The army often displays a tendency toward right-wing values (given its mission to impose order on society, religious leanings and support for right-wing organizations) and distrust and pessimism toward society (overall dissatisfaction with one's own life and economic status, etc.) (Bötticher, 2013; Nečej & Ďurfina, 2015).

Nativism and xenophobia. Anti-immigration beliefs and attitudes and an exclusive national identity seem to be key factors in far-right radicalism (Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2014; Rieker, 2006).

Nationals/Immigrants. Regardless of their immigration status, the majority of people who become radicalized did so in their country of residence, in the West (Bakker, 2006). Considering that, in the case of Islam, a significant number of individuals are converts, the problem remains fundamentally local (Crone & Harrow, 2011). In the study by Bhui et al. (2014), no significant difference was noted between people born in the United Kingdom and immigrants in terms of their sympathy for radicalization. In 85% of cases involving Western terrorists identified by Crone and Harrow (2011), radicalized individuals were raised and educated in the West. In Spain, on the other hand, the *jihadist* profiles developed by Jordan and Horsburgh (2005) indicate a significant percentage of first-generation immigrants. Although there is no obvious relationship between new immigrants and radicalization, researchers have noted the presence of second- and third-generation immigrants in radical Islamist groups (Sageman, 2004). For some, the key factor is incompatibility between identification with one's minority group and with one's society of residence (Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013). People with a dual identity are more likely to address their demands through official channels within the political system, while those who perceive an incompatibility between the two identities are more sympathetic to radical action (Simon et al., 2013).

Religiosity. Individuals who undergo an Islamist radicalization process do not feel strongly toward the religion in the beginning (Sageman, 2004, 2007). They either started as non-Muslim or recently converted, which makes them more vulnerable to radicalization. In Australia, for example, the profiles of radicals indicate a low-level of religiosity (Zammit, 2010). In other studies, the frequency of mosque attendance did not increase sympathy for radicalization (Bhui et al., 2014), and among Turkish immigrants to Germany, attendance diminished as identification with the religion increased (Simon et al., 2013). In short, as explained by Khosrokhavar (2014), Western *jihadists* are more easily radicalized if they have a narrow view of Islam. Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009), on the other hand, see religion as an important factor. According to their study, 20.5% of homegrown terrorists in the United States and United Kingdom had a spiritual guide. They explain that religion plays an important role when it comes to adopting a rigid interpretation of the faith, when individuals trust only religious authorities, and when there is a perceived schism between Islam and the West. Furthermore, unlike first-generation immigrants who usually follow a traditional interpretation of religion, second- and third-generation immigrants take a much more intellectual approach, with an individual preference for combining certain cultural aspects of the religion with their experience of the West (Sirseloudi, 2012). This religious individuation gives rise to a sense of non-belonging among youth, reinforced by socio-economic structural factors, which may nudge them toward radicalization (Khosrokhavar, 2014).

Religion is also extremely prominent among radical right groups (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Blee & Creasap, 2010; Rowatt, Shen, LaBouff, & Gonzalez, 2013, see also Box 3): 64.5 % of radical right groups in the United States were connected to a religion—including 53.6% of Christian origin—and 35.5% displayed strong religiosity (Fitzgerald, 2011). In the same study, groups with a Christian

identity had a stronger propensity to justify the use of violence than other religious groups. Despite these results, religion does not appear to be a major factor in explaining the use of violence, but rather a facilitator.

<p align="center">**Box 8. How do some religions turn violent?**</p>

Four characteristics explain why a religion turns violent (J. Bartlett & Miller, 2010; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Borum, 2014; Dawson, 2010, pp. 10–16; de Graaff, 2010):

a) *Apocalyptic beliefs or, minimally, a rejection of the world*: A growing sharp division, where traditional social rules are conditioned by the imminent accomplishment of the law of God; socialization and early preparation for violent times; demonization of enemies; and a dualist vision of the world (good and evil, "with us" or "against us").

b) *Charismatic leader*: Groups centred on the presence of a powerful, often paranoid leader displaying a high level of self-confidence and conviction in his or her ideas.

c) *Conspiracy theories:* Particularly present in radical right groups, these theories concern the belief that major historical events were subject to secret conspiracies of benefit to certain groups or individuals.

d) *Social encapsulation*: A process whereby groups place a growing number of symbolic and physical barriers between their members and the rest of society.

Mental health. According to a review by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010), psychological disorders are no more prevalent among terrorists than the general population, as already mentioned by Sageman (2004) and consistent with mass murderer profiles (ICPC, 2015). Victoroff (2005) explains in turn that extremists do not present aggressive personality traits, although other researchers emphasize the thrill-seeking, impulsiveness and sensationalism evident in the profiles of certain radicals (Pauwels et al., 2014). No proven tie to a suicidal-type personality, as understood in the fields of psychiatry and psychology, could be established among suicide attackers (Townsend, 2007). However, this finding seems less applicable to lone wolf cases. Such persons seem more isolated and are often depressed or have another mental disorder (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; Spaaij, 2010). Gruenewald et al. (2013a) distinguish between loners (unaffiliated), lone wolves (affiliated) and wolf packs (that received help for the attack). In this case, less than one half of attackers and lone wolves had mental problems, compared to 3% of wolf packs. In the study by Gill et al. (2014), however, this factor did not generally seem important in relation to the profiles of 119 lone wolves. In a different study by the Gruenewald team, no significant differences emerged between loners and other far-right extremists in terms of drug and alcohol use (2013b).

<p align="center">**Box 9. Search for identity through the radicalization process**</p>

The *search for identity,* particularly among Western-born youth, seems to be one of the major explanations reported by many researchers (Precht, 2007). However, it is difficult to define because of the impact of several variables at different levels that interact and limit its possibilities.

For some, this search is a simple expression of the identity crisis typical of adolescence (Beski-Chafiq, Birmant, Benmerzoug, Taibi, & Goignard, 2010). Others emphasize macrosocial variables: the influence of living conditions in Western countries in the context of modern life, i.e., individualism and the relativism of values that drive individuals into a personal quest, without prior markers (Khosrokhavar, 2014). In several publications, Hogg has shown, for example, that youth who feel uncertain about their identity are more likely to identify with a radical group that that sets sufficiently rigid limits and structures to protect them from this feeling (Hogg, Kruglanski, & Bos, 2013; Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010). This situation becomes more acute among second- or third-generation immigrants, due to the absence of a sense of belonging to the parents' country of origin, and grows following repeated experiences of discrimination and limited socio-economic opportunity in the country of residence (Beski-Chafiq et al., 2010; Raffie, 2013). According to the report by Noppe et al. (2015), threats to the group's social identity, not the individual's identity, play the most significant role in the initial phases of radicalization.

In any case, armed conflict seems to be the answer to the search for meaning, identity and recognition, by securing certain life-long normative certainties and "just causes." Therefore, joining a terrorist group stabilizes the identity of persons with low self-esteem and other marginalized persons in search of a sense of belonging to protect their identity (Victoroff, 2005).

3.1.3   Relational or group factors

Factor	Islamism		Radical right	
	Consensus	ICS*	Consensus	ICS*
Internal group cohesion	▨			■
Family		■		
Charismatic leaders	■		■	
Relationship with other adults	▨	▨		■
Personal networks	■		■	
Resources	▨	▨		■
Intergenerational transmission of radical ideas	▨	▨	■	

   * Insufficient or contradictory studies

Internal group cohesion. Closely associated with leadership, this factor explains the growth of radical right-wing groups. It relates to the groups' ability to avoid creating internal factions and to avoid conflicts (Freilich, Chermak, & Caspi, 2009).

Family. While the absence of family responsibilities seems to be an important factor for some (Abrahms, 2008; Cole, Alison, Cole, & Alison, 2010), other studies report that many radical Islamists are married with children (Zammit, 2010). In the United Kingdom, for example, Cole et al. (2010) explain that isolation resulting from migration could weaken the family as a protective factor. On the other hand, 77% of radicalized individuals in Australia had a stable family (Zammit, 2010). Nilsson (2015) also explains that the presence of loved ones in conflict zones is a factor that can

normalize[28] *jihad* as a lifetime undertaking. As for the radical right, Gruenewald et al. (2013b) explain that lone attackers are more isolated and do not live with family, unlike other extremists of the same type. In this study, however, almost one quarter of extremists had children.

The parent-child relationship also seems an important factor in the intergenerational transmission of radical right extremist ideas. A correlation exists between racism, xenophobia and nationalistic, authoritarian attitudes between parents and their children in adolescence, which could explain the identification with radical right thinking (Grubben, 2006; Pels & de Ruyter, 2012). Higher rates of xenophobia were recorded among adolescents with emotionally distant parents and adolescents from families that applied a punitive, authoritarian approach (Pels & de Ruyter, 2012).

Charismatic leaders. Whether Islamist radicalism or radical right extremism, the presence of a charismatic leader seems to be a key factor in accelerating the radicalization process (Ashour & Azzam, 2009; Bjørgo, 2005; Freilich et al., 2009; Hofmann & Dawson, 2014). In the case of Islamist radicalism, the charismatic leader consolidates the religious ideology and approach and reframes such things as negative experiences in relation to the armed struggle (Bjørgo, 2005; Sinai, 2012, cited in Schmid, 2013). A strong and determined leader of a radical right group provides and frames an ideology, justifies certain beliefs or actions, and issues clear instructions on how to achieve the group's objectives (Freilich et al., 2009).

Relationships with other adults. Meaningful relationships between an adult and an adolescent can moderate xenophobic ideas. Teacher intervention, for example, in response to related comments by students reduce their xenophobia (Pels & de Ruyter, 2012).

Personal networks. More than ideology or ties to a specific organization, the radicalization process seems best explained according to the relationships among individuals (Sageman & Hoffman, 2008a; Sageman, 2004; Taarnby, 2005). In situations where, as Sageman (2004) points out, the influence of groups like al-Qaeda are beginning to fade in terms of a formal organizational structure, networks are becoming increasingly independent and self-activated, which represents one of the key factors in the process. Persons of roughly the same age, with a similar life experience, who live in relatively the same area and share the same opinions, begin to follow a path that leads to radicalized thinking (Bakker, 2006). Among the 12 radicalization mechanisms described by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), four directly relate to group characteristics.[29] Groups become radicalized when they are isolated and feel threatened, when they compete with other radicalized groups for the same support base, when they compete with the state or when competition exists inside the group in question. The importance of personal networks has been established several times by different researchers. In one study on Sunni militants, converts and non-converts, in the United States, 93% of cases involved a group influence at work in the radicalization process (Kleinmann, 2012). In the same study, 42% were radicalized through horizontal contacts: groups of friends, family members or other social contacts. Jordan and Horsburgh (2006) explain that

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[28] [translation] "The ideal of fighting as a normal way of life, rather than seeing jihad as a limited-time experience" (Nilsson, 2015, p. 351).
[29] See Box 12. McCauley and Moskalenko.

personalized and informal relationships are a basic characteristic in the structure of radical networks in Spain,.

Resources. In keeping with resource mobilization theory,[30] Freilich et al. (2009) underscored the fact that access to sufficient financial resources by radical right groups is also associated with the rise of these groups in the United States.

Group characteristics. Based on an analysis of white supremacist group networks in the United States, Caspi (2010) found that the size and age of the group correlated positively to murders. The older and larger groups are more dangerous than smaller groups.

Box 10. The recruiter's role in Islamist extremism

Although horizontal and independent radicalization are mentioned increasingly often in several studies (Heinkel & Mace, 2011), ties with other extremist groups remain a cause of controversy among researchers (see note 10). DAECH, responsible for the recent attacks in Paris, is one example. However, although the tie is uncertain and groups in the West operate more as self-activated cells, the role of gatekeeper or recruiter remains important. The gatekeeper is the one who serves as a link between cells and other extremist groups, and who provides the "know-how" needed to join a cell and obtain the necessary training and knowledge about politics and religion (Nesser, 2006). The recruiter does not activate the radicalization process, however, but rather accelerates it (Verldhuis et Bakker, 2007 cited in Noppe et al., 2015). According to Taarnby (2005), without this gatekeeper's influence, the cells are less dangerous and isolated.

Many of these gatekeepers are former veterans of the war in Afghanistan or received training from various countries in conflict (Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, etc.) (Nesser, 2006). Some imams or charismatic Salafist chaplains have also been identified as gatekeepers (Bokhari, Hegghammer, Lia, Nesser, & Tonnessen, 2006; Precht, 2007). Hegghammer (2006, p. 8) underscores that although gatekeepers may use Internet sites for recruitment, most rely on informal social ties: "In many Islamist communities the gatekeepers are relatively well known, meaning that potential recruits know who to approach."

3.1.4   Community factors

Factor	Islamism		Radical right	
	Consensus	ICS*	Consensus	ICS*
Isolated community	██████			
Cultural conflicts				██████
Radicalization subculture		██████		

  * Insufficient or contradictory studies

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[30] A social movement's rise depends on its ability to mobilize human, financial and other resources.

Community isolation. Given the integration problems confronted by ethno-cultural communities, especially in Europe (see Box 11), isolated communities seem to be favourite targets of *jihadist* recruiters (Alonso, 2012; Haider, 2015; Mitchell Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The sense of belonging to a diaspora, especially the kind that entails a feeling of rejection, like the Muslim diaspora, increases feelings of isolation, a need to form ties with others with similar traits, and a need to protect oneself from the rest of society. Taarnby and Hallundbaek (2010), for example, describe how isolation within the United Kingdom's Somalian community fostered the recruitment of unemployed, poor youth by the radical al-Shabaab group.

Cultural conflicts. The presence of this type of conflict in a neighbourhood seems to increase the probability that youth will join a radical right movement (Blee & Creasap, 2010).

Presence of a radicalization subculture. Sinai explains that in an extremist group's radicalization phase, the presence of extremist subcultures in a local community, along with a gatekeeper (see Box 10), facilitates the recruitment process (2012, cited in Schmid, 2013).

3.1.5 Macro and exo-systemic factors

Factor	Islamism		Radical right	
	Consensus	ICS*	Consensus	ICS*
Traditional gender identity		■	░	░
Weak or unstable nations	■		░	░
Fast-paced modernization	░			■
Other macro-political factors		■		■
Cultural heterogeneity	░			■
Social integration	■			■
Conflicts in Muslim countries	■		░	░
Authoritarian societies		■	░	░

* Insufficient or contradictory studies

Box 11. Social factors and integration problems

Factors explaining radicalization based on major social variables are not a matter of consensus among researchers. French sociologists like Khosrokhavar (2014) and Roy (2008) emphasize the importance of individualism and the relativity of values in Western societies, as well as Muslim integration problems, especially in Europe, which are driving young people who have lost their bearing to try to find a personal identity that is eventually stabilized via armed conflict. However, other researchers believe that this factor is necessary but not sufficient to explain radicalization; empirical data do not support the influence of macro-sociological variables on this process (Kleinmann, 2012).

According to other sociologists, this type of variable only explains the particular form of radicalization found in Europe and North America. The inability of European nations to integrate other cultures has isolated certain communities and groups of individuals, whose frustration and disenchantment with the hope of integration has spurred their radicalization (Belkin, Blanchard, Ek, & Mix, 2011; Leiken, 2005; Taarnby, 2005). Furthermore, Muslim communities in Europe are

distributed according to the colonial influence of the host country or geographic enclaves (Pakistanis in the United Kingdom, Algerians in France, Turks in Germany, etc.), which recreate a conflict-ridden relationship with society (Cesari, 2008). In North America, however, Muslim immigrants arrive in countries built on migration, with vast expanses of territory that enable the distribution and ethnic fragmentation of national communities, thus allowing more opportunities for success (Abbas & Siddique, 2012; Leiken, 2005). Accordingly, "As a consequence of demography, history, ideology, and policy, western Europe now plays host to often disconsolate Muslim offspring, who are its citizens in name but not culturally or socially" (Leiken, 2005, p. 123).

Social construction of gender roles. Despite the shortage of studies explaining these characteristics in sufficient detail, beliefs and attitudes surrounding male and female roles in society seem important characteristics of Islamist radicalism and extreme right radicalism. As mentioned earlier, men who live in male-dominated societies where equality between the sexes is uneven are more vulnerable to the radicalization process (Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey, & Feinberg, 2013; Mitchell Silber & Bhatt, 2007). In another French study, stakeholders perceive sexual and sexist stereotypes in the name of culture to have some influence; the demeaning attitude of young people toward women is even mentioned as a significant sign of Islamist radicalism (Beski-Chafiq et al., 2010). Also, as mentioned in the section on trends, radical right groups are more inclined to support a male-dominated culture and to subordinate women in secondary roles within the organization, often based on gender roles (Blee & Creasap, 2010; Blee, 2005).

Macro-political factors. In his book *Root Causes of Terrorism,* Tore Bjørgo (2005) identifies a series of structural factors[31] that have had some influence on terrorism: lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law, weak or unstable nations, illegitimate or corrupt governments, hegemonies or non-egalitarian authorities, historical precedents of political violence, modernization and fast economic growth, and foreign powers that support illegitimate governments. State weakness often seems to be one of the most important factors accounting for terrorist attacks (Gelfand et al., 2013; Piazza, 2008). In the case of post-Soviet Russia, fast Western modernization of the country has been underscored by Balayan (2012) as one factor involved in the rise of Russian nationalism, and by various researchers in the case of former communist countries (Glaser, 2006). Effective use of the political opportunities structure (see Box 5) was proposed by several researchers as an important factor in explaining the rise of the radical right both in the United States and Europe (Freilich et al., 2009; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2015). Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2015) explain that the increase in right-wing extremist groups in Europe during an economic crisis could indicate the capacity of these groups to capitalize on political and cultural opportunities. Furthermore, individuals who legitimize the political system are less likely to participate in radical right acts of violence (Pauwels & De Waele, 2014; Schils & Pauwels, 2014).

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[31] Bjørgo distinguishes between structural, facilitating, motivational and triggering factors (2005).

Cultural heterogeneity. According to Art (2013), the most important factor in the rise of the radical right, especially in Europe, is the transformation of relatively homogeneous societies into heterogeneous societies, a situation closely associated with social integration and growing migration problems. In the United States, the cultural competition generated by the change in population composition at the start of the 20th century may have played a part in the rise of groups like the Ku Klux Klan (Blee & Creasap, 2010).

Social integration: A sense of alienation within the host society could prompt second- or third-generation immigrants to identify with the global Muslim community and with victims of conflict in the country, thus increasing the likelihood of radicalization (Belkin et al., 2011; Sirseloudi, 2012). Among the fourteen key causes of terrorism, Bjørgo (2005) includes, for example, the failure or reluctance of states to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes. On one hand, the incompatibility between identification with one's cultural minority group and one's society of residence is associated with greater sympathy for radical ideas (Simon et al., 2013). On the other hand, compatibility between the two identities can peacefully channel demands through the established political system (Simon et al., 2013). Accordingly, facilitating a dual identity seems key to preventing sectarian or radical action. In a study that compared groups of non-violent and violent radicals, one of the most important differences between the two was the sincere affection that non-violent radicals felt "for Western values of tolerance and pluralism, system of government, and culture" (J. Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010, p. 10). Pauwles and Waele (2014) showed in a study of extreme-right radicalism that better social integration reduces the likelihood of involvement in acts of violence.

Foreign policy of Western countries in conflict with Muslim countries. Conflicts in Muslim countries were reported by many researchers as the primary motivating factor of Islamist groups (Abbas & Siddique, 2012; Heinkel & Mace, 2011; Nesser, 2006; Precht, 2007). Pape (2005, cited in Moghadam, 2008), for example, suggests that countries that were occupied by foreign powers are more likely to be targets of suicide attacks. In 2007, Sageman recommended to the United States Senate that it pull its troops out of Iraq in order to pull the plug on a major source of al-Qaeda inspiration and propaganda. *Jihadist* groups therefore take advantage of the idea that the West is at war with Islam: " In line with Al Qaeda's ideology they interlinked issues such as the occupation of Palestine, the French support for the Algerian regime, the Russians' military operations inside Chechnya, the Iraq war, with regional European issues such as tightened security and more restrictive immigration legislation, as well as surveillance and prosecution of jihadist milieus in European countries in the aftermath of 9/11" Nesser, 2006, p. 327). Therefore, military intervention and counter-terrorism following terrorist attacks in the West can have paradoxical consequences when it comes to fighting terrorism (Haider, 2015; Schmid, 2013). Action by minority Islamist groups triggers waves of discrimination and Islamophobia which, in turn, increases the communities' isolation and sense of alienation, thus aiding recruitment (Cesari, 2008; Schmid, 2013; Skoczylis, 2013). This weakens the link and sense of belonging to the host country, especially for second- or third-generation immigrants (Thurairajah, 2011). Moreover, this type of conflict also has indirect consequences: it provides an opportunity to gather and train large numbers of *jihadists* in conflict zones, who then

fuel radicalization in the West in the years to come (Skoczylis, 2013). The attacks therefore have two objectives: to strike Western countries on their own land, and to nurture the future of radicalization. However, other researchers underscore that this factor alone is insufficient to explain radicalization (Kleinmann, 2012).

Authoritarian societies. Societies with strict standards that punish deviations from accepted behaviour are more likely to experience terrorist attacks (Gelfand et al., 2013). Ramakrishna (2015) hypothesizes that individuals who accept hierarchal power differences are more likely to gravitate to radical educational environments.

3.2   Radicalization trajectories

The radicalization trajectory is the process or path toward understanding "how an individual moves towards radicalized beliefs over time in a fluid and constantly changing social environment" (Costanza, 2012, p. 26). Horgan (2008) believes that trajectory studies, when compared to the weaknesses of profile studies, can generate a better understanding of the gradual engagement process among individuals. In this case, the trajectory study makes it possible to understand why a person engages and drops out, and the factors that explain the course of these events (Horgan, 2008). Despite these recommendations, all of the models identified centre on the engagement process but overlook the withdrawal process.

There are many radicalization processes or pathways. Although some models are not perfectly linear, like the one developed by McCauley and Moskalenko, most are characterized by a one-way progression and suggest radicalization phases or steps related to a causal order. Nevertheless, most researchers underscore that no single trajectory can explain the radicalization process, except perhaps some that describe it according to various mechanisms and approaches (A. Bartlett, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2010). Silber and Bhatt (2007), for example, explain that even if most people may not necessarily experience all of the phases, those who follow each one will very likely become radicalized. The individuality of these trajectories is another important characteristic. Although some authors include the group component, most try to explain the radicalization process first as a person-centred evolution, and then (in the second or third phase of the trajectory) incorporate a group dimension. According to Christmann (2012), these models concur that the radicalization process implies an individual change determined by external factors.

This type of phase model has come under criticism. Veldhuis and Staun (2009) object to the fact that the researchers proposing these models rely on radicalization case studies to try and retroactively explain radicalization. However, the correlations made in these models are difficult to prove empirically (Kundnani, 2015). In fact, people who experience the same phases do not always become radicalized; no cause and effect relationship is therefore evident. Furthermore, some of these models lack scientific data proving their real-life validity. Most rely on secondary sources to formulate their findings, thus confining them more to the realm of theory. Schmid (2013) argues that one problem with these models is that they concern specific cases of men (Muslims) who

became radicalized and that, although they start at the same point, they neglect the diversity of pathways to radicalization; in other words, they encounter the problem of "statistical discrimination" (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). The phase models use certain general traits, for example, traits indicating the unobservable potential of radicalization. Based on this type of model, certain persons may possess these shared traits without necessarily being involved in a radicalization process. These "false positives" can generate discriminatory and oppressive treatment based on religious affiliation, race or certain behaviours, and thus wrongly create the suspicion of radicalization. Moreover, these individual development models make no mention of macro-societal variables, particularly concerning the role of Western governments abroad and their actions from a "war on terror" perspective (Kundnani, 2012, p. 5).

For the purposes of this report, we will limit our presentation to six radicalization trajectories that have contributed to an understanding of this radical pathway.[32] First, we selected trajectories related to homegrown radicalism in the West. In that instance, we did not consider the model by Gill (2007) on suicide bomber trajectories in the Middle East. Then, we eliminated trajectories that lacked sufficient explanation, like CONTEST, or that made an insufficient contribution compared to other models.[33]

We will present the various trajectories proposed below. These models appear in chronological order.

3.2.1   The Wiktorowicz model

Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004, 2005, 2006) developed his model after studying the Al-Mouhajiroun group in the United Kingdom, based on social movement theory. His model emphasizes the importance of groups in the radicalization and mobilization process. He explains that no single theory can explain the recruitment process and stressed the vital importance of focusing on the specific mechanisms of a series of mobilization components. In short, each social movement theory explains only a portion of the radicalization process, not all radicalization mechanisms.

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[32] We included two extra non-linear models in Box 12 and Box 13.

[33] For more information about radicalization trajectories, see for example Borum, 2011a, 2011b; Christmann, 2012a; Horgan, 2008. Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009), following a scientific study, offer six tangible signs of radicalization. We nevertheless decided not to include this model since it consists more of a description of specific factors following a scientific study. This also applies to Taarnby's model, which is heavily influenced by that of Sageman. Taarnby extends Sageman's four factors by dividing them into eight. Lastly, we disregarded Borum's model (Borum, 2011a, 2011b), which shows the transition from a sense of grievance to binary thinking (us against them), since this idea was examined sufficiently in the other models.

Illustration 3. The Wiktorowicz model

This model calls attention to the role of social influences in a person's trajectory to a radicalized group. Wiktorowicz suggests three key processes that increase the likelihood of being attracted to these groups. These processes are:

1. **Cognitive opening**

   Cognitive opening is the process whereby a person becomes more receptive to new ideas and world views. This opening can be triggered by a personal crisis or may relate to past socialization experiences. These crises can be economic (i.e., a job loss), sociocultural (i.e., humiliation, racism, etc.), political (i.e., torture, political discrimination or repression) or personal (i.e., the death of a family member). They topple previously held concepts and open the door to new perspectives.

   Some members of the group exploit their existing social ties with potential members by magnifying their personal crises to get them to support their cause.

2. **Religious seeking and frame alignment**

   Religion can comprise an important component of an individual's identity. Cognitive opening can cause a person to turn to religion to find meaning. This seeking can be initiated and pursued by individuals themselves. They peruse the religion "marketplace" and choose the one that aligns with their needs and outlook. They may also be caught up in a movement. In some cases,

members of a movement may assist or guide the seeker in joining the group or movement by convincing them that the group's ideology is the most plausible choice.

This process is dialogue-oriented, not coercive. In this regard, seekers are active participants, and their exposure to an ideology does not necessarily cause them to support the group, but increases such a possibility. This dialectic depends on the movement's ability to provide the person with an interpretive framework[34] that aligns with what is being sought. A frame alignment process occurs in which the interpretive frameworks of the individual and of the group are aligned and shared. This is nevertheless rarely the way a person is persuaded to engage in high-risk behaviour. Such choices are more likely made during the next process: socialization.

3. Socialization and engagement

If the person accepts the group's interpretive framework, a socialization process follows. In this case, the seeker discovers and explores the group's ideology in more depth through various interactions: events like protests, discussion groups, various social events, readings and other group activities. During these moments, the group forges a cohesive identity and unity among its members. The seeker accepts the group's ideology and becomes an active participant. Some people may leave the group while others conform and accept the group's strategies and vision.

Processes 1 and 2 are prerequisites for the third process—socialization—in which the individual may engage in violent behaviour supported by his or her group or movement.

3.2.2 Stahelski's five stages of social psychological conditioning

Stahelski (2005) developed a diagram of social psychological conditioning to explain the formation of violent groups. Terrorist groups use cult-like conditioning techniques capable of transforming ordinary individuals into remorseless killers. Staheslski describes five stages of social psychological conditioning that can shed light on the transition from ideology to violent action (Flannery, 2015):

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[34] Here, Wiktorowicz bases his study on the frame analysis theory of Snow and Benford (1986). Based on Contamin, this [translation] "alignment of interpretive frameworks [...] implies a framing activity by mobilization entrepreneurs. They seek to influence the image that their various audiences have of reality. To do so, they construct "frameworks of collective action," series of beliefs and representations geared to action, that inspire and legitimize the activities and mobilization campaigns, while emphasizing the unfairness of a social situation" (2010, p. 58).

Illustration 4. Stahelski's five phases of social psychological conditioning

1. Depluralization: The terrorist group conditions the joiner to strip away all other group member identities and adopt the group's identity exclusively. This is usually the case of individuals who leave the dominant culture to join a subculture.

2. Self-deindividuation: Stripping away each member's personal identity. In this phase, a person ceases to identify as an individual. The individual's personal identity is gradually taken away and replaced by the group's identity. Personal freedom is relinquished, and individuals adapt to the group's thinking and identity.

3. Other-deindividuation: Stripping away the personal identities of enemies. The group begins to identify others—persons outside their own group—as a faceless mass. The construct of the others as a homogeneous mass and their description as "evil incarnate" denies the individuality of others and depersonalizes them.

4. Dehumanization: Identifying enemies as sub-human or non-human. This is accomplished through discursive comparisons of the enemy to non-human entities, such as insects, dogs, viruses, etc.

5. Demonization: Identifying enemies as evil. Here, too, the enemy is considered the very incarnation of evil and is compared to demons, evil forces, etc.

According to Skahelski, the last two phases come to fruition when groups increasingly gravitate toward violence.

3.2.3   The Moghaddam model

The author uses the metaphor of a staircase to describe the path leading a person to commit acts of violence, suicide attacks in particular (Christmann, 2012; Moghaddam, 2005). The model is based on three types of factors : individual, organizational and environmental, and focuses on the psychological aspects of the process. This gradual transition considers the decision-making capacity

and perception of the individual involved. Reaching the "fifth floor" implies violent acting out. In all, there are six levels/floors:

Illustration 5. Moghaddam's staircase model

Ground floor

Psychological injustice of material conditions

First floor

Perceived options to fight unfair treatment

Second floor

Displacement of aggression. Direct or indirect support of binary outlooks: "us versus them."

Third floor

Moral engagement

Fourth floor

Black and white thinking and group consolidation. Legitimation of terrorist organization

Fifth floor

Sidestepping inhibitions. Acting out.

1. ***Ground floor***: A psychological interpretation of material and social conditions.
    a. Subjective perception of deprivation, injustice, social immobility;
    b. Identity threats;
    c. Media's influence in propagating a sense of injustice.
2. ***First floor***: Proposed options for fighting against unfair treatment. These options are:
    a. Perception of opportunities for social mobility and alternative pathways for improving a situation;
    b. Perception of legal procedures that can lead to solutions to perceived problems.
    If these options seem or prove to be blocked, they generate a feeling of injustice and a sense that the established system is illegitimate. The aggression felt is displaced toward others who are blamed for the problems. This allows movement to the second floor.
3. ***Second floor***: Displaced aggression.
    The second floor is characterized by displaced aggression which, at this point, is more verbal than physical. It translates into direct or indirect support for organizations or institutions that support and encourage an "us against them" mentality. People who feel physically ready to move on to aggression climb to the higher floors.
4. ***Third floor***: Moral engagement.
    This floor is where the terrorist organization appears to support the engagement process through persuasion and justification of the means to achieving an ideal society. It uses isolation, affiliation, confidentiality and fear tactics to achieve its ends. These organizations position themselves at two levels:
    a. At the macro level, as the only option for changing the world or reforming society; and

b. At the micro level, as a refuge for the outcast, the discontent, the alienated and other persons in similar situations.

5. ***Fourth floor*** : Black and white thinking and the legitimacy of the terrorist organization. The recruitment stage.

a. Entry into the terrorist organization and the start of socialization within the secret life of the cell;

b. The group promotes dichotomist thinking, "us" versus "them," and isolation heightens.

6. ***Fifth floor*** : Terrorist acts and inhibition mechanisms.

This is the operational phase in which recruits are trained and equipped to carry out acts of terrorism. They receive the necessary resources to overcome any inhibitions about killing others, using :

a. Social categorization, to identity the target and enemy. At this point, civilians can be considered the enemy group;

b. Distancing, to exaggerate in-group and out-group differences;

c. The neutralization of inhibition mechanisms.

The advantage of this model is that it provides an image of the steps in the trajectory and highlights the fact that fewer and fewer alternatives exist at each progressive floor toward radicalization. The perceived identity threat is crucial in this model. Like most other analysts, the author believes that a desire for revenge is extremely important to suicide attackers, but also a sense of duty to family, the community, God, etc.

3.2.4   Sageman's model

Marc Sageman (2004, 2006, 2008) was one of the first to suggest a model for understanding radicalization. Four factors explain or help clarify the process:

1. A sense of moral outrage over perceived violations of rights. The situation and conflicts in Muslim regions like Iraq, Palestine, Bosnia, Kashmir, etc., and other local situations in the West, become a source of moral outrage for some people. The perception of local humiliation combines with a perception of global humiliation to create a personal interpretation of the Muslim situation across the world.

2. A specific interpretation of the world in which moral violations are seen as representing a war against Islam. This interpretation of local or global reality is perceived by some as a war against Islam. This is not an intellectual but an emotional interpretation that encompasses a wide range of problems: Middle East conflicts, experiences of discrimination, the tendency of various media to focus on fringe Islamist discourse that promotes violence while ignoring the peaceful position of the Muslim majority, etc.

3. Resonance with personal experiences. This interpretation of a war on Islam finds more resonance in Europe, given the difficult daily experience of many European Muslims. Anti-Muslim

comments and the fact that the Muslim community is perceived as a victim of socio-economic and political injustice and discrimination illustrate this experience.

4. Mobilization through networks. All of these factors and situations affect the world view of certain young Muslims whose frustration builds. A very small percentage of them become radicalized. This radicalization can begin and grow on the Internet, particularly through social media. Various networks offer chat rooms where numerous people can connect and share the same points of view, lending each other support.

3.2.5   NYPD model

This model was developed by the New York Police Department based on a model by Silber and Bhatt (2007) for groups that endorse a *jihadist-Salafist* ideology. The model proposes a four-phase radicalization trajectory to explain domestic radicalization or homegrown terrorism. According to the authors, the model is not linear: acting out can begin or end at any phase. However, the authors start with the premise that if a person transitions through all of these phases, the possibility of committing acts of terrorism is high. The suggested radicalization phases are as follows (Christmann, 2012; Mitchell Silber & Bhatt, 2007):

Illustration 6. NYPD model

1.   Pre-radicalization: This is the starting point, before a person becomes influenced by *jihadist-Salafist* ideologies. At this point, people are living a normal life and have a normal job.

2.   Self-identification: The intermediate process in which people, under the influence of internal or external factors, start exploring Salafism; they begin to turn their backs on their past life

and associate with like-minded individuals as they internalize the ideology. A cognitive opening provides a channel for new ideas, often in the wake of an event or personal crisis. The triggers to acting out at this phase are varied: economic, social, political or personal. Here, the most vulnerable individual are people who have reached a crossroads in their lives, as they search for their identity or validation of their trajectory.

The transition to the second phase, according to the authors, emerges through indicators of alienation, such as: distancing themselves from their past and forming closer ties to persons with similar opinions and sensitivities, etc. Other indicators of radicalization include: a) joining a Salafist group, b) foregoing the use of tobacco, alcohol, gambling and Western clothing, c) dressing in Eastern/Muslim clothing and growing a beard, and d) becoming an activist in their community.

At the start, radicalization is often a process of self-radicalization and self-selection; later, once the person joins the radical group, the specific process of group radicalization begins. Groups of people with the same characteristics form around "radicalization incubators."[35] The authors claim that two factors are involved : a) the shift toward Salafist Islam and b) attendance at a Salafist mosque. Contact with a radical imam is critical at this stage.

3. **Indoctrination**. Beliefs intensify and Salafism is accepted in its entirety. Personal beliefs about conditions elicit support for jihad. This process is led by a spiritual censor. In this phase, individuals who share the same beliefs meet together, which helps expand teachings and commitment. Peers become essential to support the radicalization process. Acceptance of the political-religious ideology that supports violence toward non-Muslims is a turning point. The goal is no longer personal, but universal.

Two indicators are especially important at this stage : (1) **Abandonment of the mosque**. The mosque no longer serves radicalized needs. It is perceived as a high-risk environment and is usually abandoned amidst an argument with other members of the mosque. The mosque is perceived as a threat because it is often monitored by intelligence services. (2) **Politicization of new beliefs**. Radicalized individuals begin to transfer their beliefs to daily life. International events are interpreted through this new, often dichotomized outlook ("us" against "them," Muslims against non-Muslims). The group assists in the withdrawal from secular life and becomes the person's whole world.

4. *Jihadization*. This refers to the time when people self-identify as holy warriors (mujahidin) and see *jihad* as their duty. This phase involves planning and represents a time when the group's ties solidify and strengthen. This is the point where the individual eventually transitions through the following sub-phases: (1) accepts *jihad* and may travel to a training camp, (2) physical and mental training, (3) planning the attack and (4) acting out.

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[35] See page 28.

3.2.6 The Danish Security and Intelligence Service [*Politiets Efterretningstjeneste*] (PET) model

Similar in various ways to the NYPD model, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) suggests four consecutive phases leading to radicalization (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009):

1. A "radicalisability" phase when a person becomes susceptible to the influence of a "radicaliser";

2. Change in behaviour and move toward new religious practices, with the resulting:

3. Narrowing of social contacts, as bonds with family and former friends are cut or restricted, leading to:

4. A hardening phase, in which the person interested in violence consumes violent material, such as videos.

The difference between the NYPD and PET models is that the PET underscores the role of factors beyond the individual's control, more specifically the recruiter's role. As Veldhius and Staun mention, this model is a process in which the individual "starts by being 'susceptible' to radical ideas and meeting a 'radicaliser', and advances to new religious practices and changed behaviour. Subsequently, the process involves a narrowing of the person's circle of friends and family and results in the so-called 'hardening phase', which includes 'reviewing of and interest in very violent videos' displaying terrorists in battle and the killing of hostages" (2009, p. 14).

Box 12. McCauley and Moskalenko's twelve radicalization mechanisms

In their radicalization model, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) describe a series of mechanisms leading to violence. They stress the fact that radicalization can develop at an individual, small group or mass level. In all, they suggest twelve radicalization mechanisms: six pertain to radicalization in individuals, three to radicalization in small groups and three to radicalization at a mass level. For our purposes, mechanisms refer to "the means or manners in which something is accomplished" (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 415). The unique feature of their model is its lack of a linear trajectory. In their opinion, any attempt to formulate a step-based theory to explain radicalization is contradictory considering the host of factors they describe (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2010). Therefore, the uniqueness of each trajectory results from the combination of these various mechanisms. They suggest the following twelve radicalization mechanisms:

Individual-level mechanisms
1. First and foremost is the issue of *personal grievances*. Government actions that harm individuals or their loved ones can generate anger or a desire for revenge. No direct tie exists between these personal grievances and the acting out. However, the factor catalyzing this potential transition is the fact that the grievance is shared or interpreted as a group reality.

2. *Political grievances*. An individual can be radicalized without experiencing the cause of the grievance personally. In this case, the grievance results from identification with the grievances of the group or community of origin.

3. *Individual radicalization in action (the "slippery slope")*. This is a gradual, step-by-progression toward radicalization.

4. *Love* is another radicalization mechanism. Some people may join a radical group at the request of a loved one or join them in a common cause, to help and protect them, whether friends, lovers or family. Deep relationships or bonds can form between a radicalized group member and potential member.

5. *Fear* is another mechanism that can encourage a person to join a radical group. This is often the case in nations experiencing bankruptcy. Some people feel more secure if they join a radical group than if they remain on their own. Joining armed friends enhances their sense of security.

6. *Thrill-seeking, status and money*. Joining radicalized groups can be motivated by a quest for social status, money or thrills. This applies to certain people who join street gangs or who enter the military, etc.

Group level

7. *Group polarization*. Group discussion and debate among like-minded individuals tends to move group opinion in the preconceived direction initially favoured by group members. Two forces come to bear in such situations. First of all, some members refrain from expressing disagreement with the group's basic values to avoid positioning themselves as being different from other members and, secondly, to avoid becoming targets of suspicion.

8. *Competition with various entities* is another radicalization mechanism identified among small groups. It can arise when a non-governmental group competes with or challenges a government or other rival group. Competition can occur within the same group when different factions compete over different viewpoints.

9. *Isolation or threatening conditions* can form a strong sense of group unity. This mechanism can foster radicalization among fringe, low-profile or underground groups.

Mass level

10. Outside threats are a powerful mechanism for small groups and mass groups alike given their impact on populations. An external threat can trigger a strong process of identification exhibited in various ways, either through ethnic glorification, idealization of values and identification of political leaders and disciplinary action against non-compliant group members. This is a reassurance process that produces spectacular reactions, such as the reactions following the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States.

11. *Hate* is another emotion that can transform into a mechanism for dehumanizing the enemy. This dehumanization makes acting out against and killing ethnically or religiously categorized enemies more readily acceptable. Civilians are not exempt from this emotion and are seen no differently than soldiers or militants.

12. *Martyrdom*. The zealous commitment of martyrs plays a role in radicalizing the masses, who see it as an example of sacrifice and evidence of a cause's importance.

Box 13. Non-radicalization factors

In terms of preventing a person from becoming radicalized, the traditional approach is to mitigate—or eliminate—the radicalization factors, i.e., factors that promote engagement in a radicalization process. However, as mentioned, these factors are correlated and non-causal; limiting their influence is therefore no guarantee that the radicalization process will be stopped.

An alternative approach recommended by Cragin (2014) is to place more importance on factors that prevent an individual from becoming radicalized, in other words, *non*-radicalization factors.

Cragin (2014) made this recommendation based on her non-radicalization conceptual model, developed to identify the factors that cause a person not to engage in violent political action, something she calls "non-radicalization" or resistance to violent extremism. To be considered resistant to violent extremism, the individuals in question must have had previous exposure to radical ideologies and may even have flirted with a radical mentality, but ultimately renounced violence (Cragin, 2014). Her conceptual model does not apply to lone wolves or individuals acting outside the confines of a terrorist group. However, it provides preliminary avenues for understanding what differentiates radicals who resort to violence from others who reject it.

After completing her research, Cragin (2014) identified four intermediate factors that might deter individuals from wanting to join terrorist groups:

- **Moral repugnance**, i.e., disagreement with the use of violence as a means to achieve a purpose or to bring about social, political, economic or religious change.
- **Perceived ineffectiveness of violence**. This impression can result from apathy, i.e., because people have no interest in or see no need for change, or because people have taken alternative, non-violent pathways to bring about change.
- **Perceived costs**, which can consist of (1) logistical costs, (2) financial costs, (3) family obligations and/or (4) fear of repression.
- **An absence of social ties to the terrorist group that strengthen** or encourage the radicalization process.

Cragin suggests that anti-radicalization measures should consider these non-radicalization factors and try to strengthen them. These factors are all the more important considering, as the model shows, that they also foster resistance among individuals to joining terrorist groups and withdrawal from existing groups by members. Therefore, whether or not a person is engaged in a radicalization process, these non-radicalization factors can prevent them from being lured by violence.

Nasir Hafezi, a British lawyer specializing in criminal law and terrorism who has defended many youth for related matters, agrees with Cragin. In his view, we must not fail to appreciate that many young people who become radicalized or leave for Syria are motivated by a desire to address injustice and make positive changes in the world (N. Miller, 2015). Hafezi argues that the desire to bring about change, to engage, must not be discouraged or smothered in youth but guided in a productive, non-violent direction. By providing youth with alternative pathways to engage and act on their desire for change, the perceived ineffectiveness of violence, as presented in Cragin's model, is a more effective tool. Otherwise, the lack of alternatives for taking action makes young people vulnerable to recruitment by radicals and extremists, as violence gradually asserts its place as the only effective means to secure political or social change. Kundnani (2009) shares this opinion, and suggests that safe spaces must be created for young people to engage in honest debate on tough political issues—in other words, spaces like those created under the STREET project in the United Kingdom (see page 88). It is important that young people feel encouraged to become politically engaged and contribute to society, without the need for some authority or other to approve their opinions in advance (Kundnani, 2009).

IV. MEASURES FOR PREVENTING RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 Crime prevention approaches

Before continuing with an analysis of counter-radicalization programmes, we must clearly establish what we mean by *prevention*, especially crime prevention.

For the purposes of this report, we will use the prevention concept proposed by the United Nations (UN) in its "Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime," adopted under Economic and Social Council resolution 2002/13 (UNODC & ICPC, 2011). The resolution identifies four crime prevention approaches, detailed below:

- Social crime prevention

- Situational crime prevention

- Locally-based or community crime prevention

- Reintegration programmes

The goal of **social crime prevention** is to minimize the development of risk factors and strengthen protective factors associated with crime. In other words, social crime prevention endeavours to influence factors that can lead individuals to criminal behaviour (Bjørgo, 2013). According to a UNODC and ICPC publication:

> Crime prevention through social development includes a range of social, educational, health and training programmes, such as those that target at-risk children or families when the children are very young, to provide them with support and child-rearing skills. Some early intervention programmes are also referred to as developmental crime prevention, since they try to intervene to develop resilience and social skills among children and their families. (2011, p. 12)

Therefore, in terms of preventing radicalization, a social approach tries to limit the driving forces and motives—in other words, risk factors—that urge individuals to resort to violence. For example, many studies have shown the preponderance of political grievances—especially in reaction to Western foreign policy—as radicalization risk factors. A social prevention approach to radicalization would therefore (1) eliminate or reduce the major causes and sources of frustration and anger and (2) halt radicalization processes as soon as possible (Bjørgo, 2013). As shown later in this report, other measures relate more to the individual factors that can entice a person to become radicalized, such as cognitive factors. For example, some measures attempt to nurture among participants the ability to manage conflicts peacefully and consider the viewpoints of others.

For some, social prevention is the only means to reduce terrorism in a lasting way (Elworthy & Rifkind, 2006). More generally, it also allows the growth of more harmonious, inclusive and tolerant societies (Shaftoe, Turksen, Lever, & Williams, 2007).

Situational prevention, on the other hand, tries to limit an individual's opportunities to commit crime. It therefore aims to increase the risk and effort involved in committing a crime and to lower the reward the individual stands to gain from the offence (ICPC, 2010). As Bjørgo (2013) underscored, situational prevention measures do not directly target potentially criminal individuals but try to influence them indirectly by changing the situations in which unwanted actions might occur. By calculating the costs and benefits of certain actions, criminals may be deterred from acting out.

From a situational prevention approach to radicalization, the goal is to reduce the *opportunity factors* that encourage a radicalization process (see Box 5). Precht (2007) distinguishes between three groups of factors capable of influencing an individual's decision to engage in a radicalization process: background factors, trigger factors and opportunity factors. Opportunity factors comprise places conducive to radicalization, in other words, places that offer an opportunity to meet like-minded people, a source of inspiration or a recruitment location. Among the various opportunity factors, Precht identifies the most common locations: the Internet, prison, the mosque, school, university, youth clubs, work and sporting activities.

From a counter-radicalization outlook, situational prevention measures would include restricting the availability of extremist discourse on the Internet or organizing support groups for prison inmates to reduce the temptation to join an extremist or radical group.

Situational prevention can occur in a wide variety of ways, which means that a host of social players can also be involved in setting them in motion. However, as Kleinig (2000) noted, the drawbacks of certain situational prevention measures is that they can place restrictions on the entire population, not simply ill-intentioned individuals.

Locally-based or **community crime prevention** aims to change local conditions that might be affecting criminal behaviour, victimization and a sense of insecurity. Based on this approach: "Community crime prevention emphasizes community mobilization, using the notion of 'community' in the sense of either a social group or a living environment, and includes the aim of improving the quality of life of residents," (ICPC, 2010, p. 2).

As shown later in this report, community prevention is significant in preventing radicalization; many measures have been developed on the basis of this approach in an effort to improve a community's social cohesion and to integrate the people in it. For example, safe spaces for young people have been created in certain communities to encourage their integration and prevent them from becoming isolated or feeling alienated, which could attract extremist recruiters to them.

Lastly, **reintegration programmes** consist of fostering the reintegration into society of persons who committed crimes. This approach is one of the most relevant to the radicalization issue, and

various measures have been devised to deradicalize persons who are already far along the road to radicalization. An individual may not have committed a crime or an act of violence but, having reached the indoctrination stage, may still pose a threat to society.

To summarize, although these crime prevention approaches may differ in some respects, none of them stop short at crime reduction as their one and only objective. As the ICPC reported in its International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: "the objective of crime prevention extends beyond the absence of crime to the improvement of the quality of life," (ICPC, 2010, p. 2). This ultimate objective is often underscored in the measures described in this report, which implicitly or explicitly take a broader outlook than merely preventing radicalization, but also try to foster social cohesion in communities and the well-being of the individuals that comprise them.

Following this brief introduction to crime prevention approaches, the next section contains background information on counter-radicalization policies. It traces the origin of these policies in an effort to understand the geopolitical events that have shaped the emergence and growth of radicalization as a concern among many governments. We will also identify countries and programmes that have played a significant role in developing strategies elsewhere in the world.

4.1.2 Background on counter-radicalization policies

a) What is counter-radicalization?

The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) defines counter-radicalization as:

> (…) policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer to a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists. (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2006, p. 5).

b) Development of counter-radicalization policies

As shown throughout this report, when seen as the process that leads a person to resort to violence for political reasons, radicalization is obviously nothing new. However, the term's use in political circles is relatively recent. The events of September 11, 2001, in New York certainly sparked concerns about violent extremism in the West. However, specific instances of homegrown terrorism that took place in Europe a few years later raised the issue of radicalisation processes. As pointed out by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008), the term "violent radicalization" came into use in the European Union following the 2004 subway bombings in Madrid. The bombings that followed the next year in London only heightened concerns about the radicalization of Western individuals (see Box 14).

These two events triggered a change in counter-terrorism policies, which gradually took a more preventive approach, and more specifically targeted domestic "radicals" (people who had grown up

and lived in the West their entire life) and non-domestic radicals (Lindekilde, 2012). Despite the lack of a clear and common understanding of radicalization processes, the concept gradually came to dominate the body of policies designed to counter ideological and violent extremism in Europe (White, 2006).

Box 14. Transport system bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005)

On March 11, 2004, ten explosions took 191 lives and injured approximately 2,000 people riding the Madrid commuter train system. The Basque ETA separatist organization was initially suspected, but it later turned out that the bombings were committed by Moroccan Islamists (Silber, 2005).

Illustration 8. Madrid bombings (White, 2006)   **Illustration 7. London bombings (Wang, 2012)**

On the morning of July 7, 2005, four bombs exploded in downtown London; three at a subway station and one in a bus. Over 50 people were killed and 700 injured during the attacks. The four suicide bombers responsible for the explosions were British Islamist extremists (European Monitoring Centre on Racism & Xenophobia, 2005).

Leaders in the field of counter-radicalization policies have been the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark, which have pioneered the development and implementation of strategies to deal with this issue. While elsewhere in the world, such as the Middle East and South-East Asia, programmes to counter radical Islamism have focused more on the deradicalization and rehabilitation of extremist prisoners, these three European countries decided to create community programmes designed to identify and reform individuals in the early stages of the radicalization process (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). The European initiatives went a step beyond radical Islamism and tried to prevent all types of extremism and rehabilitate all types of radicals. The programmes described in this report focus more specifically on radical Islamism and right-wing extremism.

Lindekilde (2012) analyzed counter-radicalization policies in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark to determine their shared characteristics and differences. It is especially interesting that the radicalization model used to support these policies was essentially the same: radicalization as a relatively linear process of escalating extremism. Extremism is defined as having two major components, one cognitive or attitudinal and the other physical or behavioural.

These policies also rely on a common concept of radicalization's development and on the traits of vulnerable individuals. The radicalization scenario underlying these policies, as described by Lindekilde (2012), reads as follows:

1. Adolescents—especially those from an immigration background—isolated, in search of an identity, feeling political frustrated, experience a "cognitive opening" following a specific event at the political, social or personal level;
2. The individual, searching for an alternate lifestyle, is more likely to be approached by "radical entrepreneurs" seeking vulnerable youth;
3. Newcomers, once they enter radical environments, fall under the influence of peers and group dynamics. They reach a stage when they are ready to back up their radical thoughts with action. At this point, a "hardening" process occurs.

Based on this view of the radicalization process, the counter-radicalization strategy involves monitoring individuals most "at risk" and promoting their well-being and personal fulfillment to prevent them from becoming radicalized. Also from this perspective, it becomes difficult to differentiate individuals at risk because of their socio-economic status or integration from those perceived as potential security risks. Concerns about security therefore become closely associated with concerns about community integration, social cohesion and the fight against discrimination (Lindekilde, 2012). One flagrant example of this new approach is the creation of new initiatives (or strengthening of existing ones) in many European Union member states to establish a dialogue with Muslim communities following the Madrid and London bombings (European Monitoring Centre on Racism & Xenophobia, 2005).

Counter-radicalization therefore exists within the broader field of counter-terrorism policies and thus combines certain traditional security policy principles—such as surveillance—and social integration and community cohesion policies (Lindekilde, 2012). The various measures that make up the strategies are based on a supply and demand rationale: counter-radicalization occurs by targeting the "demand" for radical ideologies and the "supply" of extremist viewpoints. By way of an example, Lindekilde (2012) mentions initiatives that try to promote a sense of integration in vulnerable youth, thus lowering the demand for radical alternatives, along with efforts to fight radical discourse on the Internet, designed to restrict the supply of extremist discourse.

In order to implement a comprehensive response, initial counter-radicalization policies enlisted a wide variety of players to allow them to pool their efforts; for example, local police, national security agencies, municipalities, parents, community and religious leaders were encouraged to work together cooperatively (Lindekilde, 2012). The emphasis centred on municipal initiatives since local

authorities were the best placed to detect early signs of radicalization and respond quickly. The programmes vary tremendously from one European Union country to another. However, European strategies are generally flexible, allowing local authorities to adapt their action to the characteristics and needs of their community (Rabasa et al., 2010).

<div style="text-align:center;">

Box 15. Legislative measures

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To date, nations concerned about radicalization leading to violence continue to enact various measures in an effort to prevent their nationals from committing acts of violence, leaving to fight abroad or contributing to various extremist movements. Although most legislative measures since September 11, 2001, at first seem more directly related to terrorism in general, some legal and administrative measures now endeavour to directly counteract radicalization leading to violence, especially certain signs of such violence, like foreign fighters. This section does not claim to provide an exhaustive inventory of all existing counter-radicalization legislation, or even to offer a critical exploration of how certain measures affect members of the public. Instead, it tries to briefly outline the various legal or administrative measures taken to fight radicalization.

This section briefly examines terrorism-related offences, foreign travel measures, loss of citizenship and the issue of terrorism propaganda and the Internet.[36]

Terrorism-related offences

The general interest of nations in a preventive approach to terrorism broadens the concept of terrorist laws (Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet, & Ragazzi, 2014). In fact, many governments include terrorism offences in their criminal codes that extend beyond terrorism strictly speaking to include participation in terrorist groups, inciting others to commit acts of terrorism, terrorist recruitment or training for terrorist purposes (Bakowski & Puccio, 2015). Countries like Germany and Belgium have even enacted provisions making it a crime to receive training for terrorist purposes (Bakowski & Puccio, 2015). Norway, for example, hands down maximum sentences of 30 years of imprisonment for terrorist activities that involve planning or leading a terrorist attack, receiving terrorism-related training, supporting a terrorist organization through financial support, recruitment, fighting, etc. (US State Department, 2015).

Passport confiscation

To address the issue of foreign fighters, several countries have chosen to confiscate travel documents (e.g., passport) to prevent individuals from leaving the area to engage in terrorist activities abroad.

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[36] Other measures are also attributed to counter-radicalization efforts, including: deportation, residency requirements, restricted association, financial measures, work- and school-related restrictions, and so on.

Countries like Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and others confiscate the passports of persons suspected of participating or showing interest in participating in terrorist activities (Bakowski & Puccio, 2015).

Under its *Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act* and amendments to the *Canadian Passport Order,* Canada can "revoke passports" and prevent "travel of those seeking to engage in terrorist activity" (Government of Canada, 2015). Furthermore, in 2013, the *Combating Terrorism Act* "brought in four terrorist travel offences, including making it a criminal offence of leaving or attempting to leave Canada for the purposes of participating in any activity of a terrorist group or facilitating terrorist activity" (Government of Canada, 2015).

The United Kingdom, in its 2015 *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act*, also provides for confiscating the passport of individuals suspected of leaving the country to engage in terrorism-related activities (Government of UK, 2015).

France introduced a "travel ban" applicable to any French citizen trying to leave the country to participate in terrorist activities or travel to a terrorist group theatre of operations, under conditions likely to cause such a person to endanger public safety on returning to French territory (Government of France, 2014a). This provision prevents a French national from leaving the country by "invalidating" his/her passport and identity card (Government of France, 2014a).

Revocation of citizenship

Various countries have instituted measures to revoke the citizenship of nationals with dual citizenship who commit serious wrongdoing in their country of residence. This measure does not specifically apply to radicalized individuals, but rather to various types of individuals who failed to comply with certain conditions.

However, such revocation could apply to radicalized persons in certain circumstances, such as the recent case of Canadian Zakaria Amara, a member of the "Toronto 18" terrorist group, sentenced in 2010 (Radio Canada, 2015). Born in Jordan, Amara's Canadian citizenship was revoked under the new measures enacted in 2015 under the *Citizenship Act* authorizing the Government of Canada to revoke Canadian citizenship from dual citizens or deny Canadian Citizenship to permanent residents who are convicted of terrorism, high treason, or spying offences (Government of Canada, 2015).

Terrorism propaganda and the Internet

Several nations have decided to punish terrorism supporters and the dissemination of Internet propaganda supportive of radicalization. This is specifically the case in France under section 5 of the country's anti-terrorism law of November 2014 (Government of France, 2014b). Specifically, this measures makes it possible to block websites that promote acts of terrorism by asking Internet service providers to deny access to sites that glorify or incite terrorism (Government of

France, 2015). This measure also makes it possible to remove terrorist-type sites from reference lists generated by search engines (Government of France, 2015).

Terrorist propaganda is also punished in Canada and covered by a new *Criminal Code* offence effective under the new *Anti-terrorism Act*, 2015. The new Act also empowers authorities to seize or confiscate "terrorist propaganda material" and to remove "terrorist propaganda from Canadian websites" (Department of Justice Canada, 2015).

4.2   Typology of measures

### 4.2.1   Measures, mechanisms and strategies

As shown throughout this report, radicalization is an extremely complex issue, and developing strategies to prevent it is far from an easy task.

For a more detailed analysis of prevention programmes, we will begin by examining the underlying terminology. Indeed, it is important to distinguish between counter-radicalization **measures**, **mechanisms** and **strategies**. This terminology is based on Bjørgo (2013), who uses it to differentiate various terrorism prevention mechanisms.

A **measure** is an action deliberately put in place to activate a specific *mechanism*. Through the measure, the mechanism's desired effect is neutralized. However, a measure can activate one or more other mechanisms than the one desired, which can be positive or negative. Therefore, a single measure can be used in different strategies, but serves a different preventive function each time. It is possible to determine (1) whether a measure produces the desired effect in a given situation and (2) how the measures were put in place.

For example, a counter-radicalization measure can involve monitoring Internet messages to identify any that are considered problematic or supportive of radicalization. As seen earlier, this measure is consistent with a situational prevention approach since it restricts the opportunity factors that encourage radicalization.

Illustration 9. Model for change based on counter-radicalization measures

A **mechanism** is a process whereby certain factors influence other variables and produce a specific *effect*. It is therefore an explanatory model created to describe how certain measures can produce a specific effect. In other words, it explains the causal ties assumed to be active. A social mechanism is not directly observable; rather, it comprises an assumption about *how* one thing affects another.

If we continue with our previous example, the surveillance of extremist discourse on the Internet can activate a *deterrent* mechanism, i.e., certain individuals will prefer not to broadcast extremist-type messages via the Internet for fear of being arrested by authorities. The effect is therefore to reduce the number of extremist messages on the Web. However, a single measure can activate more than one mechanism, some of which may be unwanted. In this case, people may be deterred from expressing controversial opinions, although these opinions may not be radical or incite violence, for fear of being misinterpreted by authorities and having problems. The mechanism activated is once again a deterrent, but the effect is to violate individual freedom of speech.

Finally, a **strategy** consists of using available measures and resources and incorporating them into an action plan to achieve a specific effect. A strategy can therefore include several measures and is founded on the concept of certain mechanisms. For this report, we will use the terms "strategy" and

"programme" interchangeably, given that our understanding of a programme, as an action plan that includes various measures, is similar to a strategy.

We could have described different counter-radicalization programmes as they exist at the national, municipal and local levels in a number of countries. However, this approach would not have allowed for a clear and effective analysis of the various *measures* that make up these programmes. A single strategy can include a wide variety of measures designed to activate different mechanisms; similarly, a single measure can be used for several strategies. It would have been impossible to develop a programme typology as such considering that the programmes can include a host of measures and seek to create a variety of effects. However, we were able to develop a typology of existing measures that make up these programmes and that concern counter-radicalization.

4.2.2   Description of typology

The measures inventoried in this report can be broken down into different levels, according to the target of the intervention. We identified four main targets: the individual, the relational environment, the community environment and the social environment. These levels relate to those identified in relation to the radicalization process explanatory factors.

At an **individual** level, the measures target radicalized persons—confirmed, suspected or considered at risk—through personal interaction with them. We organized the identified measures into the following categories: enhance the personal skills of individuals identified by the initiative, present a normative religious practice, develop the critical judgement of persons on the Internet and rehabilitate radical or violent extremists. Examples include measures involving young people in mosques or schools, to present them with a normative religious practice, or the many programmes developed by different countries for deradicalizing or disengaging from extremist groups.

In terms of the **relational environment**, we identified measures for persons who have direct contact with radicalized or vulnerable individuals. The two main types of measures identified are front-line worker training and training and support for parents.

Community environmental measures focus on strengthening the community's ability to confront radicalization. In this regard, two major types of measures include creating partnerships, along with community cooperation and support. This may involve initiatives designed to strengthen the community's trust in institutional authorities or to create safe spaces for youth in trouble. Usually, these measures endeavour to foster community resilience, social cohesion and integration of their members.

Lastly, measures at the **societal level** are broader in scope and target society as a whole. Their goal is to lower the likelihood that individuals will become radicalized. Some measures will be instituted to counteract propaganda and extremist discourse, whether by developing counter-discourse or monitoring extremist talk circulating in society. Others will try to counteract more general factors that provide fertile ground for radicalization, such as poverty, alienation and exclusion.

In a separate category, we find centres of expertise and databases, measures designed for sharing information about radicalization and best practices for preventing it. For the most part, these measures are available online to maximize dissemination.

The following section describes these various counter-radicalization measures based on the typology developed. Assessed measures were given priority, along with those that produced the most effective results. We will concentrate on the measures themselves, rather than the mechanisms they can activate, since mechanisms are sometimes difficult to identify.

Through this inventory of counter-radicalization measures, we hope to be able to devise possible solutions and avenues for thought to develop future strategies or improve existing strategies.

4.2.3   Individual measures

a)   Enhanced personal skills

Many primary prevention measures endeavour to develop personal skills in young people to make them more "resistant" to radicalization and extremism. This may involve, for example, developing the ability to manage conflicts, learning to listen to different viewpoints while respecting the other, reflecting and questioning their personal identity in an atmosphere of non-judgement, developing their self-confidence and promoting their participation in civil society. The most effective measures in this regard are those that emphasize experiential learning, i.e., scenarios, plays or activities that elicit cooperation and openness to the other, to allow the participant to play a proactive role in the activity.

As we saw earlier, ideology plays a vital role in the process of indoctrinating people into radical groups. As underscored by Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino and Caluya (2011) in their survey of the literature on the fight against violent extremism, several radicalization models are rooted in the assumption that thought precedes action; in other words, ideology leads to violence. Many of the counter-radicalization measures developed from these models, especially the ones that target individuals directly "focus on preventing people from developing anti-democratic views and belief in the usefulness of violence, or from developing a particular ideology" (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Measures that target these objectives thus take an ideological approach. One type of ideological approach available concerns the "multiplicity of interpretations" (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011).

The multiplicity of interpretations approach is based on the idea that an intervention must not try to convince a person that "their" viewpoint is wrong and "ours" is right. Instead, it promotes the idea that a single issue can be interpreted in a host of different ways and, most importantly, all of them are legitimate. Gregg (2010), for example, states that to be effective, the fight against violent extremism must include the development of a "marketplace of ideas," a space where competing ideas and ideologies can coexist. The components of this marketplace of ideas are (1) a culture of questioning and debate and (2) the inclusion of an uncensored range of opinions. With the existence of this marketplace of ideas, the grievances and solutions proposed by extremist

ideologies could be more easily refuted. For this author, the best way to counter an ideology is to offer a more attractive, realistic and, ultimately, a preferable alternative.

Accordingly, intervention that follows a multiplicity of interpretations approach aims to prove to the individuals concerned that there is more than one way to think about an issue. The goal is not to teach people *what* to think, but rather, *how* to think. Although this kind of objective may seem paternalistic, the idea is to encourage people not to limit themselves to a single interpretation of an issue.

Box 16. *Being British Being Muslim***: Prevention through value complexity**

The method used for the **Being British Being Muslim** programme, called the "value complexity prevention method" (Liht & Savage, 2013, p. 44), is similar to a multiplicity of interpretations approach: it tries to develop a more complex understanding of the different viewpoints and values of others. To achieve this goal, the method enlists the cognitive concept of integrative complexity: a measurement of the intellectual style used by an individual or group to process information, resolve problems and make decisions (Suedfeld, Cross, & Logan, 2013). The higher the level of an individual's integrative complexity, the more his or her ability to think and reason involves a recognition and integration of multiple viewpoints and possibilities.

The rationale underlying the activity relates to the assumption that one factor favouring radicalization and recruitment in extremist groups is the cultural intermingling resulting from globalization (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). This growing mixture of cultures encourages closer interaction among groups with different values, which can make many people uncertain about their identity and behavioural norms (Liht & Savage, 2013). With their values "threatened" in this way, some will be more likely to find themselves in conflict with other groups.

Bearing this in mind, extremist groups can seem especially appealing. They are usually based on a simple world view and a clear hierarchy of values*;* they afford a level of certainty in an increasingly ambivalent and complicated world. Furthermore, their discourse frequently argues that important values are being "threatened" by the "other"—the binary structure of "us" versus "them" or "good against evil" being common to extremist ideologies. As Liht and Savage (2013, p. 46) write:

> Extremist discourse usually emphasizes [sic] one moral value (such as justice for the oppressed or communalism) in regard to an issue to the exclusion of all other values (such as liberty or individualism). This focus on one single value (per issue) reduces the perceived complexity of the social world.

In other words, stronger support for extremist ideas is associated with weaker integrative complexity. The individual's perspective is limited to a single outlook and other possible viewpoints are not taken into account. Furthermore, this inability to make compromises between values and competing viewpoints can easily lead to conflict, sometimes violent, since more involved solutions, or solutions that require collaboration, are discarded (Liht & Savage, 2013).

Suedfeld et al. (2013) obtained interesting results in this regard: they analyzed fifteen extremist groups that differed in their acceptance and use of violence and showed that a growing tolerance for violence was associated with a significant decrease in integrative complexity. Therefore, greater integrative complexity encourages negotiation and the search for peaceful solutions to conflict.

The *Being British Being Muslim* programme was developed with the aim of enhancing participants' integrative complexity, i.e., increasing the complexity of their thinking about issues that radicals might try to exploit would reduce their vulnerability to radical messages. The programme was essentially designed for Muslim youth, potentially attracted to the discourse of Islamist radicals and the issues they raise. During the activity, participants explore their attachment to certain values and what it means to them to be Muslim and British. They listen to the viewpoints of different Muslim speakers on a series of issues, ranging from far right to far left. The issues covered are chosen based on how often they are mentioned in Islamist extremist discourse. This is followed by group activities based on the "Theatre of the Oppressed" teaching method.[37]

At the cognitive level, the activity seeks to produce three effects leading to greater integrative complexity (Liht & Savage, 2013):

1) The first effect is *differentiation*, which reflects the ability to recognize multiple viewpoints or dimensions of an issue.
2) The second effect is *value pluralism*, or the ability to accept the validity of the values that underpin a viewpoint, without necessarily sacrificing competing values. The goal is for participants to realize that there is nothing wrong or unacceptable about differences of opinion and that different values can coexist without one value necessarily taking precedence over the others.
3) The third effect is *integration*, i.e., the discovery of connections or an overarching framework between the different viewpoints. In this way, participants are able to understand why reasonable people can have different viewpoints on the same issue.

Liht and Savage (2013) measured the integrative complexity of 81 participants through seven pilot groups in the United Kingdom, before and after their participation in the *Being Muslim Being British* project. Their findings showed that integrative complexity significantly increased among participants following the activity and that their conflict resolution style was geared more to collaboration and compromise. A similar activity was later developed in Kenya called *Being Kenyan Being Muslim*, and the results following an assessment were equally conclusive (Savage, Khan, & Liht, 2014).

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[37] The Theatre of the Oppressed is a form of theatre developed in Brazil by Augusto Boal in the 1960s and influenced by the work of educator and theoretician Paulo Freire. The audience plays an active role in the performance and explores ways to promote social and political change (Boal, 1997).

This method entails many advantages:

- The activity can be successful, even in the absence of a complete understanding of pathways to violence.
- The approach avoids a hierarchy of values (for example, to promote Western values over other values) and does not force participants to accept a system of values–secular or not. Instead, it holds that, "religious, non-secular values need not be discarded or even tempered in order to achieve social cohesion" (Liht & Savage, 2013, p. 63).
- One vital advantage of the value complexity prevention method is that it targets the *structure* of thinking, rather than the content of an ideology or a community's beliefs. It therefore calls into play a cognitive concept–integrative complexity–that is both specific and measureable and can also be applied to different types of extremism and intergroup conflicts.
- It is extremely difficult to determine whether a measure can prevent radicalization. However, a person's integrative complexity can be measured before and after an activity to identify any improvement. The possibility of performing this assessment is a considerable asset.

In addition to the ideological aspect, other measures also address participant identity issues and lead them to think about their place in society. Specifically, this applies to the Diamant anti-radicalization training in the Netherlands, This training was developed in 2011 by the SIPI (*Stichting Interculturele Participatie en Integratie,* or the foundation for intercultural participation and integration), a citizens' initiative established in 2005 in Amsterdam by three immigrant women. Following two political murders[38] in the country, these women decided to pool their life experience and strategic positions in migrant communities to address the Netherlands' integration problem. They hoped to develop empowerment training methods in a participatory manner, for and by migrant communities (Feddes, Mann, & Doosje, 2013).

The Diamant initiative primarily consists of group training and individual coaching. It comprises the following elements:
1) "Turning Point" personality and identity training during which young people are asked to think about their identity and manage important events in their lives*;*
2) Moral development from an intercultural viewpoint to learn to deal with different opinions and make decisions*;*
3) Conflict management from an intercultural viewpoint.

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[38] Pim Fortuyn, a Netherlands politician with controversial opinions on multiculturalism, immigration and Islam in the Netherlands, was assassinated in 2002. Director Theo van Gogh was also the focus of controversy following the release of his film criticizing the treatment of women in Islam; he was assassinated in 2004.

Researchers from the University of Amsterdam (Feddes et al., 2013) evaluated the activity. Their research was longitudinal: the factors were examined before, during and immediately after the programme, and then three months after the programme ended.

The researchers' assumptions were as follows:

1. *"Self-esteem"* would be higher after the programme;
2. A *sense of having the ability to take action (*knowing what we want and how to get it) would be greater after the programme;
3. The *connection to society* (reduced social isolation) would be greater after the programme;
4. *Juggling viewpoints* (the ability to imagine the viewpoints and opinions of others) would be greater after the programme;
5. *Empathy* (the ability to put ourselves in another's shoes, to feel what they feel) would be greater after the programme;
6. After the programme, participants would be less supportive of violence as a means of achieving their ideals (Feddes et al., 2013).

Questionnaires and interviews were used to measure changes in these factors. The results showed that over time, participants felt less disconnected from society, and after the programme, most of them were in school, working or taking a training programme. Empathy and juggling viewpoints had improved, and participants said they better understood the viewpoints and opinions of others. They were also less supportive of using violence as a means of achieving their objectives once the training was over. Follow-up took place with one group three months after the programme ended. The results showed that empathy and the ability to juggle viewpoints had not diminished over time. Furthermore, most participants were still working or in school and had therefore remained connected to society (Feddes et al., 2013).

The Diamant initiative, like *Being British Being Muslim*, can be used to counter Islamist radicalism or extreme-right radicalism because the skills it aims to develop in participants are factors that enable them to resist radical ideologies or indoctrination of all sorts. These measures lead participants to question their identity, their way of interacting with others and their place in society, concerns that are shared by all individuals, regardless of their background or religious affiliation.

Various national counter-radicalization strategies also stressed the importance of developing personal skills in young people to fight radicalization. One example is Denmark's **Counter-radicalization and extremism action plan**, with a *General Initiatives* component designed to develop social skills, critical thinking and a sense of responsibility in youth (Government of Denmark, 2014). The **Radicalisation prevention plan for schools** in Belgium follows a similar strategy with an emphasis on strengthening the moral resistance of students and offering citizenship courses in school (Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles, 2015).

b) Emphasis on normative religious practice

In the fight against Islamist radicalization, some measures more directly concern religious aspects. The objectives of these kinds of measures may be to increase knowledge among individuals about the diversity that exists within the same religion or to equip them to recognize radical interpretations of Islam.

Several activities were conducted using this approach with the **Slotervaart Action Plan**, in the Netherlands. Slotervaart is a sub-municipality of the city of Amsterdam with a large Muslim population and high crime and unemployment rates. It is also the sub-municipality where many members of the radical Hofstad group were raised, including Mohammed Bouyeri, responsible for the murder of Theo Van Gogh in 2004 (Nuansa, 2007). Following the implementation of a national strategy that stressed the need to counter radicalization at a local level, the Slotervaart sub-municipality was identified as a test case. With a large contingent of youth among its population and second-generation immigrants of Moroccan or Turkish descent, it was considered at risk for radicalization (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014c).

The action plan's major objectives were to (1) raise awareness among youth, especially Muslim youth, about radicalization; (2) help (Muslim) youth become resistant to all (religious) forms of radicalization; (3) stimulate knowledge about diversity within Islam and society (other religions and belief systems).

Thus, in addition to organizing information sessions to demystify radicalization among youth, parents and people who attend mosques, a number of debates were organized. The purpose of these debates was to encourage critical, independent thinking in the youth and to elicit their opinions, primarily about the role of religion and Islam in Western society: What is Islamophobia? How can freedom of religion be maintained? What can be done to stand up against discrimination? What diversity exists within Islam? What values do Islam and Dutch society share? By approaching these various questions in a debate format, the youth were not only encouraged to question their role as Muslims in a non-Muslim society, but also to develop their thoughts and ability to share them.

In Scotland, the **Solas Foundation** tries to promote authentic Islamic education. Established in 2009 by two Muslim academics, the goal was to disseminate an informed and coherent image of Islam, present traditional Islamic teachings on controversial issues and dispel any confusion created by radicalization (Ibrahim, 2010). The foundation developed various projects geared to the target audience; for example, its *iSyllabus* programme for students offers courses based on Islamic scriptural sources that describe the foundations of the religion and their relevance in a contemporary Western setting. One objective of these teachings is to equip students to identify radical interpretations of Islam and to use traditional sources to refute them. Calling on credible teachers is an important component for fostering the programme's success; its two founders, sheikhs Amer Jamil and Ruzwan Mohammed, were born and raised in Scotland, and later studied with well-known theologians in the Middle East. Their theological knowledge and their own

experience of reconciling religion and life in Scotland gives them greater credibility among Scottish students (Ibrahim, 2010).

c) Developing critical judgement on the Internet

Considering the prevalence and ready access to extremist discourse on the Internet, measures were developed to improve the skills and critical judgement of individuals—young people in particular—in relation to the sea of information available on the Internet. These measures sometimes incorporate concepts like verifying sources, understanding search engines and understanding the techniques used to manipulate and radicalize them through the Internet.

In the United Kingdom, the ***Digital Disruption*** programme is specifically intended to improve the skills of youth, particularly their critical judgement of the digital world. The programme was established in 2008 following a project on the negative messages young people receive online, especially the influence of certain YouTube videos on their behaviour and values. Different workshops were organized for young people between 12 and 25 years of age to develop their digital proficiency and understanding. For example, the two-hour "Truth, Lies and the Internet" workshop teaches youth from 12 to 16 years old to identify and deconstruct online propaganda (Digital Disruption, n.d.). Other workshops, like "Conscious Creators" and "Knowledge is Power" teach youth the technical skills they need to create websites, films and online campaigns ("Conscious Creators," n.d., "Knowledge is Power," n.d.). This equips them to identify the various techniques used to create propaganda and develop a critical eye when it comes to Internet information.

Internet awareness workshops in schools are also used in various national counter-radicalization strategies. Under Belgium's **Radicalisation prevention plan for schools**, projects on radicalization, freedom of speech and media education will be developed and educational tools placed online (Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles, 2015). In Quebec, the 2015-2018 Government Action Plan entitled "**La radicalisation au Québec: agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble**" [radicalization in Quebec: act, prevent, detect and live together] has a prevention component that raises youth awareness about the ethical and responsible use of the Internet and social media (Government of Quebec, 2015).

d) Rehabilitating radical individuals or violent extremists: disengagement and "deradicalization"

Many initiatives have been developed to rehabilitate individuals who belong to an extremist group or who have already begun a radicalization process. Two main types of measures are relevant in this regard (Rabasa et al., 2010):

- **Disengagement** measures usually try to rehabilitate radicalized individuals or terrorist groups (alleged or convicted) and reintegrate them into society, or at least deter them from resorting to political violence again (Schmid, 2013).
- **Deradicalization** measures encourage a person to abandon an extremist ideology. As Rabasa et al. described in their report on the deradicalization of Islamist extremists, deradicalization is a process used to try to change an individual's belief system and encourage them to relinquish their extremist ideology and accept the values of the majority.

When these measures target individuals who committed acts of terrorism, they can be considered tertiary prevention or recidivism prevention since the aim is to reduce the likelihood they will commit further terrorist acts. However, this type of measure can also target people in the process of radicalization who have not yet committed violence. From this standpoint, it would be inappropriate to speak of recidivism prevention.

Some programmes incorporate both disengagement and deradicalization measures, while others are limited to one or the other. For example, programmes geared to right-wing extremism generally focus on the disengagement of individuals from an extremist group and provide the necessary resources (financial, material, psychological, etc.) to ensure that the individual and the individual's family are no longer dependent on the extremist network. On the other hand, the ideological aspect is not necessarily addressed during the intervention. However, several prison deradicalization programmes for Islamist terrorists include workers (such as imams) who confront extremist ideology and terrorist beliefs about Islam viewed as false, without necessarily offering ongoing disengagement support.

Given the broad range of disengagement and deradicalization programmes worldwide, we will present a selection that have had an important influence on the development of subsequent programmes. We will begin by focusing on programmes addressing right-wing extremism, which primarily concern disengagement measures, followed by deradicalization programmes in prisons.

Fighting right-wing extremism, racism and xenophobia: "Exit" programmes

"Exit" programmes were first developed in Scandinavia in the 1990s to disengage white supremacists from neo-Nazi groups (Fekete, 2014). Later exported to Germany and then elsewhere in Europe, these programmes have gained momentum in recent years, to the point where the European Commission suggested in January 2014 that all European Union member states introduce them to disengage extremists in an effort to improve their response to radicalization and extremism (European Commission, 2014).

The first "Exit" program was developed in Norway in 1996-1997 (Bjørgo, 2002; Butt & Tuck, 2014). In the early 1990s, several Norwegian communities were confronting problems with racial violence and xenophobia. The city of Brumunddal, facing serious racist tensions targeting immigrants and refugees, established an action plan in 1991 to remedy the problem. The action plan was funded by the national government and involved a partnership between government agencies, the

Brumunddal municipal authority and NGOs (Shaw & Barchechat, 2002). The action plan, which involved government agencies and civil society, was extremely successful and significantly reduced xenophobic violence in the city (Bjørgo, 2002). Major lessons were learned from this action plan: first, problems involving xenophobic and racist violence must be positioned as the entire community's responsibility; second, it can be extremely useful to enlist the support of outside consultants. Following the success of the Brumunddal action plan, the Norwegian central government decided to establish a permanent committee of experts, the "Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action against Racism and Xenophobia" (Bjørgo, 2002) This organization remains in operation and includes researchers, social workers, police officers and others. The committee of experts is mandated to provide support and advice to municipalities and local agencies dealing with problems of racism and xenophobia. Through its work in various municipalities, the advisory service has managed to accumulate and systematize its knowledge, methods and practical experiences. In this way, the Service offers the ideal framework for experts to collectively develop effective methods for countering violence and racism in communities. This collaboration later gave rise to Project Exit (Bjørgo, 2002).

Project Exit – Leaving Violent and Racist Groups was officially created in 1997 as a three-year project, funded by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Children and Family and the Directorate of Immigration of Norway. It was hosted by an NGO and had three primary objectives (Bjørgo, 2002):

- Support youth seeking to disengage from racist or violent groups;
- Support the parents of children embedded in racist or violent groups and establish local parental support networks;
- Develop and disseminate methodological knowledge to professionals working with youth associated with racist or violent groups.

Project Exit in Norway did not involve the creation of an independent agency providing services to youth. Instead, its work is accomplished through local organizations by equipping them with tools and knowledge. In this way, local stakeholders such as social workers, teachers and police officers are trained in prevention and intervention activities with youth involved in racist or violent groups. Two initiatives were developed under the programme: "parental network groups" and "structured youth-parent-professional conversation." These initiatives involve parental training and support and are described later in this report.

Project Exit in Sweden started a year after the Norway organization in 1998. Its objectives were similar to the Norwegian model, but its implementation was slightly different. The work is done with individuals who contact Project Exit directly and is based on a five-step model. Each step represents the process an individual has to complete to leave an extremist movement and return to society. These steps are as follows (Bjørgo, 2002):

1) The phase of *motivation*: The person is still part of a neo-Nazi group but has started to have second thoughts about it and decides to contact Exit. Exit answers questions and offers a meeting with a contact person who has been through a similar process, i.e., a

former neo-Nazi who managed to disengage. This person will serve as a point of contact for the individual transitioning through the disengagement process.

2) The phase of *disengagement*: The person has made the decision to leave the neo-Nazi scene but is afraid of retaliation by other members and is left with no social network. Exit will act as an intermediary between such persons and any social services they may need to disengage and protect their safety (police, psychosocial support, etc.). The contact person they met in the first phase remains available to answer the person's questions or address concerns during the disengagement process.

3) The phase of *establishment*: Individuals have now broken off contact with the extremist environment they once belonged to. They have found a place to live and a means of subsistence, whether with help from parents, social services or a job. Their ties to former friends in their extremist circle are broken, but they now find themselves in a vulnerable position with a limited social network. The contact will try to provide links to a new life or help them expand their social networks. With this in mind, Exit organizes activities for former disengaged extremists to gather together and form ties.

4) The phase of *reflection:* This stage corresponds to an insight process following disengagement from an extremist or neo-Nazi group. Disengaged individuals question the reasons that led them to join such a group, the hate they felt and where it came from, as well as how to start life over again. They begin to realize what they got themselves involved in, whether violence, crime, extremist ideologies, etc. For some of them, this realization is a painful phase and can trigger anxiety, insomnia or bouts of depression. An Exit therapist is therefore available for consultations as needed.

5) The phase of *stabilization*: On reaching this stage, the disengaged individuals have resumed a "normal" life with a job or studies, and their past involvement in a racist or violent group is far behind them. Although Project Exit no longer works with these individuals directly, some of them still keep in touch with their contact person.

In Sweden, active involvement in Exit lasts an average of six to twelve months (Bjørgo, 2002). Front-line Exit workers do not directly address ideological matters; the programme is based on the premise that youth join racist or extremist groups for reasons unrelated to ideology (Briggs, 2014). The emphasis is on the social and emotional reasons that led the person to join an extremist group.

Project Exit in Germany, **Exit-Deutschland**, was co-founded in 2000 by Ingo Hasselbach, a former neo-Nazi, and criminologist and former police officer Bernd Wagner (Fekete, 2014). Like its Scandinavian predecessors, the programme's objective is to provide support structures to people who want out of radical right movements. During one-on-one meetings, participants receive advice concerning their personal safety and legal issues. Work also addresses ideology, to change the perceptions cultivated by extremist beliefs. Exit-Deutschland offers support to family members and friends of persons involved with extremist groups (Ramalingam, 2014).

Despite their popularity, Exit programmes are not unanimously supported. According to Bianca Klose, supervisor of the Mobile Counselling Team against Right-wing Extremism Berlin, placing so much emphasis on extremists can detract from the debate over society's responsibility

for the growth of right-wing extremism, or fail to give a voice to the victims of extremism. She is also concerned about creating a "class of experts" among former neo-Nazis whose experience gives them a predominant place in the public arena. Some become violence and extremism prevention consultants, or work for disengagement programmes like Exit. As Klose underscores, their "expert" status is based on their personal experience, which should not necessarily be confused with professional expertise. She also points out that disengagement from an extremist group is not incontrovertible proof that the associated ideology has been rejected (Fekete, 2014).

Other right-wing extremist disengagement programmes

In addition to the various Exit programmes, other initiatives have been developed to disengage individuals from radical right groups or movements.

The **Tolerance Project** was developed in 1995 in Sweden's Kungälv sub-municipality following the murder of a 14-year old teenager, John Hron, by four youth with ties to the neo-Nazi movement (Lundmark & Nilsson, 2014). Since then, the model (also known as the Kungälv model) has been used across Sweden (Ramalingam, 2014). As a tolerance education programme, its objective is to counteract intolerant and anti-democratic ideas and values among youth. It is designed for high school students identified as being at risk of joining a neo-Nazi group.

The first step consists of identifying youth involved in a neo-Nazi group and then identifying which individuals are more fringe members of the group ("followers") and not actively engaged at the moment, and which ones are the core members. This identification process is performed in cooperation with local stakeholders who have detailed knowledge of the community and its students, such as social workers, teachers and youth workers (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1995). Once the youth gravitating around a neo-Nazi group have been identified, they are invited to participate in the Tolerance Project. The incentive used to entice them to participate in the programme (as part of their regular academic curriculum) is the promise of a trip to Poland once the programme ends (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1995). The project now calls on former participants to share their positive experiences and encourage other youth to participate. (Ramalingam, 2014).

The Tolerance Project combines a Holocaust education model with educational experiences that enable youth to reconsider their beliefs (Ramalingam, 2014). The project includes three main steps:

1) *Break-away activities*: Breaking-away involves separating individuals at the periphery of the group from core members. The programme organizes stimulating activities during spare time so that the youth gradually draw away from the neo-Nazi group and escape the influence of the individuals at its core.
2) *Looking ahead to the future*: This step consists of encouraging participants to think about their future, to visualize the kind of life they would like to have and how their membership in an extremist group could negatively affect it.
3) *Resocialization activities*: During this step, the youth involved in the programme participate in activities with other students who perform well in school and are not considered at risk.

The purpose of this approach is to confront each group with "the other" and reassess any preconceived ideas. These activities also enable youth to develop their own strategies for functioning socially in a group that is unfamiliar to them, making them more resistant to peer pressure.

At the end of the programme, participants take part in an organized trip to Poland, where they can explore the history of the Holocaust and take part in activities that humanize the experience. They can then apply the lessons learned from the trip to their own life experiences (Ramalingam, 2014).

Prison-based deradicalization programmes

In the case of religious radicalism, many programmes have been created to deradicalize extremists or terrorists, particularly in the Middle East, South-East Asia and Europe. Most of these programmes operate in prisons where work can be done with persons found guilty of committing acts of terrorism or hate crimes (Rabasa et al., 2010). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, prisons are considered a radicalization opportunity factor: due to the specific circumstances of a detention facility, individuals isolated from society, their friends and family begin to search for belonging, group identity and protection. As a result, they are more vulnerable and easily accessible to extremist inmates interested in recruiting them (Precht, 2007). Measures have therefore been taken not only to foster the rehabilitation of radicalized inmates, but also to prevent radicalization and recruitment inside prisons.

Given the large number of programmes operating across the world–over forty to date (Horgan, 2015)–we will limit our discussion to one programme per region, selected on the basis of its success and/or international influence. The cases presented therefore include the Saudi Arabian terrorist rehabilitation programme for in the Middle East, Singapore in South-East Asia and Denmark in Europe.

Saudi Arabia has been a major leader in rehabilitation programmes for violent Islamist militants (Boucek, 2008). In fact, the **Saudi Arabian terrorist rehabilitation program** has long been considered one of the best of its kind in the world (Lankford & Gillespie, 2011). It is one of the ten "soft power" counterterrorism measures implemented by the Saudi government in 2004 after a series of bombings in Riyadh in 2003 (Ansary, 2008; Boucek, 2008). The Saudi experience has proven extremely effective and successful and has had a major impact on similar programmes developed in other countries, like Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia (Boucek, 2008).

The rehabilitation programme, which includes religious re-education components and assistance, is designed to encourage prisoners to abandon their radical ideology and to foster their reintegration into society (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The targeted prisoners can be divided into three groups (Ansary, 2008, pp. 118-119):

- "those who planned, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts;

- sympathizers who did not aid terrorists but only sympathized with them and perhaps spoke publicly in support of them;
- and those who have been deceived and are passive and uncooperative with the authorities, but may have provided only limited services to terrorists who they believe are on the true path of jihad."

Although the programme is intended for these three types of prisoners, it is primarily offered to those who were not directly involved in acts of terrorism. It is administered by the Mobilization Committee of the Ministry of the Interior, which in turn consists of four sub-committees: religious, psychosocial, security and media (Ansary, 2008).

An initial step in the programme is to submit prisoners to psychological and social assessments under the supervision of the psychosocial sub-committee. This committee includes over thirty psychologists and psychiatrists who assess the prisoners' psychosocial and financial status in order to determine the type of support that they and their family might need during and after incarceration (Ansary, 2008). In some cases, the inmates are the main breadwinner for their family; it is therefore considered vital to offer them financial support during their imprisonment, not only to ensure that their social network remains intact after release, but also to avoid insecurity and poverty from causing other members of the family to become radicalized (Boucek, 2008). In other words, if medication or psychological treatment is required for the prisoner's well-being, the sub-committee will facilitate the process (Ansary, 2008).

Once the psychological and social evaluations are completed, the religious sub-committee begins the inmate's religious re-education process. This sub-committee consists of over 160 Muslim clerics, theological experts and university professors (Ansary, 2008). Their objective is to refute the radical Islamist ideology used to indoctrinate the inmate in the first place. The first few meetings with the inmate take the form of conversations with sub-committee members involving informal discussions about religion. These members then inform the inmate where they went wrong and present them with accurate interpretations–based on the version of Islam endorsed by Saudi authorities (Horgan & Braddock, 2010)–using texts from the Quran (Boucek, 2008; Lankford & Gillespie, 2011). The approach is personalized: sub-committee members adapt to each inmate's knowledge and misinterpretations (Lankford & Gillespie, 2011).

In addition to this personalized, religious re-education, inmates are asked to take a six-week course during which they and another twenty or so other inmates learn the "true teachings and lessons of Islam" (Lankford & Gillespie, 2011). They must take an examination at the end of the course to assess their progress. Whether they pass the course is taken into consideration when making decisions about release (Lankford & Gillespie, 2011). Individuals found guilty of acts of terrorism, although eligible for the programme, are not eligible for early release (Horgan & Braddock, 2010).

The security subcommittee is responsible for evaluating inmates and making recommendations concerning their release. It also provides them with advice about their reintegration into society and plays a monitoring role once they are released. The media sub-committee produces the

documents used in the programme and develops educational materials for schools and mosques (Briggs, 2014).

Over 3,200 inmates have participated in the rehabilitation programme (Ansary, 2008; Briggs, 2014), and the Saudi government states that the recidivism rate among participants is 3% to 4% (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Lankford & Gillespie, 2011). While the source of this statement may certainly raise doubts about its authenticity, the programme has also attracted its share of criticism. Specifically, this criticism, leveled against it by high-level Saudi leaders, concerns the religious element, described as religious re-indoctrination. As underscored by authors Lankford and Gillespie (2011, p. 122):

> Reindoctrinating terrorists may be the quickest way to change their thinking, but it is also the most fragile, because it is based on rewarding immediate acceptance and conformity to organizational norms, rather than prioritizing more lasting changes in individual thinking.

Lankford and Gillespie developed recommendations on this issue which will be presented later in this report.

Despite its weaknesses, the Saudi extremist rehabilitation programme remains one of the first of its kind and has had a significant impact on the development of subsequent programmes elsewhere in the world.

The **Singapore rehabilitation programme** is considered one of the most comprehensive deradicalization or disengagement programmes in South-East Asia, if not the world (El-Said, 2015; Rabasa et al., 2010). It was developed in 2003, following arrests in 2001 and 2002 of more than ten members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Indonesian Islamist organization affiliated with al-Qaeda, that was planning terrorist attacks against US institutions in Singapore (El-Said, 2015).

The programme's premise is that Islamist inmates have been misled and misunderstand Islam (Briggs, 2014). The programme was based on the Saudi Arabian model described above (El-Said, 2015) and includes five interconnected dimensions for addressing the problem:

- Psychological rehabilitation
- Religious rehabilitation
- Social rehabilitation
- Community involvement
- Family support

During the psychological rehabilitation component, inmates meet with a psychologist on a regular basis to assess their condition and discuss their situation and emotions (Rabasa et al., 2010). The discussions also provide an opportunity to study the inmate's psychological reasoning that led to the decision to join the JI group (El-Said, 2015). The benefits of these meetings are not limited to psychological support; inmates also develop a trusting relationship with their psychologist, which

makes them more receptive to the rehabilitation process. Once released, some inmates stay in touch with their psychologist and turn to them in times of need (Rabasa et al., 2010).

Religious rehabilitation is similar to the deradicalization program used in Saudi Arabia: extremist inmates engage in theological discussions with religious scholars to persuade them that their radical interpretation of Islam is wrong (Rabasa et al., 2010). These scholars are part of the "Religious Rehabilitation Group" (RRG) developed and implemented by two leaders of Singapore's Muslim community who collaborate closely with the government (El-Said, 2015). The RRG now includes some thirty religious advisors, men and women, who have studied at various Islamic institutions (Rabasa et al., 2010). Most took a seven-month training programme on psychological intervention, organized by the government of Singapore (Briggs, 2014; El-Said, 2015). RRG members hold discussions with inmates and their family members and clarify certain ideas expounded by radical JI ideology. For example, they explain to the inmates that, based on the Quran, it is wrong to believe that "true" Islam can only be practised in an Islamic state or that Muslims must hate and avoid non-Muslims (Rabasa et al., 2010). The goal of this instruction is to show inmates that Muslims can live in a secular environment and a multi-denominational society and that there are legitimate, non-violent means to help people suffering in conflict zones (Rabasa et al., 2010).

Social rehabilitation consists of providing inmates with training to develop their occupational skills. For example, they can take courses or work in prison (El-Said, 2015). In this way, they improve their job prospects after release. The government of Singapore sometimes offers guaranteed employment to former radicals on their release from prison (Rabasa et al., 2010).

Community involvement is considered vital to counter-radicalization and to ensure that inmates do not become radicalized again after their release. The government has therefore enlisted the help of Pergas, an association of Islamic scholars in Singapore, to organize conferences and workshops that refute *jihadist* arguments and discourse (Rabasa et al., 2010).

Family support is provided by a community group, the "Aftercare Services Group" (Rabasa et al., 2010) that provides material and emotional support to the families of inmates.

According to Rabasa et al. (Rabasa et al., 2010), the Singapore rehabilitation programme is the closest thing to an ideal model. It includes elements that the authors have identified as factors that foster the success of a deradicalization programme.

- Measures are taken to break an inmate's emotional, material and ideological ties to an extremist group;
- Monitoring and continuous support are provided once the inmate is released from prison and has completed the official programme;
- Credible, competent partners are used to discredit radical Islamism.

Singapore is a multi-ethnic, multi-denominational society where, unlike many other countries that have established deradicalization programmes, the Muslim population is a minority (El-Said, 2015).

Singapore therefore has important lessons about deradicalization to teach other nations with a Muslim minority, particularly Western countries.

Lastly, the **Back On Track** programme in Denmark is the product of collaboration between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration and the Prison and Probation Service. It was established in 2011 in Danish prisons to encourage inmates to abandon their extremist circles, whether the radical left, the radical right or religious extremism (Butt & Tuck, 2014). The targeted prisoners were people accused or found guilty of committing acts of terrorism, or who committed hate crimes (Briggs, 2014). Prisoners considered at risk of radicalization were also included.

The programme enlisted the help of mentors whose goal was to support and motivate inmates to participate in positive networks and to avoid criminal and extremist environments after their release from prison (Briggs, 2014). During meetings with their mentor, inmates were advised about managing problems, conflicts and day-to-day situations (Butt & Tuck, 2014). Developing these skills is intended to assist the individual's reintegration into society after release from prison and lower their risk of recruitment once again by an extremist group. Mentors work in close collaboration with the inmate's family and social circle to provide him with continuous support upon his release from prison and upon returning to society (Briggs, 2014).

The project was introduced through an existing mentorship programme operating in Danish prisons and implemented by the Prison and Probation Service of Denmark. Approximately a dozen mentors were recruited within the existing network and trained by a psychologist to develop their mentoring skills and add to their knowledge of extremism. More specifically, the topics covered included conversation, active listening, conflict management and techniques for the more active involvement of the inmate's family members and social circle (Briggs, 2014).

4.2.4   Relational environment measures

a)   Front-line worker training

Front-line workers, such as teachers, social workers and imams, are often not suitably equipped to deal with radicalization when they confront it. Some measures therefore relate to their training in order to make them aware of radicalization and equip them to identify and prevent it. The material covered by the training can vary, but the information provided usually takes account of local factors, legal frameworks, confidentiality issues, organization-specific issues and good practices in counter-radicalization (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2014).

In France, the **Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance (CIPD)** [interministerial committee for the prevention of delinquency] was assigned a number of tasks under the government's counter-radicalization strategy. Among other things, it organized training for field workers involved in providing support and assistance to families or to youth reintegration (Colombié, 2015; INHESJ, 2015). This two-day training focuses on: knowledge of Islam, *jihad* history, discussion of the legal framework surrounding counter-radicalization, presentation of the radicalization process and cult recruitment (INHESJ, 2015). According to the INHESJ report

published in July 2015, over 1,800 government officers and field workers have taken this training since it started in 2014.

In Germany, the Amadeu Antonio Foundation, dedicated to eliminating neo-Nazism, the radical right and anti-Semitism, established an **Expert Centre on Gender and Right-Wing Extremism**. Its major objective is to include a gender viewpoint in strategies and actions designed to prevent right-wing extremism. Even today, this phenomenon is still perceived as a "male" problem, and the motives and roles of women in radical right movements do not receive the same attention as those of men (Ramalingam, 2014). The Centre is therefore trying to raise awareness among front-line workers about the gender aspect of right-wing extremism and offers relevant training to women kindergarten teachers and workers at youth clubs, community centers and sports associations (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2014).

Training programmes have also been developed for police forces. As front-line workers, community police play a vital role in local-level counter-radicalization, whether in terms of detecting signs of radicalization or through partnerships with local communities in fighting it. However, like all other front-line workers, police officers are not necessarily appropriately equipped to prevent radicalization. The **CoPPRa**—Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation—initiative was developed to fill this gap. Funded through the European Union, the programme was introduced in Belgium in 2009 and then to more than ten other European nations: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Portugal and Spain (OSCE, 2014). The first phase of the project, operating from January 2009 to December 2010, was to develop a practical guide containing instructions for promoting community engagement, potential indicators of radicalization, case studies, legal frameworks and profiles of the different extremist groups in Europe. The objective of the project's second phase, from September 2011 to September 2013, was to update and develop more initial tools for the project, and organize training based on these tools (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2014). Police departments from different countries were able to adapt the material developed by the CoPPRa to their local circumstances.[39]

In addition to police officers, training was also devised specifically for imams, particularly in Morocco. Moroccan imams are required to take training at the **Mohammed VI Institute** since it opened on March 27, 2015, in Rabat (INHESJ, 2015). The purpose of this training is to ensure they teach moderate Islam, expound values of tolerance and moderation, and are able to counter extremist discourse. The Moroccan experience with imam training has attracted interest from many Arab, African and European countries (INHESJ, 2015). Imam training is especially important in countries that operate deradicalization training programmes in prisons. In France, for example, approximately sixty additional chaplains were recruited after the January 2015 bombings in Paris to work in prisons (INHESJ, 2015).

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[39] For an overview of material developed by CoPPRa, visit the official site at http://www.coppra.eu/implementation.php.

b) Parental training and support

Like front-line workers, parents are often ill-equipped to cope with radicalization. Measures have therefore been developed to assist them in this regard through training programmes or by including them in their child's disengagement and deradicalization process.

For example, theme-based meetings were organized under the **Slotervaart Action Plan** in the Netherlands. The purpose of these meetings was to support parents in their role as educators and to try to answer their questions and concerns, such as "What is radicalization?," "How can I tell if radicalization is affecting my children?," "Who should I turn to for help?," and so on. These programmes also try to cultivate a deeper understanding in parents about the shared values of Islam and Dutch society. The goal was to support parents in raising their children from a religious and civic standpoint, so that they would one day want to play an active role in Dutch society, without necessarily feeling they must give up their religious values (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014c).

As mentioned earlier, the Norwegian **Project Exit – Leaving Violent and Racist Groups** focuses on the important role of parents in their children's disengagement from extremist groups. Two initiatives in particular were developed in this area under the programme: (1) parental network groups and (2) structured youth-parent-professional conversations.

The parental network groups were developed to allow the parents of children involved in racist or violent groups to get together and talk. This platform allows them to share their concerns, experiences and advice. Parents derive many benefits from these meetings: they gain a better understanding of the environments in which their children are involved, obtain advice about how to support their children without alienating them, and receive warnings when potentially violent events are planned in extremist circles (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014b). It can also be difficult for parents to speak openly if their child is part of a racist or extremist group, given the possible social stigma involved. This network provides parents with an opportunity to discuss their situation without fear of judgement (Bjørgo, 2002).

The Structured Youth-Parent-Professional Conversation, now also known as **Empowerment Conversation**, has become an extremely popular measure in Norway (Butt & Tuck, 2014; Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1998). Although it was originally part of an approach launched by the municipal police in Oslo to divert youth from right-wing groups, it is now used to address a variety of Norway's crime problems (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1998; Ramalingam, 2014). When a teacher or social worker notices that a young person is engaging in potentially worrisome activities and/or reports membership in a racist or violent group, they notify a preventive police officer. The officer asks the young person and his/her parents to participate in a discussion session to talk about the activity or behaviour that initially raised concerns (Bjørgo, 2002). For the police officer, this meeting is an opportunity to open a dialogue with the young person in a conflict-free setting. The youth is asked to create a "social network map" during the conversation, to identify any connections to known radicals (Ramalingam, 2014). The map is then used to determine the youth's position in a given group and reasons for joining. The conversations are often geared to the person's interests and goals in life, and how belonging to a radical or criminal group could make those goals difficult

to reach. The purpose of the meeting is to encourage the individual to imagine the kind of accomplishments and lifestyle possible outside an extremist or radical movement, and help them leave an extremist group if they are members (Butt & Tuck, 2014; Ramalingam, 2014). If results are not immediately forthcoming after an initial meeting, other conversations might be necessary (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1998). The approach has proven more effective when parents are present for the conversation (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1998; Ramalingam, 2014).

Some measures can serve multiple purposes; this applies in particular to reporting centres. These centres are not simply for identifying individuals who are "at risk" of becoming radicalized; they also provide support to concerned parents and loved ones looking for answers. In France, a national reporting platform, the national centre for radicalization assistance and prevention, was launched on April 29, 2014: ***Centre national d'assistance et de prévention de la radicalisation*** **(CNAPR)**. Attached to the *Unité de coordination de la lutte antiterroriste* (UCLAT), it consists of a mechanism enabling people close to an individual suspected of undergoing radicalization to discuss their concerns. The CNAPR therefore has a dual mandate: to provide support and guidance to people close to radicalized individuals, and to identify situations that may require monitoring by government authorities (INHESJ, 2015). To determine whether a person is in the process of becoming radicalized, the CNAPR relies on a series of indicators. However, as underscored by Arnaud Colombié, special advisor to the *Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance* (CIPD) [interministerial committee for the prevention of delinquency], it was necessary to exercise judgement in selecting these "tipping point" indicators (Colombié, 2015). The two traps to avoid were:

1) Stigmatize a religious practice by confusing radicalization with the practise of, or conversion to, Islam;
2) Minimize the radicalization risk factors that could potentially result in acts of violence.

Accordingly, indicators of separation were given preference over indicators related to physical appearance.

Illustration 10. The *Centre national d'assistance et de prévention de la radicalisation* (Government of France, 2015b)

4.2.5   Measures targeting the community environment

a)   Creation and strengthening of partnerships

In order to facilitate a coordinated effort, various measures have been launched to develop and strengthen partnerships among the different counter-radicalization stakeholders. The goal is to foster cooperation between schools and youth centres, promote interaction between community groups and religious groups, or improve networks among government authorities and community organizations.

The **Slotervaart Action Plan**, developed in the Netherlands and described earlier, has been identified as a model of best practices in prevention; the project managed to bring together a wide range of community players and the community has been receptive to its methods (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014c). The action plan emphasized involvement in Slotervaart by various parties, including parents, schools, mosques, immigrant support organizations, civil society organizations, etc. in the fight against radicalization. Another objective of the partnership among these various parties was to improve social cohesion and mutual trust among Slotervaart residents (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014c).

Again in the Netherlands, the **Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism**, established in 2014, focused on strengthening partnerships and existing networks among the major local and national stakeholders. For example, national government consultants support key stakeholders in Muslim communities who oppose and clearly stand against *jihadism*. They receive media training (to develop their media communication skills) and help as needed. Measures have also been taken to ensure the safety of key figures in Muslim and immigrant communities. Those threatened or intimidated receive enhanced support and are included in the surveillance and protection system. The Action Programme also reinforces local stakeholder networks willing to discuss sensitive issues (such as alienation, radicalization and *jihadist*-motivated travel) in their own community. Lastly, the government provides ongoing support to educational institutions, including certain students active in *jihadist* networks or who have asked for help in this regard. If necessary, consultants are sent to these institutions to advise them about the problem and possible approaches (Department of Security and Justice, 2014).

b) Community cooperation and support

In a number of Western countries, measures have been developed to foster cooperation with various communities, particularly Muslim communities. Some of these measures, including the *Prevent* policy described in the box below, have generated their fair share of criticism and controversy. Nevertheless, other initiatives have been able to establish or enhance the bond of trust between the community and the institutions involved in fighting radicalization; these will be presented next.

<div align="center">

Box 17. *Prevent*, a controversial measure

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The counter-terrorism strategy applied in the United Kingdom, known as CONTEST (*CouNter-TErrorism STrategy*), was developed in 2003 (Rogers, 2008) and has been updated many times since then, particularly due to the frequent controversy it has caused (Barclay, 2011). The strategy revolves around four main pillars, each with its own objectives (Bjørgo, 2002):

- *Pursue:* to stop terrorist attacks;
- *Prevent:* to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- *Protect:* to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack;
- *Prepare:* when an attack cannot be prevented, to mitigate its impact.

The London attacks on July 7, 2005, raised concern in the United Kingdom about the possibility that terrorist threats could be "homegrown" and that individuals born and raised in the United Kingdom could become radicalized there and commit acts of terror. These concerns form the basis for development of the *Prevent* component, dedicated to fighting radicalization (Rogers, 2008).

As described by Ragazzi (2014), the first version of *Prevent* had three objectives:

- Through non-violent counter-narratives and alternatives to violence, refute the ideologies supported by terrorists and others who promote them;
- Support individuals susceptible to radicalization through support and counselling initiatives for persons identified as being "at risk." This objective led to the development of the *Channel* mentorship programme;
- Work with various sectors of society and institutions where the risk of radicalization is high. In other words, work with mosques, religious institutions and neighbourhoods, as well as schools, hospitals and other social services, to better detect and eventually "deradicalize" individuals spreading violent ideas.

Since its inception, at least 200 million pounds have been spent to fund community engagement and education initiatives (Thomas, 2014). The *Prevent* model had a strong influence on similar policies developed in other Western countries (Neumann, 2011; Ragazzi, 2014). In the beginning, however, *Prevent* raised political controversy and was hotly criticized not only over its actual effectiveness in preventing radicalization and acts of terrorism, but also for its impact on relations between the government and Muslim communities (Thomas, 2014). In fact, the policy was blamed for causing one of the most elaborate Muslim community surveillance programmes ever witnessed in the United Kingdom (Kundnani, 2009). As pointed out by Ragazzi (2014, p. 30):

> The *PREVENT* strategy is based on the assumption that recourse to political violence is due to dire economic and social conditions within the Muslim community. It was deployed through local authorities via the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) on the controversial basis of the percentage of Muslim population in designated target areas.

Its mentorship programme, *Channel*, also generated its share of controversy. A feeling emerged within Muslim communities in the United Kingdom that activities considered normal for any other community, such as activity and participation in peace movements, automatically came under the shadow of suspicion when young Muslims were involved, the proof being that they resulted in management by the *Channel* mentorship programme. This reporting bias reflected an inability to recognize the "symptoms" of radicalization (Ragazzi, 2014).

Accordingly, at its very first evaluation by the Communities and Local Government Committee of the House of Commons, it was noted that the strategy had fostered a sense of frustration and alienation among Muslims of the United Kingdom that could contribute in a highly counter-productive way to creating a fertile ground for radicalization (House of Commons UK, 2010).

Nevertheless, despite its flaws, the *Prevent* strategy at least had the benefit of being able to steer the course of development of other anti-radicalization strategies in a direction that avoided the kind of alienation and resentment that it had generated within Muslim communities in the United Kingdom.

Creation of a safe space for the community's youth

One initiative that was especially successful at the community level was the United Kingdom's **STREET** programme (*Strategy to Reach, Empower, and Educate Teenagers)*. It was launched in 2006 by members of the Salafist Muslim community of south London (Barclay, 2011). Under the project, a safe space was created within the community, open 24 hours a day. Young people are invited to come and talk about religious, social and political issues of concern to them, in a safe, informal setting. Workers are qualified and trained to respond to these various questions and encourage the community's youth to speak their minds. They are able to debate topics that bother them, such as their feelings of powerlessness and marginalization, topics often exploited by extremist groups for radicalization purposes (Barclay, 2011).

The *STREET* project received no funding under the United Kingdom's *Prevent* policy. In fact, it was the product of efforts by the Salafist community of Brixton to confront individuals who came to recruit young Muslims in the neighbourhood (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). Since the initiative emerged from inside the community, its credibility and the confidence it received were all the greater; programmes following a top-down approach, i.e., imposed by government, generally receive a cooler reception in the communities (Kundnani, 2012).

What sets the *STREET* project apart from many other counter-radicalization initiatives is that it does not seek exclusively to encourage community cohesion and resilience in response to extremist recruitment; one of its main objectives is instead to directly confront the extremist threats with street-level outreach (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). The project is based on local networks that were already firmly established in the community, with a proven reputation and trustworthiness. The approach also reflects the neighbourhood reality; the project enlisted the participants' sense of belonging as Londoners, rather than British citizens, since it means more to them as an identity (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). Adapting to the local reality is one aspect of the *STREET* project that contributed significantly to its success and that should be included in every radicalization prevention initiative.

A second guarantee of successful intervention is the credibility of *STREET* project staff. They have both the skills and "street" experience as well as religious knowledge of Islam. Not only are they credible in the eyes of neighbourhood youth, they are also able to effectively rebut the arguments of radical recruiters (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010).

Strengthen community trust in institutions

Sometimes, the community takes a distrustful attitude toward certain institutions (like the police or government institutions), making it difficult to cooperate with institutions interested in fighting radicalization. Measures have therefore been specifically developed to strengthen community trust.

Kosseim (2011) notes that NYPD officers in New York encountered four main difficulties in their attempts to collaborate with the Muslim community:

- The community's distrust of them

- A lack of cultural sensitivity among police officers and other forces of law and order
- Language barriers
- Concerns among certain citizens about their immigration status

Initiatives were taken to remedy these problems, such as sporting activities between police and community members, and police training to improve their cultural sensitivity (Kosseim, 2011).

Another programme implemented to restore trust between authorities and Muslim communities is the **Community Approach Program** implemented in 2007 in Sydney, Australia. The programme was initiated in large part by a Muslim police officer, Sam al-Mugrabi, who noticed a large number of Muslim youth wandering the streets, most of them unemployed drop-outs getting mixed-up in the drug world and without solid family ties (El-Said, 2015). Afraid they might become easy prey to radicalization and extremism, he decided to take action and worked on developing a programme.

Community liaison committees were created; they each include three workers: a psychologist, a social worker and a police officer. The three travel the streets of the town at night to identify "hot spots" where youth are congregating. Other local workers assist in the identification process, such as imams, community leaders and schools. Once the "hot spots" have been identified, the youth are approached by a liaison committee member, usually the social worker (El-Said, 2015). The social worker talks to the youth and tries to address topics like the importance of education, a good job, good family relationships and making a place for themselves in society. Their social and economic needs are also assessed and, as needed, the worker can refer them to government agencies responsible for the relevant services (El-Said, 2015). Liaison committee members therefore seek to create ties between these youth, at-risk and disconnected, with institutions that can help them.

The **Aarhus Program** in Denmark adopted a similar approach in creating liaison officers between the community and authorities. The programme enlists the help of approximately 125 community members known as "scouts" or "monitors." They can be parents, teachers or outreach workers, but all have received psychological training to prepare them for their work. Their role is to identify individuals presenting signs of possible radicalization in progress; for example, if they are growing increasingly isolated, praying more, starting to listen to religious music or dressing differently. If their suspicions seem increasingly founded, a team of approximately ten persons is created to gather as much information as possible about the person in question from family, friends, etc. After these meetings, they decide whether direct intervention with the individual is necessary. If so, they ask them to come to an informal meeting at the Aarhus police station (Ertel & Hoppe, 2015).

4.2.6 Measures targeting the societal environment

a) Countering extremist discourse

Many measures have been developed to confront extremist discourse. These may be counter-discourse on the Internet that confront and contradict the extremist arguments posted, or media campaigns to discredit extremist groups. Other measures focus more on monitoring and

eliminating extremist and hateful comments, whether online or elsewhere in society. More specifically, we will present a few Internet-based counter-discourse and monitoring measures.

Internet counter-discourse measures

The Internet is a highly effective radicalization and recruitment space. Countering extremist propaganda online is therefore an important situational prevention measure for reducing opportunity factors that could encourage someone's radicalization. However, the task can be extremely difficult. Schmid (2015) notes that the Islamic State produces an average of over 90,000 tweets a day and publishes its messages in about twenty languages. Activity on this scale is difficult to match by governments trying to control online propaganda.

In France, the **Stop-Jihadism** Internet site was launched in February 2015. Its objective is to decrypt *jihadist* recruiting, deconstruct the discourse used by terrorists on the Internet and in social networks, and to reveal the truth of the daily reality in zones controlled by terrorist organizations (INHESJ, 2015, p. 24). However, this media campaign generated some controversy. One of the documents disseminated on the site, containing nine criteria indicating possible *jihadist* radicalization (see **Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.**) drew mockery by the English-language press. Journalists considered the various signs highly subjective, if not verging on the ridiculous or self-deprecating, such as the baguette pictogram—the perfect symbol of French food—used to indicate a change in eating habits, or the "highly surprising" sign that extremists might visit extremist websites (Le Cain, 2015). However, this mockery only underscores the actual difficulty in detecting radicalization. The radicalization process varies from one individual to another, and the different criteria presented in the campaign do not necessarily mean that a radicalization process is underway.

Illustration 11. Early signs of jihadist radicalization (Le Cain, 2015)

Nevertheless, some media campaigns have deliberately used humour to deflate extremist sentiments. This was the case for the United Kingdom's ***English Disco Lovers***. The purpose of this group, created in London in 2012, is to fight the online presence of the *English Defence League*, or EDL, a xenophobic, racist and Islamophobic radical right group. To do so, the *English Disco Lovers* try to limit the extremist group's presence among the main results of a Google search using the term "EDL" (Ramalingam, 2014). They keep attention focused on this issue on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, and also organize disco-themed events during *English Defence League* demonstrations, where they dress in wigs and colourful clothing. Using this approach, they have managed to broadcast their message of peace and respect, while mocking, ridiculing and ultimately discrediting the extremist discourse. Disco was chosen intentionally: disco music, from its early days in the 1970s, has been associated with cultural difference and disco clubs were a place for gathering and for solidarity among marginalized racial and homosexual communities (Frank, 2007).

Ramalingam (2014) underscores the importance of using the same strategies as extremists to develop effective counter-discourse, i.e., emotion, technology and culture. These methods are more effective than simply disputing radical comments. She notes, for example, the effort to take control of Twitter hashtags, such as #creepingsharia, originally used by radical right extremists. Its humorous conversion by activists is designed to show the ridiculousness underlying the idea of a "Muslim invasion."

Other counter-discourse initiatives targeting online extremists include the Saudi Arabian government's **tranquility campaign** (Ansary, 2008). It forms part of the ten "soft power" counter-terrorism measures introduced by the Saudi government to derail the activities of individuals promoting violent extremism. The campaign is run by volunteers (academics, psychiatrists, etc.) who visit extremist websites, forums and chat rooms to engage in dialogue with the people who use them. By presenting alternatives to the extremist sentiments, they hope to be able to halt the spread of Internet radicalization and recruitment (Ansary, 2008).

More recently, in July 2015, the United States and the Arab Emirates announced the launch of a strategic communications centre known as the **Sawab Center** based in Abu Dhabi. The purpose of the Centre is to counter terrorist online propaganda, particularly that of Daesh. To do so, the *Sawab Center* plans to increase the intensity of online debates featuring moderate and tolerant speakers from across the region and emphasize inclusive and constructive content (US State Department, 2015). The Center has also agreed to develop a network of individuals dedicated to denouncing Islamic State propaganda, recruitment and funding activities.

Internet monitoring measures

Other measures designed to counteract extremist discourse consist of monitoring and censoring comments considered problematic on the Internet. This method is an example of situational prevention, given that it tries to limit an individual's opportunity to become radicalized via the Internet by restricting the availability and visibility of extremist sentiments.

This is the case specifically for YouTube's **Trusted Flaggers** programme. As part of this programme, experienced individuals are recruited to detect videos with malicious content on the host site. These videos are then analyzed in priority and removed as necessary. A partnership was thus initiated between YouTube and the Against Violent Extremism network, composed of former extremists and gang members. They receive training from computer specialists and, using their experience and understanding of extremist group culture and ideology, they are able to quickly identify videos containing malicious or hateful content (Ramalingam, 2014).

b) Fighting general factors conducive to radicalization

Various factors have been identified as conducive to the development of radicalization, such as racism, poverty, exclusion, discrimination and so on (see page 34). Measures that address more than radicalization have been developed to combat these problems and can lead to many other

consequences. They can consist of measures that promote socio-economic development in a neighbourhood in difficulty or the creation of practical training and work opportunities for youth.

In its **Amsterdam Against Radicalisation** action plan, the municipality of Amsterdam in the Netherlands targeted representations of minorities in the media. A media review was conducted in collaboration with Muslim youth to analyze how Muslims and Islam are covered in the media. The youth were able to share their impressions concerning how they were represented and suggest possible solutions. Workshops were then held with journalists to make them aware of potentially problematic and discriminatory language and images (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2007).

Morocco and Algeria have also implemented **socio-economic development plans** to prevent the spread of radicalization (INHESJ, 2015). In Algeria, for example, over 190 billion Euros were invested by governments during the 2010-2014 period to support local development. As reported by the INHESJ, these measures have enabled:

> [translation] an increase in the number of dwellings, development of infrastructures for youth (community stadiums, sports complexes, playgrounds, etc.) and lead an ambitious policy against unemployment (training and qualification programmes, micro-enterprise and micro-activity development, employment, waiting-time mechanisms, etc.). As a result, over 1.6 million young people have received job placements and employability upgrading and some 800,000 young people are still under placement contracts. (INHESJ, 2015, p. 31)

Work in Morocco was done along the same lines through the **Initiative nationale pour le développement humain** [national initiative for human development] launched in 2005 (INHESJ, 2015). Its objective is to fight poverty, insecurity and social disparity. In doing so, it emphasizes a participatory approach that fosters effective local governance (INHESJ, 2015).

Box 18. Centres of expertise and databases

In order to share information and best practices in radicalization prevention, many centres of expertise and databases have been developed. These measures enable stakeholders in the field, academic researchers and prevention policy developers to access the most up-to-date information available on the issue, and they foster cooperation among different players.

The Australian government launched the website **Living Safe Together: Building community resilience to violent extremism**, which contains a large amount of information on a range of topics. In particular, it discusses the nature of radicalization, government initiatives designed to prevent it, and current community projects underway in the various Australian States to make the community more resistant toward extremism and violent ideology. Government grants for research projects designed to counter a community's susceptibility to violent extremism are also presented (El-Said, 2015). This vast array of resources is especially useful for communities

interested in developing their own project to fight violent extremism, and the examples given can help guide their development.

In Norway, two databases were created to disseminate counter-radicalization and crime prevention information: *The Toolbox of Radicalisation and De-radicalisation* and *Wiki-Prevent*. **The Toolbox of Radicalisation and De-radicalisation** was developed to provide community organizations and police dealing with radicalization and extremism easily access information and tools for responding to them. The database contains methods and practices for combatting crime and extremism in local communities under various circumstances. It offers a series of approaches organized into five sections: interdisciplinary cooperation, prevention, triggers, intervention and deradicalization (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014d). **Wiki-Prevent** is an online encyclopedia (currently available in Norwegian only) used to share information on prevention techniques in different cities. The portal is extremely useful to Norwegian communities; it encourages the sharing of knowledge and experience among different cities in countering extremism and brings all of the information together in a single space (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014d).

One extremely useful resource in countering right-wing extremism is **The FREE Initiative** online resource. This voluminous resource contains the experiences and best practices of over ten European countries in fighting right-wing extremism in Europe. It offers definitions of the problems, interactive maps showing the location of different extremist groups in Europe, guides to deal with specific problems, case studies and films available for educational use. *The FREE Initiative* is the product of a project mounted from 2012 to 2014 by the Swedish Ministry of Justice and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, with the support of the European Commission, entitled "Preventing and Countering Far-Right Extremism and Radicalisation: European Cooperation." The project included field work in ten European countries and interviews with over one hundred workers fighting right-wing extremism. The project led to the development of reports, worker guides and a network of experts active in fighting right-wing extremism across the whole of Europe (The FREE Initiative, 2014).

Lastly, some centres of expertise have a physical database, in addition to a virtual data base, for example, the **Nuansa initiative** in the Netherlands. This centre of expertise and advice was created by the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior in 2011 to ensure the sharing of knowledge on radicalization and extremism (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014a; Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2011). The Nuansa advisory service provides information and advice tailored to the needs of a vast range of ridings with questions or concerns about radicalization or extremism. It also provides strategic advice to municipalities on counter-radicalization best practices, assists members of the public in recognizing signs of extremism, develops relationships among front-line workers to encourage more effective intervention, and encourages youth and parents to express their concerns in case of potential extremism. In addition to this advisory service, Nuansa also offers a dissemination database that acts as a depository for information and includes local and national strategic documents, handbooks, evaluations and media documents (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, 2011).

Prevention lends itself to two paradoxes. First, since prevention addresses factors underpinning a phenomenon, its tie to the phenomenon is always indirect. In other words, although the ultimate outcome is to prevent terrorist attacks, prevention, particularly social prevention, works only through measures that are themselves far removed from violence, such as social integration. Furthermore, if the prevention is successful, its tie to the absence of a phenomenon will be difficult to establish. This observation is at the core of the evaluation problems targeting this type of programme. Therefore, social prevention wrestles two shadows: the shadow seen, but distant from the measures implemented, and the shadow never seen as long as the response is effective.

This dual paradox provides a context for the difficulties inherent in a topic as complex as violent radicalization which primarily calls for reactive, emergency measures and visible action, compared to prevention, which works on a different timeline. In fact, social prevention centres on medium- and long-term measures; prevention works today so that young people do not resort to ideological violence in the next five, ten or twenty years. This does not imply a failure to react. The fact that prevention works over the long term is not to say it is a topic for future discussion. On the contrary, prevention involves urgent work accomplished <u>now</u> and on an ongoing basis, with the awareness that the desired results will be achieved in future years.

Furthermore, prevention is by no means a precision tool. If we address the factors underlying radicalization, we also touch on other phenomena related to these factors. Community integration does not relate exclusively to radicalization: it also concerns social cohesion, a reduction in crime, a sense of belonging, happiness, a feeling of security, and so on. Therefore, successful prevention programmes have been complex, holistic, intersectoral and inclusive of different systemic levels (see page 26). Conversely, programmes targeting other phenomena can touch on or prevent radicalization. Migrant integration programmes are a relevant example (ICPC, 2014).

Finally, prevention is not entirely limited to addressing risk factors in order to avoid them, but also includes work on protective factors. This is probably one of this study's most important findings: a large majority of studies and intervention programmes are directed at risk factors, while neglecting factors that can bolster resilience among individuals and communities confronting violent radicalization. As Neumann and Kleinmann (2013) mention, there is no radicalization field of study, just as there is no counter-radicalization field of study. Apart from the non-radicalization model by Cragin (2014), studies have focused so far on factors that explain the process, not the factors preventing it.

To expand upon the major observations of this report, this conclusion is divided into two parts: the first concerns the issues and challenges facing the study and the prevention of radicalization leading to violence, and the second offers recommendations for prevention programme implementation.

5.1 Issues and challenges

5.1.1 Limited knowledge of the topic

Many authors agree that the empirical research on radicalization prevention that is available is insufficient (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Zeiger & Aly, 2015, see also Box 4). Although several radicalization process models have been developed,[40] most of them exist out of context and do not address a specific, localized situation of radicalization and recruitment. This applies to the linear trajectory models of radicalization discussed earlier. There is an even greater lack of research on right-wing radicalization compared to Islamist radicalism, considering its importance, especially in North America.

For the purposes of our study, for example, only 11 of a total of 32 factors inventoried for the two types of radicalism were a matter of some consensus among researchers, including four about two types of radicalism, five exclusively on Islamist radicalism and two exclusively on radical right radicalism. At an individual level, for example, the studies agree that right-wing radicalized individuals and Islamists are usually men who are younger than the general population to which they belong. There is also consensus that the search for identity is important to Islamist radicals and that right-wing extremists are associated with nativism and xenophobic thinking. At a relational and community level, the researchers agree that personal and informal networks are essentially contained within the radicalization process. The presence of charismatic leaders within both types of radicalism and community isolation are risk factors in the case of Islamist radicalism. At the macrosocial level, the consensus surrounding Islamist radicalism is complete. In this regard, the researchers agree on two observations: (1) weak or unstable nations are more likely to experience terrorist attacks, (2) conflicts in Muslim countries and Muslim integration problems in Western countries affect the radicalization process.

These weak observations reflect the difficulty involved in creating profiles of radicals, even though this measure is fairly widespread among the measures instituted by different governments. As underscored several times in different studies, there is no single radical profile. However, these findings generally relate to global studies or international comparisons that disregard local factors. One assumption that requires more work is the fact that these profiles are more relevant when studied at the local level. Gradually, however, as we approach the local level, the number of radicalized individuals complicates this type of approach. Zeiger and Aly (2015) underscore that research on this topic is nonetheless vitally important to develop effective measures based on and adapted to local situations, which have their own radicalization and recruitment realities. Zeuthen (2015) picks up this comment, reminding us that an individual's weaknesses and the motivating factors leading to a radicalization process cannot be understood except in relation to local, regional and world politics. The research must therefore focus on radicalization at this level, i.e., by making

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[40] See the relevant section of our report.

allowance for the fact that radicalization diagrams and processes are subject to change at the whim of politics.

5.1.2 Persisting evaluation difficulties

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of radicalization prevention programmes. As underscored by Schmid (2013), how can we determine whether a radicalization prevention programme stopped a terrorist attack? Was it simply that no terrorist attack was attempted? Accordingly, we confront two challenges: to determine *whether* the programme was successful in preventing radicalization (or rehabilitating radicalized individuals), and if so, *why* (Horgan & Braddock, 2010).

El-Said (2015) also notes the difficulty inherent in accessing data in such a politically sensitive field as radicalization, monopolized by government; in his opinion, government representatives have every reason to exaggerate the effectiveness of the policies they implement and minimize their failures.

Accordingly, the absence of radicalization prevention programme evaluations is glaring. Christmann (2012), for example, systematically reviewed the literature on radicalization processes and extremism prevention programmes as part of a national evaluation by the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. The review identified only two prevention programmes in the United Kingdom targeting Islamist radicalization that had been evaluated: the *Muslim Contact Unit* (MCU) and the *Street Project*, described earlier in this report.

The issue of programme evaluation is all the more urgent now that European countries are currently facing a financial crisis leading to major budget cuts that have not spared the counter-radicalization sector. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have been sorely affected (Lindekilde, 2012). This situation entails additional pressures when it comes to developing counter-radicalization strategies, and the issue of policy effectiveness and their cost-benefit ratio becomes a major issue for their developers.

5.1.3 The absence of a gender perspective

The gender perspective is associated with the role of women in society and how they approach the social and material reality. Therefore, since women are rarely involved in radicalization processes, a gender perspective could easily be overlooked. This outlook, however, is misleading for two reasons.

First of all, a gender perspective is not limited to the study of women only. Although a large majority of radicalized individuals are men, there is room to question the reasons why men engage in this type of struggle and women do not. What ties exist, for example, between the use of ideological violence and constructs of masculinity? This study offers a few leads on this topic, particularly in the section on explanatory factors, in discussing the relationship between radicalism and constructs of traditional gender identity, whether in Islamist or right-wing radicalism. Studies with a gender perspective have primarily been addressed in conjunction with other types of violence and crime.

Additionally, women have started to play a significant role in radicalization, as various researchers have pointed out (Blee, 2005; Knop, 2007; Ness, 2005). The question at issue is not only to determine whether women are engaging in armed conflict, but also what role they play in it and how we can understand radicalization from a gender perspective.

5.1.4 The absence of protective factors and limited use of social prevention in the strict sense

Most research focuses on risk factors, not on factors that protect against the process of radicalization leading to violence. The difference in that approach is that those factors make it possible to render the communities and individuals more resilient, by strengthening the positive aspects of their lives. Cragin's non-radicalization model, mentioned in Box 13, tried to address this aspect. However, more studies are needed to confirm these ideas. Furthermore, the model applies only after individuals have already been exposed to a radicalization situation (secondary prevention). And yet, work based on protective factors, although possibly addressing persons or communities already exposed to violent radicalization, primarily reaches them long before the phenomenon occurs. This is an approach to consider as part of all social and primary prevention measures. It avoids stigmatizing the communities by emphasizing strengths rather than negative factors, and it therefore focuses on promoting rather than discouraging a type of behaviour. However, this aspect was barely touched upon in the literature and among the measures inventoried. In fact, cooperation and community support measures and efforts to counter general factors conducive to radicalization can be considered part of a social prevention-type approach.

5.1.5 The importance of working with the community and two-way social integration

Concerning the previous observation and the marginalization and stigmatization of Muslim communities (see below), this review highlights the importance of working with communities, particularly the cultural communities, to counteract radical discourse and recruitment efforts. It underscores the risk of isolated communities that can comprise opportunities or vectors for radicalization (see page 41). A dual identity, however, to the country of residence and the minority group, makes it possible to channel an individual's political action through the official political system, thus reducing the risk of violent radicalization (see Box 11). In this way, key intervention is precisely designed to break down barriers and build bridges among these communities and society in general, rather than abandoning the field to Islamophobic discourse, an even greater responsibility for politicians and the media.

Furthermore, as underscored in our 4th International Report on the topic of migration (ICPC, 2014), social integration is not a one-way process for immigrants or cultural communities alone, but rather a two-way integration effort between the community and society in general. Therefore, to succeed in building a bridge, both the community and society must adapt to one another, an effort that seems more difficult in Europe than elsewhere (see Box 11).

5.1.6 Familiar tools

Certainly, some counter-radicalization measures are innovative. A large majority, however, are based on familiar approaches known within the broader prevention field. Examples include worker training or partnership work. The novelty therefore lies in the application of preventive measures to a field surrounded by repressive action. Accordingly, while radicalization prevention is by no means new, it nevertheless appears to be a viable strategy for countering violent extremism. Adapting existing prevention tools used in other fields therefore seems promising. For example, the immigrant integration work component is a format that could be used to work with communities, not against them.

5.1.7 Marginalization and stigmatization of Muslim communities

As seen in the case of the United Kingdom's *Prevent* policy, one of the major criticisms levelled at radicalization prevention policies is that their approach seems to deliberately target specific communities, especially Muslim communities, which are often reduced to "the" Muslim community, stripped of all diversity (Liht & Savage, 2013). Lindekilde (2012) notes:

> A number of studies have pointed out how much official counter-radicalisation discourse in northwestern Europe has been centred on Muslim communities and the perceived link between Islam and radicalisation, often problematizing entire communities rather than the exceptional few who flirt with extremism and violence. (p. 339)

This counter-radicalization discourse is incorporated into the broader discourse of "new terrorism" used by experts in the security field in reference to "Islamist" terrorism, an unpredictable and unprecedented global danger (Spalek, 2010). This has gradually led to the heightened surveillance and control of Muslim communities, thus positioned as "suspect" communities (Spalek, 2010). *Prevent* offers a relatively blatant example: this program allocated its funding in proportion to the number of Muslims in a given community (Kundnani, 2009).

Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) argue that radicalization as a concept and industry contributed to the stagnation of certain Muslim group and individuals, and to their exclusion from political processes in the United Kingdom. Radicalization discourse encouraged the media and government to engage in a process of differentiating between "good" and "bad" Muslims, the good being those who support the government's political plans at home and abroad, and the bad being those who oppose and criticize these policies (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). Ragazzi (2014) adds to the discussion with the example of young Muslims in the United Kingdom who joined in pro-Palestinian demonstrations and were referred to the *Channel* mentoring programme, described earlier in this report.

Therefore, to be considered a legitimate partner in the fight against radicalization and terrorism, a Muslim community—or its representative at least—had better not criticize the "war on terror" and would be wise to conform to government policy (Spalek & Lambert, 2008). This choice of partners poses a problem in terms of community representatives: participants in the study by Choudhury

and Fenwick (2011) said that community leaders not officially elected to represent the community nevertheless received funding under the *Prevent* programme in the United Kingdom because their viewpoints were compliant with and did not challenge those of the government. It is especially problematic that this kind of situation should occur if we consider that these "community representatives," whose legitimacy is challenged within the community itself, are intended to serve as intermediaries between government authorities and the community.

Thus, Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) complain about what they term "conventional thinking on radicalization," that is, all the media and political discourse used in reference to radicalization—having stripped the term of its scientific value. It is now nothing but a political label, used like a tool of power by government to control Muslim communities. This criticism has also been reported by other authors (including Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly & Jarvis, 2014; Kundnani, 2012; Ragazzi, 2014).

5.1.8   Respect for individual freedoms

Censorship of public discourse

Monitoring discourse spoken in the public arena can be problematic given the ambiguity of the term "radicalization" and of what exactly constitutes radical discourse. For example, as the European Commission's Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force pointed out (ECEGVR, 2008), the relationship between the term "radicalization" and "radicalism" can create confusion. The ECEGVR notes that radicalism, as the expression of legitimate political thinking, supports change and the restructuring of social and political institutions; however, the desire for social or political change is not an automatic indication of an intention to resort to violence. In its report, the ECEGVR stresses the fact that radicalism challenges the legitimacy of established standards and policies but does not in itself lead to violence (2008, p. 5).

Moreover, the monitoring and censure of certain discourses deemed to be radical can inhibit the diversity of opinions and viewpoints in the public arena. For example, Ragazzi (2014) underscores the fact that promoting "moderate Islam" can contribute to limiting the political representation of different points of view. In the United Kingdom, and in the Netherlands, governments collaborate with ideologically moderate organizations. This approach can potentially be counter-productive in two respects: it can undermine the credibility of certain partner organizations, making them seem like nothing more than mere instruments for disseminating government discourse, and it delegitimizes non-violent organizations by refusing to collaborate with them on the grounds that their policies are incompatible with those of the government (Ragazzi, 2014).

Surveillance of individuals

It is important that teachers and workers in contact with youth are not turned into counter-terrorism surveillance instruments of the State (Kundnani, 2009). Kundnani reports that this issue emerged in the *Prevent* policy: "to turn public services into instruments of surveillance only serves to alienate

young people from institutional settings that would otherwise be well-placed to give them a sense of trust and belonging" (2009, p. 7).

Lindekilde argues that "the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies is intimately related to the maintenance of limits of tolerance in ways which ensure that violent extremism is prevented and fundamental security is obtained, while individual freedoms are respected." (2012, p. 336). The major challenge facing political decision-makers is therefore to develop strategies that can prevent violent extremism while respecting individual freedoms—particularly freedom of speech—of all concerned.

5.2   Recommendations

Following our review of the literature and the various measures introduced to fight radicalization and violent extremism, we will now make recommendations on preventing radicalization. These recommendations are presented in the same format used throughout this report: differentiated by the entity in question: individual, relational environment, community environment or societal environment. Some of the recommendations go beyond this framework and will be presented early on in a separate category.

5.2.1   General recommendations

The importance of radicalization opportunities

Opportunities for radicalization can become a basic analytical tool for explaining the process of radicalization, acting out and prevention measures (see Box 5). Opportunities are contextual or situational variables that allow the possibility of radicalization or acting out. Individual characteristics alone are not enough to explain engagement in this process and in acts of terrorism. For an explanation, we must look to situations where this characteristic is apparent. It is therefore advisable not only to consider the individual as such, but also the individual in his or her context. Paradoxically, individual-centred models overlook the choices that individuals make during this process. Presented in this way, radicalization seems to be a process triggered under certain specific conditions, beyond the will of the individuals. On the other hand, a situational approach focuses on the individuals' choices under the same conditions. The combination of certain individuals and certain environments creates specific situations that allow a person to become radicalized. Prevention therefore endeavours to act on this relationship and thus inhibit opportunities for violent radicalization.

Reinforce protection and non-radicalization factors

This approach involves promotion rather than inhibition. The aim is to promote factors that reinforce characteristics already present in individuals or communities and that have some influence over the counter-radicalization and social or individual resilience process. This is what is involved in strengthening critical judgement in youth about the Internet, or gaining a broader knowledge of

religion. In the case of the community, it means fostering a dual identity and pride, in the society of residence and in one's cultural community.

Common information-sharing platform

Zeiger and Aly (2015) comment on the advisability of developing a platform to foster cooperation among persons developing radicalization prevention policies and strategies and others researching the topic. This type of platform would ensure that relevant data, best practices, research methods and lessons learned could be shared among various stakeholders working on the issue or radicalization prevention. The authors underscore the fact that collaboration between government and researchers has begun and networks have been developed, but a shared platform is still awaited, making it difficult to consolidate information in a single location. Ramalingam (2014) adds to the topic, mentioning that information should be disseminated on existing platforms rather than creating new ones.

5.2.2 The individual

Use credible workers

Some of the measures described in this report show the importance of using workers with credibility among participants. This is the case for Solas Foundation programme workers: the two main teachers offering courses on the fundamentals of Islam and its relevance in a Western society have recognized theological training and life experience similar to that of their participants. They were both born and raised in Scotland, as Muslims, and have therefore managed to reconcile Islam with life in Scotland.

The *STREET* project in London also enlists workers who have life experience "on the street" and in the community, as well as detailed knowledge of Islam. They therefore have more credibility among young people.

The many programmes for radical right disengagement also frequently enlist the services of former neo-Nazis or extremist group members, who are thus able to understand the problems encountered by people trying to leave an extremist group or movement. This is the case of the network "Against Violent Extremism," a group of former right-wing extremists and gang members, which was involved in YouTube's "Trusted Flaggers" programme.

Use a personalized approach

Every individual who becomes radicalized embarks on a unique process specific to that particular individual (individual factors) and situation (opportunity factors).

Dounia Bouzar, a French anthropologist who leads the *Centre de prévention contre les dérives sectaires liées à l'islam* [centre for the prevention of sectarian derivatives linked to Islam] in France has observed the uniqueness of the radicalization process undergone by each young person. She has worked with many youth recruited by radical Islamists. Experience has taught her that a single approach cannot apply to the deradicalization issue (or even to radicalization prevention more

generally), given that each individual engages in a radicalization process specific to his or her circumstances and self (Bouzar, 2015). As she underscores:

> [translation] Individualization of the "jihadisation" motif demands an individualized exit process: the young person who signs up thinking he is going to save Syrians from the dictatorship of Bachar al-Assad, and who escapes because he ends up enrolled in Daesh massacres in Iraq cannot be understood in the same light as someone who supported the Daesh ideology and argued in favour of terrorism for months on his Facebook account. (2015, p. 36)

Other authors (Bjørgo, 2013; Ramalingam, 2014) share Bouzar's thinking and contend that given the individualized nature of the radicalization process, prevention and rehabilitation approaches must follow suit.

Ramalingam (2014) also suggests that the best time to work with a person is when they are actually considering joining or leaving an extremist movement. To disengage and/or deradicalize from right-wing extremists, for example, the author mentions that it might be effective to intervene after a violent incident perpetrated by a radical right group. In terms of prison intervention, inmates who are about to be released and who are therefore likely thinking about their future are also worthy candidates. It is usually best to focus on the individual's future, not his past, and to identify his objectives and ambitions and help him develop a plan to achieve them.

Overall, the important thing is to follow a personalized approach that takes account of the individual's path and specific situation.

Avoid re-indoctrination

This recommendation was made by Lankford and Gillespie (2011) following their evaluation of Saudi Arabia's terrorist rehabilitation programme. The authors underscore that rewarding conformity, in the same manner as terrorist organizations, can produce short-term changes in participants but ultimately compromises a more lasting transformation. In their opinion, programmes should try to immunize participation against all forms of indoctrination by developing their ability to think independently, to distrust group thinking and to challenge group assumptions. This approach goes hand in hand with recommendations concerning the rehabilitation of criminals which suggest that programmes emphasizing self-determination, freedom, autonomy and personal growth will have a positive and much more lasting impact on participants (Day & Ward, 2010). Along the same lines, Kundnani (2009) encourages governments to refrain from promoting specific interpretations of Islam. Government intervention addressing the beliefs of religious communities could elicit strong resistance.

Re-humanize the "enemy"

Re-humanizing people who were essentially seen as enemies by former terrorists, such as Americans and Jews in the case of Islamist terrorists, is the second recommendation by Lankford and Gillespie (2011). It relates to the more general framework of *restorative justice*, an increasingly frequent initiative applied around the world that seems to help reduce recidivism (Ward &

Langlands, 2009). To do so, participants are placed in contact with persons seen as "enemies" by their former extremist or terrorist group in order to elicit empathy and counteract the effects of dehumanizing extremist propaganda (Lankford & Gillespie, 2011). Hungary's Artemisszio Foundation has developed activities in which youth from various ethnic backgrounds are placed in teams to work cooperatively. The goal of these activities is to encourage communication and interaction among youth from different social, economic and ethnic backgrounds to fight prejudice and discrimination (Ramalingam, 2014).

Establish comprehensive programmes

Comprehensive programmes that address different aspects of the radicalization process have proven more effective (such as rehabilitation programmes in Saudi Arabia and Singapore). Rabasa and colleagues (2010) identified the factors required for effective programmes: they must be thorough, comprehensive, address the **affective, ideological and pragmatic factors** that bind a radical to an extremist organization, and continue to offer **support** to rehabilitated extremists after the programme ends.

- **Ideological factors**. Many deradicalization programmes try to discredit the extremist ideology through theological dialogue. To do so, they must enlist a credible individual whose authority is respected by the participants. This respect may relate to the person's formal theological training, experience as a seasoned militant or personal religious experience. The purpose of these dialogues is to help participants gain a deeper and more refined understanding of the religion.
- **Affective factors**. It is important that a programme not address radical ideology alone. Someone who takes part in an extremist organization usually develops ties with other persons in the organization. Unless these ties are broken, the person is unlikely to permanently withdraw from the organization and build a new life. It is therefore vital that the programme offer alternative ways to meet his or her psychological and material needs to end the dependency on other members of the extremist organization. This means providing the participant with emotional support and assistance in finding peers opposed to radicalism.
- **Pragmatic factors.** Many radical organizations provide services to meet the basic needs of their members and families; it is therefore important to ensure that deradicalization programmes not only assist participants, but also their families, in finding alternative sources of income, housing, education, etc.
- Lastly, programmes must offer organized aftercare services to participants who completed the programme by providing them with **continuous support**. In this way, they can assist the reintegration of such individuals into society and limit the likelihood of recidivism. In short, as Rabasa et al. underscore: "Countering the radical Islamist ideology is necessary but not sufficient to produce permanently rehabilitated ex-radicals." (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 43)

General recommendations concerning individual intervention

Use moderate, non-combative language. As mentioned by Ramalingam (2014), it is important that the approach used during interventions is non-judgemental and free of labels about individuals ("extremists," "radicals," etc.) or their ideas ("mistaken," "false").

Demystification is much more effective when it is **learned by experience**. Experience and the development of relationships and friendships during intervention have a much longer lasting impact than mere statements of fact alone.

Peer-based learning is another preferred approach with long-term effects.

5.2.3   The relational environment

Provide support to workers

Support for workers fighting radicalization and violent extremism is strongly recommended. Dealing with difficult situations on a daily basis demands considerable support and workers must ensure that their work does not have a negative impact on their health and well-being. In the offices of Finland's Aggredi program, for example, a room is reserved for workers who need a break; their work consists of deterring violent criminals from resorting to violence again (Ramalingam, 2014).

5.2.4   The community environment

Coordinate action locally

As underscored by Bjørgo (2002), comprehensive and coordinated policies and measures will be more successful than isolated approaches pulling in different directions. It is therefore important that local level stakeholders, such as police, social services, schools, social workers and non-governmental organizations, agree on the objectives to be met in fighting radicalization and violent extremism, and that they collaborate accordingly. Furthermore, comprehensive approaches are more effective in countering radicalization or in rehabilitating radicalized individuals. An intervention that targets several levels will necessarily involve participation by various stakeholders and a need to ensure coordination among them to foster a successful outcome

Engage the community

In an approach similar to coordinating action locally, it is important to engage the various community stakeholders to ensure that an intervention is effective.

For his doctoral thesis, Southers (2013) examined homegrown violent extremism. Based on his research and observations, he developed a community intervention model that he named the "*Mosaic of Engagement.*" According to Southers, families and communities in which violent extremists grow up and live can help reduce the risk of a future terrorist act. For that reason, his intervention model includes all community partners and places them on an even footing.

The main objectives of the mosaic of engagement is to define and contain radicalization and violent extremism and to reduce the risks to local and national security. As he underscores, "Efforts to reduce the risk of HVE are best accomplished when incorporated into the public safety framework,

employing existing programmes that address crime and violence while safeguarding children and the overall community." (Southers, 2013, p. 192).

Ongoing community engagement in a radicalization prevention programme offers two critical advantages: it identifies the issues that the programme must tackle, and it ensures continuous feedback allowing for gradual improvements to strategy as problems and weaknesses come to light (Southers, 2013).

The *STREET* programme in the United Kingdom showed the importance of engaging the community in the radicalization prevention process. Workers from the community itself were better able to understand the needs of the youth around them and adapt to local realities.

Adapt to the local reality
According to El-Said (2015), programmes to fight radicalization and violent extremism must adapt to local realities, i.e., the political, legal, cultural, historical and social tradition of each country. He notes, for example, that some countries have tried to recreate the Saudi Arabian model of deradicalization but with poor results because the model does not suit their local reality. In short, he considers it counterproductive to import programmes from other countries and establish them without considering the national context (El-Said, 2015).

5.2.5   The societal environment

It is also recommended that general counter-radicalization strategies be more holistic. For Bjørgo (2002), the fight against radicalization and violent extremism requires a more comprehensive approach that can refer to five key measures:

- **Control measures**: This may involve improving laws against racism and hate crimes and ensuring that these laws are more effectively enforced;
- **Victim support**: It is important that victims of acts of violence, extremism or terrorism receive the support and care they need. They must also receive assistance to bring complaints as needed;
- **Awareness of intolerance and racist and xenophobic violence**: According to Bjørgo, it is important to disseminate information through campaigns, gatherings, declarations and public demonstrations;
- **Work on structural causes** of radicalization and extremism: Marginalization, discrimination and unemployment, all factors that generate political and social grievances;
- **The size and activities of racist and extremist groups**: In other words, prevent radicalization and encourage the rehabilitation of radical and extremist individuals. The ultimate objective is to restrict recruitment by extremist groups, increase disengagement from these groups and eventually have them disband and cease their activities.

Consider the effects of foreign policy
As mentioned earlier, the foreign policy of many Western countries has been identified as a major factor—if not a trigger—of engagement in a radicalization process. Examples include the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and support for Israel by many Western governments that soon

triggered dissatisfaction and indignation in many quarters, fostering feelings of resentment toward Western society as a whole (Precht, 2007).

Respect and treat Muslim communities equally

As mentioned in the section on counter-radicalization policy issues, one of the most problematic issues to arise from counter-radicalization measures over the years has been the creation of suspect communities, more specifically, Muslim communities. Some researchers consider them the targets of greater surveillance and discrimination (Awan, 2012; House of Commons UK, 2010; Kosseim, 2011; Kundnani, 2012; Ragazzi, 2014), especially under the United Kingdom's *Prevent* policy.

Precht (2007) underscores how important it is for governments to cooperate with Muslim communities, not by differentiating them based on their religious identity or as a group at risk but by treating them as equal citizens. This is the only way to nurture a sense of belonging and shared values.

Singapore is a good example in this regard. As soon as its deradicalization and Islamist counter-radicalization programmes were implemented, the Singapore government positioned violent extremism as a national problem, not as a threat originating in a specific community. From the start, the focus of the problem to be overcome centred on defeating ideologies that fuelled intolerance and violence, regardless of any religious or ethnic affiliation (El-Said, 2015). This made it easier to establish trust between the government and the country's Muslim minority, which took action like any other community, without necessarily feeling targeted or perceived as the source of Islamist extremism (El-Said, 2015).

Precht (2007) also points out that "the" Muslim community, often presented as a seamless whole, is an illusion; there is no unified group rallying behind a single representative or viewpoint. The diversity that exists within Muslim communities must be considered, and an effort made to reach under-represented elements (as elsewhere in society), such as women and young people.

Fighting discrimination by promoting diversity

Another recommendation suggested by Precht (2007) is to increase the representation of ethnic diversity in Western societies. For example, it is important not only to identify models for youth engaged in school activities; models arising from cultural and ethnic diversity in other segments of society must also be promoted to show that social mobility and success are not privileges reserved for white people from the West. For example, greater representation of a variety of ethnic groups in public advertising and posters would send a strong message that cultural and ethnic diversity are part and parcel of society (Precht, 2007).

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A.1   Appendix 1. Methodology

Phase 1 of this study consisted of a review and analysis of the scientific and grey literature, of national and international standards and legislation, and of international programmes or promising practices related to radicalization leading to violence.

To achieve this objective, we conducted two systematic reviews of the relevant literature, using various keywords.

a) The first review concerned literature that contextualized the phenomenon, exclusively in Western countries, such as trends, radicalization and recruitment contexts, determining factors in the process, and explanatory models and radicalization trajectories.

b) The second review directly addressed strategies, programmes and projects for preventing radicalization leading to violence. In this case, given the limited number of studies on this specific topic, we considered all studies regardless of the country of origin.

Although studies based on evidentiary data and primary sources constitute the core of this review, given their limited number and insufficient quality (see Box 4) we also considered articles relating to discussion and theoretical and general conceptual thinking on the topic, particularly from other literature reviews or documents based on secondary sources. This enabled us to enrich and contextualize the information gathered from this review.

We initially found 40,373 documents during the first review and 45,231 during the second. After analyzing the titles, we selected 3,601 documents (excluding duplicates). We finally settled on 483 documents considered relevant to our report, including 291 pertaining exclusively to the first review, and 11 to the second; 92 documents addressed the topic of the radical right.

A.1.1   Research questions

- How is radicalization understood, defined and framed internationally, and are there any trends concerning types of radicalization?

- How is radicalization explained? What are the major risk factors underlying the process? What are the primary models used to explain the topic?

- What radicalization pathways are taken by individuals, and by groups?

- What contexts facilitate the radicalization process? What role is played by new technologies, including online websites sites, chat rooms, forums, games, multimedia messaging (photos, videos and audio) and social media?

- What international norms and standards guide the development of responses to radicalization, including prevention?

- What are the respective roles of national, sub-regional and local governments in developing strategic responses and programmes?

- What types of prevention programmes and practices have been developed and to what extent are they participatory? For example, school programmes; sports, culture and the arts; leadership skills and civil engagement; Internet and social media initiatives; community and inter-faith dialogue.

- How are at-risk populations identified and are their rights respected? Are initiatives appropriately adapted to the various groups, to women and to men?

A.1.2 Research strategy

Review period and languages: We limited our research for both reviews to the period from January 1, 2005, to June 1, 2015, and to articles in French or English. However, in some cases where an article was clearly important (by allowing us a better understanding of an aspect of the phenomenon), we used specific sources dated prior to 2005 or after June 2015.

Documents gathered: Articles from scientific journals, chapters of books, government reports and documents, conference presentations, others (dissertation, unpublished work, etc.).

Search engines: The following *search engines* were used for scientific articles:
- *ProQuest*
  - Selected databases: *IBSS, ProQuest Sociology, Social Services Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts*;
- *JSTOR*
  - Selected disciplines: *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, *Middle East Studies*, *Peace & Conflict Studies*, *Political Science* and *Sociology*;
- *Psychological Information* (PsychInfo);
- *National Criminal Justice Reference Service* (NCJRS);
- *Google Scholar*: In particular, to gather grey literature and thus add to our data collection, we limited the quantity of results generated by selecting only PDF-type files, while also ensuring that the keywords appeared in the titles of our results;
- Additional research on programmes was required given the limited number of articles on the topic found in the literature review. This research led to the retrieval of government action plans, academic articles containing programme evaluations, etc. These documents were selected on the basis of missing information about the various programmes.

Keywords:

For the *first review* we used the following keywords[41]

*radicali?a?ion

Radicalism*

Radicali* + religio*

Radicali* + right-wing

Radicali* + far-right

Extremis*

right-wing + extremis*

far-right* + extremis*

Jihad*

Jihad* + violence

radicali + violence

Jihad* + *radicali*

Jihad* + Homegrown

Homegrown + terror*

Homegrown + *radicali*

Neo-nazi + *radicali*

For the *second review*:

Program + *radicali*

Program + terroris*

Program + extremis*

Prevent + *radicali*

Prevent* + terroris*

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[41] By adding a "*" or a "?" before or after the keyword we were able to search according to root words and thus include terms like "*de*radicalization."

Prevent* + extremis*

Prevent* + right-wing

Prevent* + far-right

Treat* + *radicali*

Treat* + terroris*

Treat* + extremis*

Treat* + right-wing

Treat* + far-right

Intervent* + *radicali*

Intervent* + terroris*

Intervent* + extremis*

Intervent* + right-wing

Intervent* + far-right

We removed the keywords *fundamentalism and anarch** to limit our research. We also added the keyword *far-right*, a term that often appeared in connection with far-right extremism.

A.1.3   Procedure

The phases of the review were as follows:

a) Initial keyword search;
b) Items excluded based on a title analysis;
c) Removal of duplicates (Zotero);
d) Items excluded based on a summary analysis;
e) Inaccessible tests excluded;
f) Items excluded following a text analysis;
g) Texts for analysis.

We organized the results into a table similar to the one below, entitled "Review Process."

"Review Process" Table

	ProQuest (IBSS, ProQuest Sociology, Social Services Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts)	JSTOR (Criminology & Criminal Justice; Middle East Studies; Peace & Conflict Studies; Social Sciences; Sociology)	PsychInfo	NCJRS	Google Scholar
Texts found	N =	N =	N =	N =	N =
Excluded after a title analysis	N =	N =	N =	N =	N =
Removal of duplicates (Zotero)			N =		
Excluded after a summary analysis			N =		
Inaccessible texts excluded			N =		
Excluded after text analysis			N =		
Texts for analysis			N =		

Texts were selected for analysis as follows:

a) *Initial keyword search*. First we indicated, in the table, the number of articles found per search engine for a series of keywords over a given period of time (*first selection*).

b) *Items excluded based on a title analysis*. We analyzed (directly on the website of the search engine) the **titles** of articles found and selected those that seemed most relevant to our research. In this way, we ended up with a *second selection*, and we entered the number of articles in this second selection in the table.

c) ***Removal of duplicates (Zotero)***. Based on the search engine, we exported references into a RIS file and then, using the Zotero software, we were able to identify and exclude duplicates.

d) ***Items excluded based on a summary analysis***. Once duplicates were removed, we created a report containing the abstracts of all the selected articles. Using these abstracts, we excluded articles that were not relevant to our research.

Based on the analysis of abstracts and research questions, we created a table for sorting the documents gathered based on twenty-two variables pertaining to the article's relevance and the themes covered. This table enabled us to easily retrieve relevant information at each stage of the analysis and to write the mid-term report.

h) ***Inaccessible texts excluded***. A significant number of inaccessible texts were books; as a result, the review is essentially based on scientific articles available online.

i) ***Items excluded after text analysis***. Sometimes a text that seemed relevant based on a review of the abstracts was less relevant than expected after it was examined as a whole. As a result, certain articles were excluded from the review.

A.2 Appendix 2. Legislative measures[42]

Table 2. Summary of counter-radicalization legislative measures in English

Country	Curtailment of Association	Curtailment of Mobility	Curtailment of Expression	Information Sharing	Supportive Intervention	Surveillance	Search	Curtailment of Access to Funds	Curtailment of Livelihood	Curtailment of Access to Weapons
Canada										
Security of Canada Information Sharing Act (2015) ****implements the Secure Air Travel Act**		**s. 9 (1) of the *Secure Air Travel Act*** – The Minister may direct an air carrier to deny transportation to a person		**s. 3** The purpose of *Security of Canada Information Sharing Act* is to encourage and facilitate the sharing of information among Government of Canada institutions in order to protect Canada against activities that undermine the security of Canada **s. 5(1)** Disclosure of Information Government of Canada may disclose information in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada **s. 8** – the *Excise Act* is amended to allow an official to provide confidential information if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the information would be relevant to the investigation of a threat to the security of Canada or whether a terrorism offence has been committed		**s. 8(1) of the *Secure Air Travel Act*** - The Minister may establish a list of any person who the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe will engage or attempt to engage in an act that would threaten transportation security or travel by air for the purpose of committing an act or omission that would be considered a terrorism offence	**s. 9(1)(b) of the *Secure Air Travel Act*** – The Minister may direct an air carrier to screen a person before they enter a sterile area of an airport or board an aircraft **s. 28(1) of the Secure Air Travel Act** – the Minister may enter any place, for verification of compliance with the Act (b) remove any document or other thing from the place where the inspection			

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[42] This chart was developed by Alexandra Frederick of the Dentons Canada LLP law firm and was used to draft the section on legislative measures (see Box 15, page 70).

| | | | | s.10 of the *Secure Air Travel Act* –The Minister of Transport, Minister of Citizenship and immigration, RCMP, CSIS, CBSA and others nay collect information and disclose information to and from each other

s. 12 of the *Secure Air Travel Act* – the Minister may enter into a written arrangement relating to the disclosure of information with the government of a foreign state, government institution or international organization

s.13 of the *Secure Air Travel Act* the Minister of Transport may disclose the List to air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems

s.14 of the *Secure Air Travel Act* the CBSA may disclose to the Minister any information in respect of a listed person that is collected from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems | | or audit is being carried out | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Criminal Code of Canada R.S.C, 1985, c.C-46 *(amended pursuant to Security of Canada Information Sharing Act)*		**s. 83.3(4)** – a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant and cause them to be detained in custody if the peace officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the detention of the person in custody is likely to prevent a terrorist activity **s.83.3(11.1)** The Judge shall consider to include in the recognizance a condition that the person deposit any passport or other travel document issued in their name that is in their possession or control **s. 83.3(11.2)** the Judge shall consider to include in the recognizance a condition that the person remain within a specified geographic area unless written permission to leave is obtained	**s. 320 .1** allows the courts to order the deletion of publicly available on-line hate propaganda from computer systems when it is stored on a server that is within the jurisdiction of the court **s.83.221(1)** of the Criminal Code – every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general while knowing that any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable for imprisonment for a term of not more than five years **s.83.223(1)** - if there is terrorist propaganda available to the public through a computer system within the court's jurisdiction, the judge may order the computer system's custodian to ensure that the material is no longer stored on and made available through the computer system and provide the information that is necessary to identify and locate the person who posted the material	**s.810.011(1)** A person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person may commit a terrorism offence may, with the AG's consent, lay information before a provincial court judge		**s.810.011(3)** if the provincial court judge adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for the fear, a judge may order the defendant to enter into recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour	**s. 83.222(1)** A Judge may issue a warrant authorizing seizure of copies of terrorist propaganda			**s. 810.011(7)** The provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable, in the interests of the defendant's safety or that of any other person, to prohibit the defendant from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all of those things. If the judge decides that it is desirable to do so, the judge shall add that condition to the recognizance and specify the period during which it applies.

Country	Curtailment of Association	Curtailment of Mobility	Curtailment of Expression	Information Sharing	Supportive Intervention	Surveillance	Search	Curtailment of Access to Funds	Curtailment of Livelihood	Curtailment of Access to Weapons
France										
Law No. 2014-1353 of November 13, 2014 strengthening provisions to counter terrorism		**Article 1** Prohibited from leaving the country **Article 3** Residency requirement with condition not to associate with specific named individuals	**Article 5** Strengthening of repressive provisions **Article 12** Administrative blocking of Internet websites advocating terrorism							
Anti-Terrorism Bill 2015						**Article 2 –** Strengthened control for the CNCTR in terms of provisions that require, for the sole purpose of terrorism prevention, telephone operators and Internet providers to implement an algorithm-based system for processing the information and documents on their networks: prior notice to identify persons involved, permanent access to the system, and information on any changes in the algorithm on which it is based (amendments of the rapporteur). **Article 6 –** Requirement for cryptology service providers to provide "without delay" intelligence service officers with the encryption keys for data transformed via services they provided (amendment of the rapporteur). **Article 9 –** Requirement for ground transit operators providing international service to				

	Curtailment of Association	Curtailment of Mobility	Curtailment of Expression	Information Sharing	Supportive Intervention	Surveillance	Search	Curtailment of Access to Funds	Curtailment of Livelihood	Curtailment of Access to Weapons
				collect the identity of passengers carried and keep the information for one year.						
French Penal Code	**Article 421-5** Direction and organization of a criminal association for the purpose of preparing terrorist acts; **Article 434-6** Prohibits the harbouring of individuals suspected of terrorism or wanted In connection with terrorist offences **Article 113-13** French nationals or individuals habitually resident in France who go abroad in order inter alia attend terrorist training camps, even though no misdeed has been committed on French territory.	**Article 421-2-1** Pre-charge Detention for Terrorism Offences **Article 421-2-1** Participation in any group or association with a view to the preparation, marked by one or more material actions shall in addition be an act of terrorism **Article 706-88** For all terrorist offences, police custody may be extended to 96 hours **Article 706-88** Police custody may be extended to six days if there is a serious danger that acts of terrorism imminent in France or abroad				**Article 705-95** Phone tapping of terrorists **Article 706-102-1-706-102-9** Access to electronic data in real time **Article 706-25-2** Individuals suspected of glorification of terrorism and incitement to terrorism may use under cover methods to extract, acquire or save elements of proof and data concerning identity **Article 706-80** Surveillance of person suspected of committing terrorist act	**Article 76** – searches and seizures without the agreement of the individual concerned **Article 78-2-2** Vehicle Inspections	**Article 421-2-2** Financing of a terrorist organization is considered an act of terrorism		
Code Civil		**Article 25 –** Individuals convicted of a terrorist offence can be stripped of their citizenship.								

Country	Curtailment of Association	Curtailment of Mobility	Curtailment of Expression	Information Sharing	Supportive Intervention	Surveillance	Search	Curtailment of Access to Funds	Curtailment of Livelihood	Curtailment of Access to Weapons
Norway										
General Civil Penal Code,	**Article 147(d)**			Norway is a party to EU border control data sharing arrangements. In 2013, Norwegian immigration				**Section 147(b)** Any person who obtains or collects funds or other assets with the intention that such assets should be		

| | | | | authorities began using biometric equipment for the fingerprinting of arrivals from outside the Schengen area. | | | | used...to finance terrorist acts...shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years. Norway also enforces Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards. | | |

Act of 22 May 1902	Anyone who "who form, participate in, recruit members, or provide economic or material support to a terrorist organization is subject to a term of imprisonment.									

Country	Curtailment of Association	Curtailment of Mobility	Curtailment of Expression	Information Sharing	Supportive Intervention	Surveillance	Search	Curtailment of Access to Funds	Curtailment of Livelihood	Curtailment of Access to Weapons
United Kingdom										
Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010				**Reporting obligations of relevant institutions** s.19 **General power to disclose information** s.23				**Freezing of funds and economic resources of designated persons** s.11 **Making funds or financial services available to designated persons** s.12 **Making funds or financial services available for benefit of designated person** s.13 **Making economic resources available to designated person** s.14 **Making economic resources available for benefit of designated person** s.15 **Powers to request information** s.20		
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011	**Association Measure** s.8(1)-(3)	**Overnight Residence Measure** s.1 (1) – (11) **Travel Measure** s.2(1)-(3) **Exclusion Measure**				**Reporting Measure** s.10(1) –(2) **Appointments Measure** s.10A(1)-(2)	*Schedule 5 – Power of Entry, Search, Seizure and Retention* **Search of premises on Suspicion of Absconding** s.7(1)-(4)	*Schedule 1 – Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures* **Financial Services Measure** s. 5(1) –(8) **Property Measure**	**Work or Studies Measure** s.9(1)-(3)	*Schedule 1 – Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures*

		s.3(1) - (2) **Movement Directions Measure** s.4(1)-(3)				**Photography Measure** s.11 **Monitoring Measure** s.12(1)-(3) *Schedule 6- Fingerprints and Samples* **Taking of fingerprints and samples: England, Wales and Northern Ireland** s.1(1)-4(7)	**Search for Compliance Purposes** s.8(1)-10(16) **Search of Individual for Public Safety Purposes** s.10(1)-(3) **Power to Retain Items** s.11(1) -12(4)	s.6(1)-(5)		**Weapons and Explosives Measure** s.6A(1)-(3)
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015)		**Seizure of Passports** s. 1(1) **Temporary Exclusion Orders** s. 2(1)-(8)		**Monitoring of Performance: Further and Higher Education Bodies** s.32(1) –(9)	**Assessment and support: Local panels** s. 36(1)-(8)					

Country	Curtailment of Association	Curtailment of Mobility	Curtailment of Expression	Information Sharing	Supportive Intervention	Surveillance	Search	Curtailment of Access to Funds	Curtailment of Livelihood	Curtailment of Access to Weapons
United States of America										
U.S.A Patriot Act 2001	**Prohibition against harboring terrorists** s.803	**Mandatory Detention of suspected terrorists; habeus corpus; judicial review** s. 412		**Authority to share criminal investigative information** s.203 **Expansion of regional information sharing**		**Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications relating to terrorism** s. 201	**Seizure of voicemail messages pursuant to warrants** s.209 **Emergency Disclosure of electronic communications to protect life and limb**			

					system to facilitate Federal-State-local law enforcement response related to terrorist attacks s.701		**Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications relating to computer fraud and abuse offences** s.202 **Roving surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act** s.206 **Pen register and trap and trace authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act** s.214 **Access to records and other items under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act** s.215 *(Please note that technically this legislation has expired and will be replaced by the U.S.A Freedom Act but will still be in effect for six months)* **Foreign student monitoring program** s.416 **Post-release supervision of terrorists** s.812	s.212 **Authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant** s.213 **Single Jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism** s.219 **Nationwide service of search warrants for terrorism** s.219 **Access by the State Department and the INS to certain identifying information in the criminal history records of visa applicants and applicants for admission to the United States** s.403 **DNA identification of terrorists and other violent offenders** s.503			

Country	Curtailment of Association	Curtailment of Mobility	Curtailment of Expression	Information Sharing	Supportive Intervention	Surveillance	Search	Curtailment of Access to Funds	Curtailment of Livelihood	Curtailment of Access to Weapons
Spain										

Country	Curtailment of Association	Curtailment of Mobility	Curtailment of Expression	Information Sharing	Supportive Intervention	Surveillance	Search	Curtailment of Access to Funds	Curtailment of Livelihood	Curtailment of Access to Weapons
	Political Parties Act No. 6/2002 (*Ley Organica de Partidos Politicos*) allows the government to dissolve any political parties which undermine individual freedom or disable the democratic system.	**Articles 17 (2) and 55 (2), and Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 520 and 520 bis**. Suspect of terrorism may be held for 72 hours incommunicado. A judicial body may impose 48 more hours. Represented by duty solicitor. Spanish Constitution,	**Article 578** of Criminal Code: "Apologism or justification by means of public expression or diffusion of the felonies included in **Articles 571 to 577** of this Code, or of anybody who has participated in commission thereof, or in perpetrating acts that involve discredit, disdain or humiliation of the victims of terrorist offences or their relatives shall be punished with a sentence of imprisonment from one to two years."	**Article 18.**4 of the Constitution provides: "The law shall restrict use of data processing in order to guarantee honour and the personal and family privacy of citizens and the full exercise of their rights."		**Article 18.3** of the Constitution of the Constitution provides that "Secrecy of communications is guaranteed, particularly regarding postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications, except in the event of a court order." Gvt may pass laws to suspend this right for specific persons in connection with investigations of the activities of armed bands of terrorist groups under Art 55.	**Article 18.2** of the Constitution provides that "No search of entry may be made without the consent of the householder or a legal warrant". Gvt may pass laws to suspend this right for specific persons in connection with investigations of the activities of armed bands of terrorist groups under **Article 55**.	**Article 576.1** of Criminal Code: "Whoever … provides or collects funds … to commit [terrorism] or to deliver them to a terrorist organisation or group, shall be punished with prison sentences of five to ten years and a fine of eighteen to twenty- four months. Should the funds eventually be used to execute specific acts of terrorism, this shall be punished as co-perpetration or complicity, as appropriate, provided this involves a higher penalty." **Article 127.1 of Criminal Code**: the state may seize all assets within the setting of a terrorist organization.	**Article 579** of Criminal Code bars those convicted of from public employment and office for time of imprisonment + 6-20 years.	**Article 573** of Criminal Code: supplying, manufacturing, trafficking ammunition is punishable with imprisonment of 6-10 years if committed by a member of a terrorist organization.
European Union										
				Council Decision 2010/412/EU – Provides for the transfer of (1) financial payment messages that refer to financial transfers and related data, which are stored in the EU by international financial payment messaging service providers to the U.S. Treasury Department; and (2) relevant information acquired from the U.S Treasury Department's Terrorist Finance Tracking				**Directive 2015/849 of the EU** Parliament on the Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing **Regulation 2015/847** on information accompanying transfers of funds **Directive 2014/42/EU** on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union		**Regulation 98/2013** on the marketing and use of explosive precursors

| | | | | Program to EU countries' law enforcement, public security or counter terrorism authorities
Regulation 603/2013 on the establishment of Eurodac | | | | **Regulation 596/2013** imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al-Qaida network | | |

This chart was developed by Alexandra Frederick of the Dentons Canada LLP law firm and was used to draft the section on legislative measures (see Box 15, page 70).

Note 1: The European Union Section of the Table only references Directives and Regulations as they are the only binding elements of EU law on member states.

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